

1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
2 Food and Drug Administration

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9 **Nonprescription Drug Product with an Additional**
10 **Condition for Nonprescription Use**

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16 Docket No. FDA- [2021-N-0862]

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22 **Final Regulatory Impact Analysis**
23 **Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis**
24 **Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Analysis**

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32 **Economics Staff**
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35 **Office of the Commissioner**
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94 **Executive Summary**

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96 The final rule establishes requirements for a nonprescription drug product with an
97 additional condition for nonprescription use (ACNU). Compared to traditional nonprescription
98 drug products, which consumers must be able to self-select and use based on their labeling, this
99 approved ACNU, in addition to the labeling, will ensure the appropriate self-selection, the
100 appropriate use, or both of a nonprescription drug product without the supervision of a
101 practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug. We expect this rule will increase options
102 for applicants to develop and market safe and effective nonprescription drug products and will
103 increase consumer access to appropriate, safe and effective drug products.

104 We estimate a reduction in access costs to consumers who could transfer from a
105 prescription to a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU. Our primary estimate for this
106 item is \$33.62 per consumer per purchase with a range of \$0 to \$67.23. We also quantify the
107 value of the potential reduction in the number of meetings with applicants that will occur during
108 the approval process. This estimate includes benefits to us and industry. Our primary estimate is
109 \$68,773.11 per applicant with a range of \$56,332.65 to \$81,763.56. We do not aggregate our
110 estimates of benefits because of the high uncertainty about the number of applicants,
111 applications, potential approvals, and purchases that might occur; and consumer preferences to
112 switch drug products. However, we present estimates in the uncertainty section of this analysis.

113 Although an applicant will incur the costs to develop and submit an application for a
114 nonprescription drug product with an ACNU, for this analysis, we assume that applicants submit
115 applications only when they believe that the profits from the approval will exceed the costs of the
116 application. We lack information to monetize these potential profits and costs.

117 Monetized costs include a one-time cost of reading and understanding the rule per
118 interested party in pursuing this path for their drug products. We do not aggregate these estimates
119 for more than one interested party because of the high uncertainty about the number of interested
120 parties over this time horizon. The primary estimate equals \$1,156.74 with a range of \$533.88 to
121 \$1,779.60.

122 Government-sponsored and commercial insurance payers may experience cost savings
123 because the availability of nonprescription drug products with an ACNU may decrease insurance
124 claims and, potentially, future medical costs. For example, access to drug products under this
125 new pathway will allow consumers to treat some medical conditions using nonprescription drug
126 products with an ACNU without the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer
127 such drugs. We do not estimate such cost savings due to lack of data.

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I. Introduction and Summary

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A. Introduction

131 We have examined the impacts of the final rule under Executive Order 12866, Executive
132 Order 13563, Executive Order 14094, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), the
133 Congressional Review Act/Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 801,
134 Pub. L. 104-121), and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4).

135 Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14094 direct us to assess all benefits, costs, and
136 transfers of available regulatory alternatives and, when regulation is necessary, to select
137 regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental,
138 public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity). OIRA has
139 determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866
140 Section 3(f)(1).

141 Because this rule is not likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of \$100
142 million or more or meets other criteria specified in the Congressional Review Act/Small
143 Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, OIRA has determined that this rule does not fall
144 within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

145 The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires us to analyze regulatory options that would
146 minimize any significant impact of a rule on small entities. This rule would establish the
147 requirements for a nonprescription drug product with an additional condition of nonprescription
148 use (ACNU). We cannot anticipate the number of applicants that would submit applications or
149 the types of drug products that would be covered under such applications. However, we estimate
150 the costs for any applicant to read and understand the rule would likely range between 0.04
151 percent and 0.12 percent of the gross receipts of very small applicants. Therefore, we certify that
152 the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
153 entities.

154 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (section 202(a)) requires us to prepare a
155 written statement, which includes estimates of anticipated impacts, before issuing “any rule that
156 includes any Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
157 governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of \$100,000,000 or more (adjusted
158 annually for inflation) in any one year.” The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is
159 \$183 million, using the most current (2023) Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic
160 Product. This final rule will not result in an expenditure in any year that meets or exceeds this
161 amount.

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B. Overview of Benefits, Costs, and Transfers

The final rule establishes requirements for a nonprescription drug product with an additional condition for nonprescription use (ACNU). Compared to traditional nonprescription drug products, which consumers must be able to self-select and use based on their labeling, this approved ACNU, in addition to the labeling, will ensure the appropriate self-selection, the appropriate use, or both of a nonprescription drug product without the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug. We expect this rule will expand consumer access to certain drug products in a nonprescription setting and increase options for applicants to develop and market safe and effective nonprescription drug products.

Table 1 shows our quantified benefits. We estimate a reduction in access costs to consumers who could transfer from a prescription to a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU. Our primary estimate for this item is \$33.62 per consumer per purchase with a range of \$0 to \$67.23. We also quantify the value of the potential reduction in the number of repetitive meetings with applicants that will occur during the approval process. This estimate includes benefits to FDA and industry. Our primary estimate is \$68,773.11 per applicant with a range of \$56,332.65 to \$81,763.56. We do not aggregate our estimates of benefits because of the high uncertainty about the number of applicants, applications, potential approvals, and purchases that might occur; and consumer preferences to switch products. However, we present estimates in the uncertainty section of this analysis. In addition, although commercial and government-sponsored drug coverage plans will likely experience cost savings if their cost of coverage declines or if future medical costs decline, we do not estimate such cost savings due to lack of data.

Although an applicant will incur the costs to develop and apply for a nonprescription drug with an ACNU, for this analysis, we assume that applicants submit applications only when

185 they believe that the profits from the approval will exceed the costs of the application. We lack
 186 information to monetize these potential profits and costs.

187 Monetized costs include a one-time cost of reading and understanding the rule per
 188 interested party in pursuing this path for their drug products. We do not aggregate these estimates
 189 for more than one interested party because of the high uncertainty about the number of interested
 190 parties over this time horizon. The primary estimate equals \$1,156.74 with a range of \$533.88 to
 191 \$1,779.60.

192 Government and commercial insurance payers may experience cost savings because the
 193 availability of nonprescription drug products with an ACNU may decrease the number of
 194 submitted insurance claims and, potentially, future medical costs. For example, access to drug
 195 products under this new pathway will allow consumers to treat medical conditions using
 196 nonprescription drug products with an ACNU without the supervision of a practitioner licensed
 197 by law to administer such drugs.

198 Table 1. Summary of Benefits, Costs and Distributional Effects of the Final Rule (\$ millions
 199 2023)

Category		Primary Estimate	Low Estimate	High Estimate	Units			Notes
					Year Dollars	Discount Rate	Period Covered	
Benefits	Annualized Monetized (\$m/year)							
	Annualized Quantified				2023			Quantified reduction in access costs per consumer purchase range from \$0.0 to \$67.23, and a primary estimate of \$33.62
					2023			Quantified reduction in meetings between FDA and applicants

Category		Primary Estimate	Low Estimate	High Estimate	Units			Notes
					Year Dollars	Discount Rate	Period Covered	
								ranges from \$56,332.65 to \$81,763.56 per applicant, and a primary estimate of \$68,773.11
	Qualitative							
Costs	Annualized Monetized (\$m/year)	\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	2023	7%	10 years	The reading and understanding one-time costs primary estimate is \$1,156.74 and range from \$533.88 to \$1,779.60 per interested party.
		\$0.0	\$0.0	\$0.0	2023	3%	10 years	
	Annualized Quantified							
	Qualitative	Interested firms will incur costs to develop and submit applications						
Transfers	Federal Annualized Monetized (\$m/year)					7%		
						3%		
	From/ To	From:			To:			
	Other Annualized Monetized (\$m/year)					7%		
						3%		
	From/To	From:			To:			Potential cost savings to government and commercial insurers if coverage cost of medications decline.
Effects	State, Local or Tribal Government: No estimated effect. Small Business: The estimated costs to very small potential applicants in this industry range from 0.04 percent to 0.12 percent of gross receipts. Wages: No estimated effect. Growth: No estimated effect.							

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C. Comments on the Preliminary Economic Analysis of Impacts and Our Responses

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On June 22, 2022, we published the proposed rule “Nonprescription Drug Product with

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an Additional Condition for Nonprescription Use” (87 FR 31313). We received several

204 comments on the preliminary regulatory impact analysis of the proposed rule (PRIA) that
205 accompanied the proposed rule. Below we group the comments by topic and offer a brief
206 description of each along with our responses. The order of comments and responses is not a
207 reflection of importance.

208 *ACNU Studies:*

209 (Comment) We received a few comments asserting that requiring applicants to conduct robust
210 consumer studies to demonstrate a label alone is insufficient will add considerable time and cost.
211 These comments further assert that these studies will preclude many companies from developing
212 a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU.

213 (Response) Like all drug development programs, we acknowledge that development of a
214 nonprescription drug product with an ACNU will require the applicant to expend resources. For
215 an application for a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU, the rule requires an applicant
216 to demonstrate the necessity and effect of the ACNU to ensure appropriate self-selection or
217 appropriate actual use, or both. The applicant may need to conduct or reference adequate testing.
218 For example, applicants may conduct consumer studies to demonstrate the necessity and effect of
219 the ACNU. Consumer studies, however, may vary in cost, and such costs are uncertain. We have
220 added uncertainty bounds of development costs to our analysis and without further information,
221 we cannot adjust them to reflect any specific concerns.

222 We disagree that the costs to develop a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU will
223 reduce treatment options. Without the rule, nonprescription drug products are limited to drugs
224 that can be labeled with sufficient information to enable consumers to appropriately self-select
225 and use the drug product without the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer

226 such drug. Therefore, the rule has the potential to broaden the types of drug products that FDA
227 could approve as nonprescription.

228 *Payment:*

229 (Comment) Some commenters believe the rule can decrease the economic disparity that exists
230 due to prescription medications not being accessible without a practitioner licensed by law to
231 administer such drugs and increase affordability and cost-effectiveness for the consumer.
232 However, several other commenters, although generally supportive of the proposed rule, express
233 concerns that the approval of nonprescription drug products with an ACNU may impact insurers'
234 coverage of the prescription version of the drug product, and efforts should be taken to mitigate
235 unintended consequences, including increased out of pocket costs for consumers that may
236 impede consumer access. We received a comment suggesting that FDA should consult with
237 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and other stakeholders to ensure Medicare
238 beneficiaries can use nonprescription drug benefits to cover nonprescription drug products with
239 an ACNU.

240 (Response) We understand that prices have a direct impact on consumers. However, an adverse
241 effect on insurance coverage is not a certain outcome of the rule. While some health insurance
242 plans may restrict drug coverage when one member of the drug class is made available for
243 nonprescription use, some health insurance plans may continue to provide coverage for
244 prescription version of the product despite availability of the nonprescription drug product with
245 an ACNU. Drug coverage could differ depending upon which state the beneficiary lives in. For
246 example, FDA is aware that some Medicare Advantage and Medicaid plans include
247 supplemental benefits that provide a regular allowance for nonprescription drug products related
248 to their conditions, whereas Medicaid beneficiaries can obtain coverage when the

249 nonprescription drug products are indicated by a health care provider. The FDA cannot stipulate
250 what drugs insurers may cover or to what extent the drug may be covered.

251 Additionally, consumers' out-of-pocket costs are not always predictable. There is a
252 misconception that prescription drug products are covered at low co-pays, but this may not
253 always be the case. For example, an insurer may classify certain prescription drug products as
254 non-preferred or non-formulary which are typically associated with higher out-of-pocket costs.
255 Further, consumers without insurance or with high deductible insurance plans may benefit from
256 the availability of nonprescription drug products with an ACNU because their out-of-pocket cost
257 is usually higher for prescription drug products as compared to nonprescription drug products.

258 (Comment) We received one comment suggesting that FDA require price controls as a
259 requirement to approve nonprescription drug products with an ACNU.

260 (Response) We disagree with setting price controls as a requirement to approve nonprescription
261 drug products with an ACNU. FDA does not have the authority to approve or refuse to approve a
262 drug product based on the prices set by manufacturers, distributors, or retailers.

263 (Comment) We received some comments wanting to see more details about the decrease in
264 access costs.

265 (Response) We have included an appendix in the preliminary regulatory impact analysis and in
266 this final analysis with details on how we model the potential decrease in
267 costs.

268 (Comment) We received comments suggesting that if insurance does not cover the respective
269 prescription drug product, generic competition in the prescription space will be effectively
270 eliminated.

271 (Response) We disagree. The rule does not affect how health insurance plans cover prescription
272 drug products. The rule includes a provision for simultaneous marketing of both the prescription
273 and the nonprescription version with an ACNU. This provision may help with maintaining
274 reimbursement status in the respective prescription markets.

275 *Simultaneous Marketing:*

276 (Comment) Several comments oppose simultaneous marketing citing financial concerns. Some
277 comments oppose simultaneous marketing citing that it will inadvertently create a less
278 competitive marketplace by failing to incentivize innovation in the prescription-to-
279 nonprescription switch. Another comment argues simultaneous marketing of prescription and
280 nonprescription drug products will severely reduce the opportunity for companies to recoup
281 investment costs.

282 (Response) The proposed rule is intended to increase options for applicants to develop and
283 market safe and effective nonprescription drug products. Without the rule, we may not be able to
284 approve certain drug products that an applicant may seek to market on a nonprescription basis
285 where labeling alone cannot communicate the information needed for the consumer to
286 appropriately self-select, appropriately use, or both the drug product safely and effectively
287 without the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug.

288 (Comment) Commenters suggested that the cost-savings to consumers we presented in the PRIA
289 may be reduced if we allow simultaneous marketing. For example, simultaneous marketing will
290 reduce the market size for the nonprescription product with an ACNU as consumers may
291 purchase the prescription version instead.

292 (Response) We disagree and present evidence in the PRIA describing that roughly sixty percent
293 of purchases for a nonprescription product are from completely new consumers. This evidence

294 from the average nonprescription markets suggests that the potential to attract new-to-therapy
295 consumers is substantial.

296 *Reporting:*

297 (Comment) We received comments that the PRIA does not adequately account for the costs of
298 quality assurance systems or implementing the reporting requirements.

299 (Response) We understand concerns about the potential costs of establishing and maintaining
300 quality assurance systems. However, due to the uncertainty about the nature of ACNU failures
301 that could occur, the likelihood, the number, and the cost, any estimate would be characterized
302 by a substantial degree of uncertainty.

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305 D. Summary of Changes

306 The main changes between the preliminary and final analysis relate to the updated
307 estimates to account for inflation. The estimates in this final analysis reflect dollars in 2023,
308 whereas estimates in the preliminary analysis reflected dollars in 2022. For example, the present
309 analysis incorporates new released reports from the U.S. Census on the number and revenue of
310 companies in the pharmaceutical preparation and manufacturing industry, and the Bureau of
311 Labor Statistics on wages.

312 Other changes include a summary of comments related to the preliminary regulatory
313 impact analysis and our responses. Lastly, we also clarified in the benefits section that the
314 potential cost savings to government-sponsored plans and commercial insurance will likely be
315 from avoided processing of drug-reimbursement claims, medical claims and the respective
316 coverage, and potential future avoided medical claims as nonprescription drug products may

317 increase access and health outcomes. In sum, the potential cost-savings are broader than changes
318 in reimbursement for a drug product.

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320 **II. Final Economic Analysis of Impacts**

321 A. Background

322 We approve drug products to be marketed in the United States as either prescription or
323 nonprescription drugs. Prescription status is reserved for drugs for which safe use requires
324 supervision by a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs. By contrast,
325 nonprescription drugs do not require supervision by such a practitioner to be used safely. Drug
326 products with the same active ingredient may be made available simultaneously as both
327 prescription and nonprescription if a meaningful difference (e.g., indication, strength, route of
328 administration, dosage form, or patient population) exists between the two drug products.

329 Currently, nonprescription drug products are limited to drug products that can be labeled
330 with sufficient information for consumers to appropriately self-select and safely use the drug
331 product. A drug is misbranded if its labeling lacks adequate directions and warnings for use in
332 accordance with section 502(f) of the FD&C Act.¹ This section authorizes FDA to issue
333 regulations exempting a drug from the requirement for adequate directions for use when such
334 directions are not necessary for the protection of public health. The final rule will amend FDA's
335 regulations to exempt a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU from the requirements for
336 adequate directions for use if certain conditions are met.

337 Currently, an applicant may propose that a drug product be approved as prescription or
338 nonprescription. A request to change the marketing status of a drug from prescription to

¹ See section 502(f) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 352(f)).

339 nonprescription is commonly referred to as a prescription-to-nonprescription switch. To seek
340 approval for a prescription-to-nonprescription switch, an applicant conducts requisite studies and
341 submits a supplement to its NDA or a separate NDA to request to change the prescription drug
342 product's status to nonprescription status. These studies may include a label comprehension
343 study, a self-selection study, an actual use study, and human factors studies.

344 For nonprescription drugs currently on the market, the labeling provides information for
345 the products for consumers to appropriately self-select or appropriately actually use the product,
346 or both. However, for some drug products, labeling alone is not sufficient to ensure that a
347 consumer can appropriately self-select or appropriately use, or both, a drug product in a
348 nonprescription setting. For these drug products, an additional condition of nonprescription use
349 (ACNU) will be needed to ensure appropriate self-selection or appropriate actual use, or both, by
350 the consumer in a nonprescription setting.

351 This final rule will codify application requirements, labeling requirements, and
352 postmarketing reporting requirements for nonprescription drug products with an ACNU. In
353 addition, the rule will clarify that a prescription drug product and a nonprescription drug product
354 with an ACNU could both be approved with the same active ingredient, indication, strength,
355 route of administration, and dosage form and may be marketed simultaneously. The rule clarifies
356 that the ACNU constitutes a meaningful difference between the two drug products. The rule
357 does not preclude a direct-to-nonprescription pathway for nonprescription products with an
358 ACNU (i.e., they will not necessarily need to be approved as prescription drugs first).

359 B. Market Failure or Other Distortion Potentially Addressed by Federal Regulatory Action

360 The main government failure this rule addresses is the lack of regulatory pathway for
361 drug products to be approved with an ACNU. Thus, this rule will establish requirements,

362 including content and format requirements, for a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU.
363 The regulation will also clarify that a prescription drug product with the same active ingredient,
364 indication, strength, route of administration, and dosage form as a nonprescription drug product
365 with an ACNU may remain on the market. In addition, a regulation is needed to add an
366 exemption to the requirement for adequate directions for use for a nonprescription drug approved
367 with an ACNU.

368 The final rule establishes requirements for nonprescription drug products with an
369 ACNU for the protection of patients and to ensure the safety and efficacy of such marketed
370 drugs. Establishing these requirements will also help us to operate more efficiently. For example,
371 potential applicants have requested additional meetings with us per development program to
372 discuss this topic; these types of individual meetings are time-consuming and use Agency
373 resources. Multiple potential applicants have been asking the same types of questions, creating
374 repetitiveness and inefficiencies. Because the rule addresses these and other questions, we
375 anticipate that the rule will reduce or eliminate this burden for potential applicants and us.

376 C. Purpose of the Rule

377 The final rule will establish NDA and ANDA application requirements, labeling
378 requirements, and postmarketing reporting requirements for a nonprescription drug product with
379 an ACNU. Specifically, the rule will:

- 380 1. Establish requirements for applications for nonprescription drug products with an
381 ACNU.
- 382 2. Clarify that a drug product with the same active ingredient, indication, strength, route
383 of administration, and dosage form could be approved in separate applications as both a
384 nonprescription drug product with an ACNU and a prescription drug product and be

385 simultaneously marketed. This is possible because the ACNU would serve as a
386 meaningful difference between the prescription drug product and nonprescription drug
387 product with the ACNU.

388 3. Clarify that generic applications (ANDAs) can have different ways to operationalize an
389 ACNU.

390 4. Establish post-marketing reporting requirements requiring applicants to submit a report
391 of ACNU failure to FDA.

392 5. Require labeling statements to alert consumers that the nonprescription drug product
393 has an ACNU.

394 This rule will apply to NDAs and ANDAs for nonprescription drug products with an
395 ACNU. An ACNU is one or more FDA-approved conditions that an applicant of a
396 nonprescription drug product must implement to ensure consumers' appropriate self-selection or
397 appropriate actual use, or both, of the nonprescription drug product without the supervision of a
398 practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug when the applicant demonstrates and FDA
399 determines that labeling alone is insufficient to ensure appropriate self-selection or appropriate
400 actual use, or both. If labeling alone is sufficient for the drug product to be used safely and
401 effectively by consumers, we would approve the drug as a nonprescription drug product, but not
402 as a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU.

403 The rule has the potential to broaden the types of drug products that could be approved as
404 nonprescription. Approvals under the rule will benefit consumers who do not have access to
405 prescription drugs because of lack of insurance and may benefit some consumers with insurance
406 by potentially reducing their access costs (for example transportation and time costs).

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D. Baseline Conditions

Without the rule, certain candidate drug products approved as prescription-only will remain as prescription-only drug products or perhaps, not marketed at all. The rule will not affect drug products that have already switched to nonprescription status without an ACNU.

Industry has expressed interest to FDA about increasing consumer access to their approved prescription drug products by also marketing these products as nonprescription drug products. However, we lack complete information of potential applications for nonprescription drug products with an ACNU and the medical conditions they will treat.

E. Benefits

By establishing requirements for a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU, we anticipate benefits to industry from introducing a pathway to market a prescription drug product as a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU and benefits to consumers from expanded access to these drug products. We also anticipate cost-savings to consumers associated with reduced costs to access nonprescription drug products with an ACNU. There could also be cost savings to industry and us from a more efficient allocation of resources by reducing or eliminating the need for repetitive meetings and information requests.

. In addition, although we are not able to predict the number of applications that may be approved under the final rule, we present estimates of monetized benefits and cost savings in the sensitivity section. In the sensitivity analysis we make assumptions about the number of applications we might receive, the number of purchases that might occur, and consumer preferences to switch products. We also anticipate potential benefits and cost-savings to commercial insurers and government-sponsored insurance plans, but we lack data or adequate information to monetize them even in the sensitivity section.

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1. Potential Reduction in Access Costs

431 We define access cost to be the monetized value for a consumer to obtain a medication.
432 In our analysis, access costs include the time to see a doctor to obtain a prescription, including
433 waiting time and other transportation costs. We also include co-pay and out-of-pocket costs in
434 our estimate of access costs. We compare the baseline access costs to the access costs under
435 potential scenarios with the final rule to estimate the potential benefits for each consumer
436 purchase. In this analysis, we use the costs to obtain candidate prescription-only products as our
437 baseline access cost. The rule will also allow for a direct approval of an application for a
438 nonprescription product with ACNU without first requiring an application to market such drug
439 product as prescription only. Although we expect the latter cases to be less common than a
440 switch, in those cases, the benefits will include the full benefits from using the drug product
441 relative to the baseline of not using the product at all. The sensitivity section in this analysis
442 presents estimated benefits from these cases.

443 Table 2 summarizes the potential access costs for one consumer to obtain a
444 nonprescription drug product with an ACNU that becomes available under the rule. We first
445 estimate access costs for the baseline prescription scenario. We use 1 hour for transit and wait
446 time from Temin (1992) as this is an appropriate time estimate because it was estimated using
447 multiple drug products.² We assign a value to time using the hourly national average of \$31.48
448 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.³ For the cost of transportation fare or fuel, we use estimates
449 from Pfoh et al. (2008) which equal about \$18.06 when updated for inflation. We use national

² Although studies on this subject are limited, we also considered another more recent study on switching antihistamine drug products from Nichol and Sullivan (2004) that indicates time used to obtain a prescription from a physician in the range of 2 to 3 hours. We do not use this study, however, because it may not be as representative as Temin (1992).

³ <https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm>

450 average co-pay per doctor visit from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which
 451 updated to 2023 dollars, averaged \$29.84.⁴ We assume that the change in the out-of-pocket per
 452 pack cost (e.g., bottle or box) is neutral and cancels out on average based on observations from
 453 past nonprescription switches.⁵ Adding all of these access costs results in a baseline access cost
 454 of about \$79.38 (= \$31.48 in time costs + \$18.06 in transportation expenses + \$29.84 in copay
 455 for visit).⁶

456 Table 2.- Consumer Potential Reduction in Access Costs from Switching to a Nonprescription
 457 Drug Product with an ACNU (\$ dollars 2023)

Item	Primary Estimate	Lower Estimate	Upper Estimate
Baseline access costs	\$79.38	\$79.38	\$79.38
Potential access costs	\$45.76	\$79.38	\$12.15
Time cost per event	\$19.68	\$31.48	\$7.87
Transportation cost per event	\$11.17	\$18.06	\$4.28
Copay for visit	\$14.92	\$29.84	\$0.00
Out-of-pocket per purchase	same	same	same
Access cost reduction per purchase relative to baseline	\$33.62	\$0.00	\$67.23

458 Note: We round numbers to the nearest decimal in the table for presentation. We calculate the estimate of time costs
 459 in column three as 1 hour lost in transit and wait time multiplied by \$31.48 hourly average wage. In column four,
 460 this estimate is 0.25 hours lost in transit and wait time multiplied by \$31.48 hourly average wage. The primary
 461 estimate of time cost is the average of these two.
 462

463 To estimate the maximum reduction in access costs for a product that would require
 464 minimal consumer effort to be eligible to purchase a nonprescription product with an ACNU, we

⁴ Available at:

https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2016/tif5.pdf and
https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_3/2016/tiif5.pdf.

⁵ We use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to estimate the change in out-of-pocket expenditures for a sample of drugs that switched from prescription to nonprescription status. We do so by comparing average expenditures before and after a marketing status switch. The data show that for the four markets examined (Lamisil, Pepcid, Mucinex, Plan B), there was an increase in out-of-pocket expenditures of \$16 per package (bottle, box, etc.) on average. By contrast, we also observe that for four other markets (Prilosec, Miralax, Xenical, Prevacid) there was a decrease of about \$12 per package (bottle, box, etc.). However, when aggregating all drugs and all years, the overall change is nearly zero. For this reason, we assume there is no change in out-of-pocket expenditures. See the Technical Appendix for additional information.

⁶ Adding the out-of-pocket for the drug product would increase the total cost by about \$30. Although the latter number may seem high, most of these products are initially branded, then nonprescription by the branded firm, and generic after that. For a deeper discussion on out-of-pocket trends, see Berndt and Newhouse (2012) p. 242.

465 estimate access costs of \$12.15 (= \$7.87 in time costs + \$4.28 in transportation expenses + \$0 in
466 copay for visit). Compared to the baseline, the maximum cost reduction would equal \$67.23 (=
467 \$79.38 – \$12.15).

468 For the lower bound, we assume there is no change in transport and waiting time relative
469 to the baseline. This lower bound may reflect cases where interaction with a pharmacist occurs
470 and may take the same amount of time as with a physician. However, we note that ACNUs could
471 incorporate different technologies and do not necessarily have to involve interactions with
472 pharmacists. For our primary estimate of the reduction in access costs we average the upper and
473 lower reduction in access costs, which results in \$33.62.

474 In the sensitivity analysis, we make simplifying assumptions about the number of
475 purchases to present estimates of potential benefits of the rule.

476 *2. Meetings with Industry and FDA*

477 We received several questions from industry about the process to market a prescription
478 drug product as a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU. Based on this experience, we
479 anticipate that the final rule will save resources equivalent to about 3 to 4 meetings per application.
480 The reduction in this allocation of resources could result in cost-savings to both industry and us. In
481 Table 3 we summarize our estimates.

482 Our records for the review of nonprescription drug products (with no ACNU) indicate that
483 it takes an average of 55 FDA staff hours per meeting including time before, during, and after the
484 meeting. For our upper-bound estimate, we use the fully loaded (wages that account for overhead)
485 hourly wage from our office of budget records of \$173.63 for CDER and calculate that our cost
486 savings from eliminating these meetings equal \$38,198.60 (= 4 meetings x 55 hours per meeting x
487 \$173.63 fully loaded hourly wage) per potential applicant. Similarly, we estimate the lower-bound

488 cost savings to us equals \$28,648.95 (= 3 meetings x 55 hours per meeting x \$173.63 hourly
 489 wage). The primary estimate is \$33,423.78 (= 3.5 meetings x 55 hours per meeting x \$173.63
 490 hourly wage).

491 Table 3. Cost Savings from Fewer Meetings per Application (\$ dollars 2023)

Item	Primary Estimate	Lower Estimate	Upper Estimate
Number of meetings that could be avoided per application	3.5	3	4
FDA hours per meeting	55	55	55
Fully loaded wage FDA	\$173.63	\$173.63	\$173.63
Cost to FDA	\$33,423.78	\$28,648.95	\$38,198.60
Applicant hours per meeting	55	55	55
Fully loaded wage applicants	\$177.78	\$167.78	\$187.78
Labor costs to applicants	\$34,222.65	\$27,683.70	\$41,311.60
Transportation, lodging, and other expenses	\$1,126.68	\$0.00	\$2,253.36
Cost to applicants	\$35,349.33	\$27,683.70	\$43,564.96
Total reduction in meeting costs (FDA + applicants)	\$68,773.11	\$56,332.65	\$81,763.56

492 Note: Estimates per application. Numbers are rounded to nearest decimal.

493

494 We assume that applicants also spend 55 hours in total on each meeting with us, including
 495 time before, during, and after the meeting. We use a fully loaded mean hourly wage of \$187.78 (=
 496 \$93.89 x 2 to account for overhead) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational employment
 497 records for general operations managers in the pharmaceutical industry (North American Industry
 498 Classification System (NAICS) 325400, occupation code 11-1021).

499 We estimate an upper-bound of meeting-time cost savings per application of about
 500 \$41,311.60 (= 4 meetings x 55 hours per meeting x \$187.78 mean wage per hour). In addition, we
 501 calculate cost savings from avoided lodging and transportation of \$2,253.36 for all four meetings
 502 (= 4 meetings x \$563.34 lodging and transportation per meeting). The combined upper-bound cost
 503 savings per application equals \$43,564.96.

504 For our lower-bound estimate of meeting-time cost savings, we use the fully loaded median
505 hourly wage of \$167.78 (= \$83.89 x 2) for general operation managers (occupation code 11-1021).
506 Thus, our lower-bound estimate of cost savings to applicants equals about \$27,683.70 (= 3
507 meetings x 55 hours x \$167.78 wage). In this case, we do not add lodging and transportation
508 because we assume that applicants will submit letters or call us instead of meeting in person.

509 Our primary estimate of meeting-time cost savings equals \$34,222.65 (= 3.5 meetings x 55
510 hours per meeting x \$177.78 average wage per hour between upper and lower wage). In addition,
511 we calculate cost savings from avoided lodging and transportation of \$1,126.68, the average
512 between lower and upper bounds for this item. The combined primary cost savings estimate per
513 application to the applicant equals \$35,349.33.

514 Adding these benefits for potential applicants and us, on average, we estimate cost-savings
515 from fewer meetings costs per application equal \$68,773.11 (= \$33,423.78 to us + \$35,349.33 to
516 applicants) with a range of \$56,332.65 to \$81,763.56. These calculations may overestimate the
517 potential cost-savings if there are efficiency gains when potential applicants become more familiar
518 with the process over time.

519 We do not have further information on the number of affected applicants or applications to
520 monetize the total cost-savings associated with the final rule.

521 *3. Potential Cost Savings to Insurers*

522 Payors such as commercial or government drug-benefit programs who offer coverage of
523 prescription drug products may experience cost savings. In addition, some of the cost savings to
524 insurance administrators may likely come from not having to process the administrative claim
525 for prescription drug products and future medical co-pays or future medical expenses when use
526 of the nonprescription products increase adherence and improves health.

527 Changes in coverage for the drug product are in part considered a transfer because as
528 insurance saves when a drug product is no longer covered consumers pay their portion in the
529 post-switch scenario. However, this is not a zero-sum scenario where insurance simply transfers
530 all of the burden to consumers; instead, prices after a switch may adjust to attract new
531 consumers to pay out of pocket. These new consumers constitute about sixty percent of
532 purchases (see appendix for details). Using MEPS data on nonprescription switches, we observe
533 that out-of-pocket prices are on average the same before and after the switch, although there may
534 be individual cases where the price increases or decreases.

535 Estimating the potential transfers and netting out any cost savings would require detailed
536 payment data such as reimbursement rates from commercial insurance companies and
537 government drug-benefit programs, as well as detailed information on different groups of
538 consumers. Insurance claims do not capture data to estimate changes in payment from
539 switching prescription to nonprescription drug products because as coverage drops the costs for
540 noncovered drugs are no longer recorded.

541 We received comments, however, that further shed light on insurance coverage. For
542 example, we received comments indicating that for some individuals with limited income, some
543 Medicare Advantage and Medicaid plans include supplemental benefits that provide a regular
544 allowance for nonprescription drug products related to their conditions. We also received
545 comments that beneficiaries with Medicaid can obtain coverage when the nonprescription
546 products are indicated by physicians. In general, based on nonprescription experience, we
547 estimate that about forty percent of nonprescription drug purchases are from consumers who

548 transfer. Based on these comments, we assume the forty percent is an upper bound of such
549 transfers, but we have no further information to present a lower bound.⁷

550 *4. Summary of Benefits*

551 Table 4 shows the summary of per unit quantified benefits. Our primary estimate of the
552 potential reduction in access costs is \$33.62 and a range of \$0 to \$67.23. The reduction in access
553 costs includes the comparison of out-of-pocket costs, transportation costs, and time costs relative
554 to the baseline prescription-only scenario.

555 The potential cost savings from fewer meetings between us and industry are presented as
556 per application reductions. The primary estimate is \$68,773.11 with a range of \$56,332.65 to
557 \$81,763.56. We do not calculate these benefits over time given the lack of information on the
558 number of potential applications, the probability of approval for each, and how often they would
559 occur per year over a ten-year horizon.

560 We also do not estimate potential cost savings to government-sponsored or commercial
561 insurers due to lack of reimbursement data. Estimating the potential transfers and netting out any
562 cost savings to insurers would require detailed payment data, such as reimbursement rates from
563 commercial insurance companies and government drug-benefit programs, as well as detailed
564 information on different groups of consumers.

565 Table 4. Summary of Potential Benefits and Cost Savings (\$dollars 2023)

Item	Primary Estimate	Lower Estimate	Upper Estimate
Reduction in Access Costs (per consumer)	\$33.62	\$0.00	\$67.23
Reduction in meetings between FDA and industry (per application)	\$68,773.11	\$56,332.65	\$81,763.56
Potential cost saving to insurers	NA	NA	NA

⁷ Additional data sets would be needed if this analysis were to estimate these savings more broadly, including the portion paid by insurance, government or other payers.

566 Note: Numbers are rounded to nearest decimal. Because we have not projected the reduction in access costs to the
567 national level, it is not appropriate to add the two rows in this table. (NA) means data not available for estimates. For
568 example, we anticipate potential cost savings to insurers but lack data to estimate them.
569

570
571 F. Costs

572 In this section we present the costs of reading and understanding the rule. In the
573 uncertainty section, we show how the rule could affect application development and application
574 review costs if the rule encourages applications that will not occur without the rule or encourages
575 applications to be submitted earlier than without the rule.

576 *1. Reading and Understanding Costs*

577 We expect potential applicants will incur one-time costs to read and understand the rule.
578 To estimate these costs, we multiply the estimated hours to read and understand by the fully
579 loaded hourly wage rates. Table 5 shows our estimates. We use hours to read and understand
580 based on small and large firms by following HHS guidance.⁸ For example, we estimate the lower
581 bound as the average of three hours considering a mix of half small and half large firms. For
582 example, for small firms, reading and understanding will take two hours if these firms find the
583 complexity of the rule low, and about four hours for a large firm. For the upper bound we
584 estimate an average of ten hours, considering that small firms that spend more time reading and
585 understanding the rule will dedicate about seven hours and large firms about thirteen hours.

586 We use wages for operation managers (occupation code 11-3000) and legal occupations
587 (occupation code 23-0000) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics-Occupational Employment
588 Statistics for Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing.⁹ The median wage for operation
589 managers is \$74.46, or \$148.92 to reflect benefits and overhead costs. The median wage for legal

⁸ Guidelines for Regulatory Impact Analysis. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services – May 2015 update.

⁹ https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_325400.htm#11-0000

590 occupations workers is \$103.50, or \$207 to reflect benefits and overhead costs. The average of
 591 these fully loaded wages is \$178. The resulting one-time cost estimate of reading and
 592 understanding the rule per potential applicant is \$1,156.74 with a range of \$533.88 to \$1,779.60.

593 We do not aggregate these estimates to the industry level because the high uncertainty
 594 about the number of potential interested sponsors and because all estimates presented in this
 595 analysis, including benefits, are presented on a per case basis. For example, using the count of
 596 2,350 pharmaceutical stakeholders from the 2017 economic census of Pharmaceutical and
 597 Medicine Manufacturers would yield an upper bound of \$4.18 million (\$1,779.60 multiplied by
 598 2,350 manufacturers).¹⁰ However, this upper bound is a gross overestimation of these costs.
 599 Based on the annual average approvals of nonprescription drug products, a more realistic number
 600 would likely resemble the count of interested sponsors in nonprescription markets of about three
 601 per year. Over a ten-year horizon of our primary estimates and about three sponsors per year, the
 602 resulting estimate would be \$34,702.20 (\$1,779.60 multiplied by 30 sponsors).

603 Table 5. One-Time Reading and Understanding Costs per Applicant (\$ dollars 2023)

Item	Primary	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Hours to Read and Understand	6.5	3.0	10.0
Hourly Wage	\$177.96	\$177.96	\$177.96
One-Time Cost per Applicant	\$1,156.74	\$533.88	\$1,779.60

604 Note: Cost is one-time.
 605

606 G. Distributional Effects

607 For each nonprescription approval with an ACNU, insurers might experience cost savings
 608 if their coverage costs decrease because consumers who originally purchased the prescription
 609 drug product transfer to the nonprescription with an ACNU alternative.

¹⁰ United States Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistics of U.S. Businesses. Accessed June 2020, www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb.html.

633 potential benefits to applicants. See appendix for full details on these calculations, including a
 634 graphical description of access costs using a demand-supply model.

635 In the main analysis, the quantified estimates including benefits from fewer meetings per
 636 applicants and costs from reading and understanding per applicant. We also estimated the
 637 potential reduction in access costs, but these estimates are per consumer per purchase and are not
 638 for comparison at the applicant-application level. In Table 6, we present annualized benefits
 639 from fewer meetings minus annualized costs from reading and understanding the rule assuming
 640 one applicant but without assuming approval. The resulting net benefits from the main analysis
 641 will average \$0.07 million and range from \$0.05 million to \$0.08 million.

642 In contrast to the main analysis, the sensitivity scenario shows the net benefits from
 643 assuming one application approved. In this scenario, we add the benefits to transfer consumers,
 644 new consumers, and applicants, and the cost savings from more efficient meetings with
 645 applicants. We also subtract application development costs, review costs, and reading and
 646 understanding costs. The result is \$127.83 million in annualized primary net benefits using a 7-
 647 percent rate ranging from \$125.89 million to \$129.77 million. We annualize estimates over a 10-
 648 year horizon for a single application reviewed and approved. Using a 3-percent discount rate, the
 649 primary net benefits will average \$129.16 million with a range of \$127.50 million to \$130.81
 650 million. This sensitivity analysis shows that the net combined benefits to consumers and
 651 applicants will likely exceed one hundred million dollars per approval thus providing support for
 652 this rule. To assess the net benefits from more than one approval simply multiply these net
 653 benefits by the number of approvals. See the Technical Appendix for full estimation details.

654 Table 6. Annualized Net Benefits Comparison: Main Analysis Compared to Sensitivity
 655 Scenarios (\$ millions 2023)

Scenario	Primary Estimate (7%)	Lower Estimate (7%)	Upper Estimate (7%)	Primary Estimate (3%)	Lower Estimate (3%)	Upper Estimate (3%)

Main Analysis (Fewer Meetings minus Reading Costs)	\$0.07	\$0.05	\$0.08	\$0.07	\$0.05	\$0.08
Sensitivity Scenario 1 (Net Benefits from One Approval)	\$127.83	\$125.89	\$129.77	\$129.16	\$127.50	\$130.81
Sensitivity Scenario 2 (Net Benefits from Six Approvals and 25 Post- marketing Reports)	\$766.10	\$754.61	\$777.58	\$774.05	\$764.29	\$783.82

656 Note: Numbers are rounded to nearest decimals. All estimates are annualized over a ten-year horizon. Net benefits
657 include benefits, costs, and cost-savings.
658

659 The second sensitivity scenario in Table 6 shows the resulting annualized benefits when
660 considering six approvals instead of one. These estimates reflect the same estimates as in the
661 sensitivity scenario 1 multiplied by six approvals. The resulting primary estimates are \$766.10
662 million using a 7-percent discount rate (ranging from \$754.61 million to \$777.58 million) and
663 \$774.05 million using a 3-percent discount rate (ranging from \$764.29 million to \$783.82
664 million). We also subtract the costs of 25 potential post-marketing reports per application to
665 notify us of ACNU failures. To value the cost of these post-marketing reports, we use the cost of
666 a medication error report from a 2019 ERG report as a proxy updated to 2023 dollars using the
667 GDP deflator.¹¹ These estimates, rounded to the nearest dollar, range from about \$475.64 to
668 \$701.53 and average about \$588.59 per report.

669 J. Alternatives to the Rule

670 We identified the following plausible alternatives.

671 1. *Retain Current Regulatory Framework*

672 One alternative to the rule involves retaining the current regulatory framework. This
673 alternative will hinder development of new nonprescription products with an ACNU. This

¹¹ From “Table 3-7. Medication Error Reporting—Labor hours and Unit Cost” on page 42 of the report.

674 alternative will impact the options available to consumers as well. In addition, this option has
675 already created inefficiencies in the allocation of resources for industry and us in the form of
676 multiple repetitive meetings.

677 *2. Require Specific Technology or Conditions to Implement the ACNU*

678 Another alternative would be to have a more stringent rule that would require the ACNUs
679 to be operationalized in the same way for the reference product and for its potentially competing
680 ANDAs. Some potential benefits of this alternative may include standardized ACNUs for both
681 the reference product and potentially competing ANDAs so that consumers may avoid any
682 confusion or inconvenience from choosing one product over another. Standardization of ACNUs
683 may also help point-of-sale outlets when ACNUs involve any actions or technologies at these
684 outlets. This alternative, however, would have some trade-offs as it would give less flexibility to
685 applicants and potentially result in fewer applications submitted. The rule currently gives ANDA
686 applicants flexibility regarding the way the ACNU will be operationalized if the ANDA's ACNU
687 achieves the same purpose and the differences from the RLD are otherwise acceptable in an
688 ANDA.

689
690

III. Final Small Entity Analysis

691 The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires Agencies to analyze regulatory options that
692 would minimize any significant impact of a rule on small entities. The final rule will establish
693 requirements for a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU. We anticipate that this rule will
694 provide flexibility in the approval and application process for all applicants, large and small. We
695 also anticipate that the rule will incentivize submission of applications from both small and large
696 applicants.

697 Although small entities will incur the costs to develop and apply for a nonprescription
698 drug product with an ACNU, this will occur when entities believe that the profits from the
699 approval will exceed the costs of the application process. For those firms that conduct
700 development and submission activities, the economic impact may be significant, but we do not
701 anticipate that the number of small entities involved will be substantial. We estimate that the cost
702 of reading and understanding the rule will be between 0.04 percent and 0.12 percent of gross
703 receipts of the very small potential applicants in the affected industry. This analysis, as well as
704 other sections in this document and the Preamble of the final rule, serves as the Final Regulatory
705 Flexibility Analysis, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

706 A. Description and Number of Affected Small Entities

707 Without knowing the size of the potential applicants of a nonprescription drug product
708 with an ACNU under this rule, we only describe the distribution of potential applicants in Table
709 7. We use the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to identify industry
710 groups potentially affected by the rule. We also use the NAICS codes to identify the Small
711 Business Administration's (SBA) thresholds for small firms.¹² The Small Business
712 Administration (SBA) considers any pharmaceutical preparation manufacturing firm (NAICS
713 code 325412) with fewer than 1,250 employees as a small business. Because the U.S. Census
714 Bureau data reports the employment differently than the SBA size standards tables, in this
715 analysis, firms with fewer than 1,000 employees are small entities.

716 We use data from the 2017 Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) from the U.S. Census to
717 identify the number of firms and their size by employment and by annual revenues.¹³ The

¹² The SBA cutoffs are provided for the four subclassifications of NAICS code 3254, but not for the category as a whole.

¹³ SUSB link: <https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html>

718 economic census occurs every 5 years and released 3 years after. For example, the 2017 census
719 was released in 2020. Data on revenue are only collected for years ending in 2 and 7. The most
720 recent economic census where revenue were collected was 2022. These revenue data, however,
721 are not yet available until 2025. Thus, we continue using revenue data from 2017 and update
722 dollar values to 2023 using the GDP deflator. These data show that the total count of
723 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing (NAICS code 325412) is 1,280 establishments.
724 Based on these data, about 76 percent, or 976, of establishments had fewer than 1,000
725 employees. Furthermore, these establishments account for about 13 percent of the total revenue
726 for the industry.

727 Table 7. Distribution of Small Establishments by Employment Size and Revenue--2017 U.S.
728 Economic Census, NAICS code 325412 (\$ millions 2023)

Employment Size	Number of Establishments	Total Revenue (\$ millions 2023)	Average Revenue Per Establishment (\$ millions 2023)
01: Total	1,280	\$ 189,025.70	\$ 147.68
02: <5 employees	334	\$ 479.11	\$ 1.43
03: 5-9 employees	137	\$ 465.72	\$ 3.40
04: 10-14 employees	76	\$ 747.27	\$ 9.83
05: 15-19 employees	37	\$ 493.32	\$ 13.33
06: <20 employees	584	\$ 2,185.42	\$ 3.74
07: 20-24 employees	27	\$ 314.04	\$ 11.63
08: 25-29 employees	22	\$ 209.59	\$ 9.53
09: 30-34 employees	26	\$ 354.43	\$ 13.63
10: 35-39 employees	20	\$ 281.62	\$ 14.08
11: 40-49 employees	31	\$ 684.01	\$ 22.06
12: 50-74 employees	37	\$ 1,007.23	\$ 27.22
13: 75-99 employees	31	\$ 1,319.89	\$ 42.58
14: 100-149 employees	46	\$ 2,289.54	\$ 49.77
15: 150-199 employees	28	\$ 1,593.10	\$ 56.90
16: 200-299 employees	42	\$ 2,389.44	\$ 56.89
17: 300-399 employees	18	\$ 2,030.02	\$ 112.78
18: 400-499 employees	14	\$ 1,967.01	\$ 140.50
19: <500 employees	926	\$ 16,625.34	\$ 17.95
20: 500-749 employees	28	\$ 2,636.95	\$ 94.18

21: 750-999 employees	22	\$ 4,518.81	\$ 205.40
22: 1,000-1,499 employees	23	\$ 2,288.48	\$ 99.50
23: 1,500-1,999 employees	18	\$ 2,804.42	\$ 155.80
25: 2,500-4,999 employees	86	\$ 12,592.30	\$ 146.42
26: 5,000+ employees	171	\$ 145,728.63	\$ 852.21

Source: 2017 U.S. Economic Census. The economic census occurs every 5 years and released 3 years after. For example, the 2017 census was released in 2020. The 2022 revenue data are not available until 2025. Dollar values updated from 2017 to 2023 using the GDP deflator.

B. Description of the Potential Impacts of the Rule on Small Entities

In the cost section, we estimate that reading and understanding costs will range from about \$533.88 to \$1,779.60. The lower bound reflects our calculations for small entities. This includes time to read the rule and communicate it across their organizations. These costs are minor; they represent between 0.04 percent and 0.12 percent of gross receipts for the smallest establishment in this sector (establishments with 0 to 4 employees). We expect that only firms interested in applying for a nonprescription drug with an ACNU will dedicate the resources to read and understand the rule. In [section C](#) of the appendix of this analysis, we present the application development costs to show their potential scale should a firm decide to apply. We certify that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Although we show that the potential profits will outweigh these costs, the initial investment to develop an application could be relatively large. Potential small applicants without easy access to the necessary funds to develop an application could find it more challenging to apply than sponsors with more funds. We note, however, that the rule does not affect this distribution of potential applicants or the market conditions that currently exist in the review and approval process of nonprescription products without an ACNU.

751 C. Alternatives to Minimize the Burden on Small Entities
752 FDA provides application fees waiver provisions for small applicants submitting
753 prescription drug applications; for more details, see the Prescription Drug User Fee Amendments
754 (PDUFA)¹⁴ and the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA).¹⁵

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799 **V. Technical Appendix: Models, Inputs, and Assumptions for the Uncertainty and**
800 **Sensitivity Analysis**

801
802
803 A. Model of Consumer Benefits


804 This appendix shows details of estimates we use in the uncertainty section of this
805 analysis. For our sensitivity scenario, we estimate potential benefits to consumers and applicants
806 and subtract potential development costs and review costs from one potential approval.

807 We estimate potential consumer benefits based on reduction in access costs relative to the
808 baseline world with prescription-only products. Figure A1 shows access cost levels using three
809 horizontal lines; a higher line represents higher access costs. The vertical axis represents access
810 costs including costs beyond out-of-pocket such as transportation and time costs. The horizontal
811 axis represents the number of total annual purchases estimated based on previous nonprescription
812 switches. The demand curve shows the corresponding quantities consumed for every level of
813 access costs.

814 We assume, the baseline market starts with consumers facing full costs to access a
815 prescription product (Rx): Cost (Rx) and purchasing prescription quantity Q (Rx). Once a
816 product is approved as a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU, consumers could
817 experience a reduction in costs represented by the line Cost (NonRx-ACNU). The level of access
818 cost could range between the Cost (Rx) and the Cost (NonRx) levels. This approach is flexible
819 and allows for zero reduction in access costs in the range of possibilities.

820 Rectangle A represents benefits to transfer consumers defined as those who before the
821 rule purchase the prescription-only drug product and after the rule purchase the corresponding
822 nonprescription product with an ACNU. Triangle B represents the benefits of expanded access to
823 new-to-therapy consumers (new consumers). As access costs decline, these two areas of benefits
824 increase, and the opposite happens as access costs are closer to the upper bound of Cost (Rx).

825 Figure A1. Primary Estimates of Consumer Benefits from Approvals with ACNU Relative to
 826 Baseline Rx Products
 827



828
 829 Note: This figure ONLY shows consumer benefits; applicant benefits, and transfers must not be inferred from this
 830 figure because market price alone is not on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis measures quantity as the number of
 831 purchases. Rectangle (A) represents gains to consumers who switch from Rx to NonRx ACNU product. Triangle (B)
 832 represents gains to new-to-therapy consumers. Arrows on the axes represent that the ACNU scenario may range
 833 between the Rx and NonRx bounds.
 834

835 1. Transfer Consumers

836 To estimate consumer benefits from consumers who switch from the prescription to the
 837 nonprescription purchase (rectangle A) we first calculate access-cost levels. Then, we multiply
 838 the difference in cost (vertical difference) by the expected change in number of purchases
 839 (horizontal difference).

840 We estimate access costs for the baseline, Rx scenario Cost (Rx), equal \$79.38. This is
841 estimated assuming one hour for transit and wait time (Temin 1992), valued using the hourly
842 national average of \$31.48 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.¹⁶ For the cost of transportation
843 fare or gas, we use estimates from Pfoh et al. (2008), which equal about \$18.06 when updated for
844 inflation. We use national average co-pay per doctor visit from the Medical Expenditure Panel
845 Survey (MEPS), which averages \$29.84 across government-sponsored plans and commercial
846 ones.¹⁷ We assume that the change in the out-of-pocket per pack cost (e.g., bottle or box) is
847 neutral and cancels out on average.¹⁸ Adding all access costs results in a baseline of about \$79.38
848 (= \$31.48 in time costs + \$18.06 in transportation expenses + \$29.84 in copay for visit).¹⁹ In
849 Figure A1, this corresponds to the line Cost(Rx). If there is no reduction in access costs, the line
850 Cost (NonRx ACNU) equals Cost (Rx) and areas A and B shrink to zero. This represents a lower
851 bound on the effect of the rule.

852 By contrast, for the maximum reduction in access costs we estimate access costs of
853 \$12.15, which correspond to a level of costs comparable to a nonprescription case. We compare
854 this estimate to the access costs in the baseline prescription case. We estimate \$12.15 access
855 costs assuming 15 minutes for transit and wait time (Temin 1992), valued using the hourly

¹⁶ May 2023 wages available at: https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#00-0000

¹⁷ Estimated from 2016 reported co-pays for commercial plans and government-sponsored plans and updated for inflation to 2023 dollars using the GDP deflator. Available at:

https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_1/2016/tif5.pdf and

https://meps.ahrq.gov/data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/series_3/2016/tiif5.pdf

¹⁸ We use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to estimate the change in out-of-pocket expenditures for a sample of drugs that switched from prescription to nonprescription status. We do so by comparing average expenditures before and after a marketing status switch. The data show that for the four markets examined (Lamisil, Pepcid, Mucinex, Plan B), there was an increase in out-of-pocket expenditures of \$16 per package (bottle, box, etc.) on average. By contrast, we also observe that for four other markets (Prilosec, Miralax, Xenical, Prevacid) there was a decrease of about \$12 per package (bottle, box, etc.). However, when aggregating all drugs, quantities purchased, and all years, the overall change is nearly zero. For this reason, we assume there is no change in out-of-pocket expenditures.

¹⁹ Adding the out-of-pocket for the drug product would increase the total cost by about \$30. Although the latter number may seem high, most of these products are initially branded, then nonprescription by the branded firm, and generic after that. For a deeper discussion on out-of-pocket trends, see Berndt and Newhouse (2012) p. 242.

856 national average of \$31.48 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This results in a time-cost per
857 event of \$7.87 (= 0.25 hours x \$31.48). For the cost of transportation fare or gas, we consider
858 estimates from Temin (1992), which updated for inflation equals \$4.28. In this case,
859 transportation costs are significantly lower than in the prescription case as consumers may be
860 able to shop for nonprescription products at more outlets and while doing other shopping
861 activities. Although it is possible that some nonprescription purchases may result after visits to
862 physicians, we assume that most nonprescription purchases are associated with no co-pay per
863 doctor visit. We further assume that the change in out-of-pocket cost is neutral and cancels out
864 on average, as in all the scenarios in this appendix. In Figure A1, this is line Cost (NonRx).
865 Compared to the baseline of a prescription purchase, the cost reduction would be \$67.23 (=
866 \$79.38 – \$12.15).

867 For the primary estimate of the reduction in access costs we average the reduction in
868 access costs between the upper and lower bound scenarios. We recognize that, without any data
869 from drug approvals with an ACNU, assuming the primary estimate is the average between the
870 lower and upper bounds is a reference point only. In Figure A1, this corresponds to the line Cost
871 (NonRx ACNU). Compared to the baseline, the cost reduction would be \$33.62 (= \$79.38 –
872 \$45.76).

873 To calculate number of purchases, the horizontal measure in Figure A1, we use the
874 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to first get the percentage of consumers who switch
875 from prescription to nonprescription purchases. MEPS data are collected directly from
876 consumers' responses, and in the case of prescription medications, it is also verified with
877 pharmacists and insurance claims when possible. We use six cases that experienced a
878 nonprescription switch (Claritin, Prilosec, Zaditor, Zyrtec, Prevacid, Allegra) and estimate that at

879 most, 63.4 percent comes from new-to-therapy consumers and at least 36.6 percent from
 880 consumers who transfer. Next, using national sales data, from IQVIA (formerly known as IMS)
 881 for the same six cases, we estimate that on average about 6.2 million purchases occur annually
 882 per nonprescription product. Thus, combining these two pieces of information, the expected
 883 number of consumers who would switch per nonprescription product would average 2.3 million
 884 (= 36.6 percent of 6.2 million).

885 Multiplying changes in access costs (vertical line) by changes in nonprescription
 886 purchases (horizontal line), we calculate consumer benefits from consumers who will switch
 887 from a prescription drug product to the nonprescription drug product with an ACNU. This is the
 888 rectangle area (A) in Figure A1. For the primary scenario, the resulting estimate is \$76.74
 889 million (= \$33.62 access cost reduction x 2.3 million purchases). For the low estimate scenario,
 890 the resulting estimate is \$0 million (= \$0 access cost reduction x 2.3 million purchases per
 891 nonprescription case per year, or by zero if consumers continue purchasing the prescription drug
 892 product.) For the upper-bound scenario, where the access costs for the nonprescription-ACNU
 893 would be like the access costs for nonprescription products without an ACNU, the resulting
 894 estimate is \$153.48 million (= \$79.38 access cost reduction x 2.3 million events).

895 Table A1.- Potential Benefits to Transfer Consumers (\$ dollars 2023)

Item	Primary Estimate	Lower Estimate	Upper Estimate
Baseline access costs	\$79.38	\$79.38	\$79.38
Potential access costs	\$45.76	\$79.38	\$12.15
Time cost per event	\$19.68	\$31.48	\$7.87
Transportation cost per event	\$11.17	\$18.06	\$4.28
Copay for visit	\$14.92	\$29.84	\$0.00
Out-of-pocket per drug product purchase	same	same	same
Access cost reduction per purchase relative to baseline	\$33.62	\$0.00	\$67.23
Number of purchases (million events)	2.28	2.28	2.28
Total cost savings per NonRx with an ACNU (\$millions)	\$76.74	\$0.00	\$153.48

896 Note: Numbers are rounded to the nearest decimal.

897

898 The estimated potential cost-savings using the set of assumptions and inputs are
899 summarized in Table A1. We note that these estimates are based on a set of simplifying
900 assumptions and a sample of products that may not be representative of what we may see with
901 this rule.

902

2. *New-to-Therapy Consumers*

903 Next, we estimate incremental benefits from new-to-therapy consumers who would start
904 purchasing a drug product when available as nonprescription with an ACNU (Triangle B in
905 Figure A1). The access cost reduction estimates, the vertical measures, are the same as in our
906 previous calculations for consumer benefits to transfer consumers.

907 We calculate the expected change in quantity of purchases, horizontal measures, as the
908 difference between each scenario and the baseline Q (Rx). We use a linear demand model: Price
909 = Intercept – Slope * Quantity. The reason for having a demand equation is to estimate the
910 quantity of new-to-therapy in the mid-point between Rx and NonRx that is consistent with our
911 access-cost estimates. We estimate this demand using two observations for access costs and two
912 observations for the quantity of purchases. Thus, the slope is $(\text{Price Rx} - \text{Price NonRx}) /$
913 $(\text{Quantity Rx} - \text{Quantity NonRx})$, or 0.0170 $(= (79.38 - 12.15) / (2,283 - 6,231))$. Prices are the
914 same vertical measures we calculated for transfer consumers in the previous section. Quantities
915 are average estimates, the horizontal measurers, we observe from IQVIA before and after a
916 switch using data for six drug products that switched to nonprescription status (Claritin, Prilosec,
917 Zaditor, Zyrtec, Prevacid, and Allegra). The intercept is $\text{Price} + \text{Slope} * \text{Quantity}$, or 118.25 $(=$
918 $12.15 + 0.0170 \times 2,283)$. Thus, the demand we derive is $P = 118.25 - 0.0170Q$, or $Q = (118.25 -$
919 $P) / 0.0170$.

920 For each resulting point estimate of quantity, we separate new-to-therapy and transfer
 921 consumers based on the corresponding percentage we estimate from MEPS data. For the baseline
 922 Rx scenario, with access costs of \$79.38, $Q(Rx) = 2.3$ million purchases, $Q = (118.25 - 79.38) /$
 923 0.0170 . In this baseline all consumers are transfer consumers and no new-to-therapy consumers.
 924 For $Q(\text{NonRx ACNU})$ the total purchases are 4.3 million purchases of which 1.97 million are
 925 new-to-therapy (= 4.3 million - 2.3 million baseline). For $Q(\text{NonRx})$ the total purchases are 6.2
 926 million and 3.95 million are new-to-therapy (= 6.2 million - 2.3 million baseline).

927 Table A2.- Potential Benefits to New Consumers (\$ dollars 2023)

Item	Primary Estimate	Lower Estimate	Upper Estimate
Baseline access costs	\$79.38	\$79.38	\$79.38
Potential access costs	\$45.76	\$79.38	\$12.15
Time cost per event	\$19.68	\$31.48	\$7.87
Transportation cost per event	\$11.17	\$18.06	\$4.28
Copay for visit	\$14.92	\$29.84	\$0.00
Out-of-pocket per drug product purchase	same	same	same
Access cost reduction per purchase relative to baseline	\$33.62	\$0.00	\$67.23
Number of purchases (million events)	1.97	0.00	3.95
Total cost savings per NonRx with an ACNU (\$millions)	\$33.18	\$0.00	\$132.73

928 Note: Numbers calculated before rounding but are rounded in the table for presentation.
 929


930 We estimate triangle B by multiplying the reduction in access costs (vertical measure) by
 931 the new-to-therapy estimates from the previous paragraph and divide by two. For our primary
 932 estimate, benefits to new-to-therapy consumers would equal \$33.18 million (= (\$33.62 cost
 933 reduction x 1.97 million purchases from new-to-therapy) / 2). For the low estimate, the benefits
 934 equal \$0 million (= (\$0 cost reduction x 0 million purchases from new-to-therapy) / 2). For the
 935 upper-bound estimate, where the access costs for the nonprescription-ACNU are as low as access
 936 costs of a nonprescription without the ACNU, the consumer benefits would equal \$132.73
 937 million (= (\$67.23 cost reduction x 3.95 million purchases from new-to-therapy) / 2).

938 We summarized the estimated benefits in Table A2. We note that these estimates are
939 based on the specific set of assumptions and data described above.

940 B. Model of Applicant Benefits

941 Applicants would consider whether to apply for a nonprescription product with an ACNU
942 based on their expected benefits. The supply line in Figure A2 represents the quantities they will
943 sell at each price level. Thus, applicant benefits would be the triangle area formed by the supply
944 curve and the equilibrium price they receive above the minimum price they would be willing to
945 sell their products for.

946 Figure A2. Illustration of Potential Applicant Benefits from a Nonprescription Product with an
947 ACNU
948



949

950 To estimate applicant benefits we would need data or information to estimate the supply
951 curve and the market equilibrium price. However, a simple way to approximate these benefits
952 when a supply curve is not known is by calculating the rectangle of revenue from equilibrium
953 price and quantities ($P \times Q$) and dividing it by two; this calculates the area of a triangle. This
954 approach assumes the supply curve is linear, has a constant slope, and begins at zero (i.e., some
955 applicants would be willing to sell near marginal cost of production, and this cost is close to
956 zero). This approach could overestimate benefits compared to when costs of production are
957 relatively high.

958 In our analysis, we use revenue data from nonprescription switches without an ACNU.
959 These data represent an upper bound of incremental revenue. We also present other estimates
960 that reflect this uncertainty. Revenue data are from IQVIA, a provider of national pharmaceutical
961 sales data, to measure applicants' revenue and estimate that every year nonprescription
962 manufacturers get \$112.02 million of additional annual revenue from switching a drug to
963 nonprescription status. This number represents the aggregate incremental revenue from new
964 consumers and consumers who switch from prescription to nonprescription purchases from six
965 drug products that switched to nonprescription status (Allegra, Claritin, Prevacid, Prilosec,
966 Zaditor, Zyrtec).

967 Thus, to measure the incremental increase in revenue we distinguish between consumers
968 who transfer from the prescription market and new consumers. The effect on revenue depends on
969 the pricing applicants set in the two markets and how consumers respond. We assume for
970 simplicity that the profit reduction in the prescription market is, on average, balanced out by
971 revenue gained in the nonprescription market from this group of consumers. Thus, incremental
972 revenue comes from new consumers. Using MEPS data on nonprescription purchases, as for

973 consumer benefits, we estimate that up to 63.4 percent of all nonprescription purchases are from
974 new-to-therapy consumers with a primary estimate of 46.4 percent that we derive from the
975 demand equation above. The lower bound is zero as in the consumer benefits section; this
976 scenario represents when there is not enough reduction in access costs to attract new consumers.

977 Using one half of the revenue, $(P \times Q / 2)$, and the expected new consumption estimates,
978 for our primary calculation we estimate that a nonprescription drug product with an ACNU
979 would generate about \$25.97 million $(= \$112.02 \text{ million} \times 46.4 \text{ percent} / 2)$. For the lower bound,
980 we estimate incremental consumer benefits of \$0 million $(= \$112.02 \text{ million} \times 0 \text{ percent new}$
981 $\text{consumers} / 2)$. For the upper bound, we estimate incremental consumer benefits of \$35.49
982 million $(= \$112.02 \text{ million} \times 63.4 \text{ percent} / 2)$. We note that these estimates are approximations
983 for reference because of the simple but strong assumptions necessary to calculate them and
984 because we use data for nonprescription products without an ACNU.

985 C. Potential ACNU Development and Post-approval Costs

986 In this section, we consider application development costs necessary for the applications
987 that may result from this rule.

988 Based on our experience with review of nonprescription product applications and
989 interactions with industry, we assume that core development costs, administrative effort, and
990 labeling would account for about sixty to seventy percent of all costs to prepare application
991 materials. We assume that costs related to the ACNU, such as development costs,
992 implementation costs, and maintenance along with post-marketing and recordkeeping costs
993 would account for the remaining thirty to forty percent of costs. ACNU development costs would
994 likely include consumer studies added to core development studies common to nonprescription
995 product applications.

996 We believe technology-based ACNU applications may need one or more of the following
997 consumer studies:

- 998 • Human Factors Studies. These are infrequently performed for most nonprescription
999 applications, and when they are performed, they are done on a small scale. These studies
1000 would be necessary to show the interactions between the consumer and the ACNU
1001 technology.
- 1002 • Actual Use Studies. These studies would be more complex than traditional nonprescription
1003 applications due to the technology interaction. Longer study timeframes may also be
1004 required of up to 1 year (typical Actual Use studies, when required, are between 3-6
1005 months).
- 1006 • Self-Selection Studies. The number of these studies would likely not change, but their
1007 complexity or the nature of the study could increase.
- 1008 • Label Comprehension Studies. This is the most common study performed for
1009 nonprescription drugs. The number of these studies would likely not change, but their
1010 complexity or the nature of the study could increase.
- 1011 • Label Comprehension Studies. This is the most common study performed for
1012 nonprescription drugs. The number of these studies would likely not change, but their
1013 complexity or the nature of the study could increase.

1014 The rule would require applicants to submit a post-marketing report of ACNU failure.

1015 The rule would also require that applicants maintain for a period of 10 years records of all
1016 reports of ACNU failures and associated adverse drug experiences known to the applicant,
1017 including raw data and any correspondence relating to a report of ACNU failure. We lack data
1018 on the potential frequency of these reports and associated costs. For simplicity, we present cost-
1019 estimates of one report every year. We use the cost of a medication error report from a 2019
1020 ERG report as a proxy updated to 2023 dollars using the GDP deflator.²⁰ These estimates,
1021 rounded to the nearest dollar, may range from about \$475.64 to \$701.53 and average about
1022 \$588.59 per report. These estimates do not reflect any incremental cost of recordkeeping. It is
1023 likely that recordkeeping is a standard practice and that with electronic records the cost to
1024 applicants may be minimal or close to zero.

²⁰ From “Table 3-7. Medication Error Reporting—Labor hours and Unit Cost” on page 42 of the report.

1025 For our primary estimate of development costs, we use \$31.1 million for core
1026 development costs and about a markup of \$16.2 million for ACNU-related cost per application
1027 for a total of \$47.3 million. The \$31.1 million is an estimate from our Center for Drug Evaluation
1028 and Research (CDER) based on feedback from industry on nonprescription drug product
1029 applications generally. We anticipate the additional markup to reflect a higher level of effort to
1030 develop ACNU materials.

1031 For our lower bound estimate, we use \$37.7 million as our estimate of development costs
1032 per approval (= \$24.9 million for core development costs + \$12.8 million for ACNU-related
1033 costs). Our upper-bound estimate of development costs for one application includes \$37.3
1034 million cost of developing all core nonprescription materials for an application, and about \$19.6
1035 million cost to develop and implement the ACNU. These costs combined amount to \$56.9
1036 million.

1037 D. Review Costs

1038 Because the rule could result in more applications, we also present our review costs for
1039 one application. We use review-costs estimates to process applications from the user fees under
1040 PDUFA's schedule of fees.²¹ Our lower-bound is about \$2.02 million for NDAs without clinical
1041 data. For our upper bound, we use \$4.05 million for NDAs with clinical data; this scenario is for
1042 applications with more complex ACNU studies, although clinical data may not be required for
1043 nonprescription products with an ACNU. For the primary estimate, we use the average of these
1044 two costs, \$3.04 million.

1045

²¹ <https://www.fda.gov/forindustry/userfees/prescriptiondruguserfee/>