History

of the

U. S. Food and Drug Administration

Interviewee: Richard E. Williams

Interviewer: Ronald T. Ottes

Date: March 20, 1989

Place: Skidaway Island, Georgia

INTRODUCTION

This is a transcript of a taped oral history interview, one of a series conducted by Robert G. Porter, Fred L. Lofsvold and Ronald T. Ottes, retired employees of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The interviews are with persons, whose recollections may serve to augment the written record. It is hoped that these narratives of things past will serve as one source along with written and pictorial source materials, for present and future researchers. The tapes and transcripts will become a part of the collection of the National Library of Medicine.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES

Public Health Service

Food and Drug Administration
Rockville MD 20857

TAPE INDEX SHEET

CASSETTE NUMBER(S) 1-3

GENERAL TOPIC OF INTERVIEW: History of The Food and Drug Administration

DATE: 3/20/'89 PLACE: Savannah, Georgia LENGTH: 125 min.

INTERVIEWEE	INTERVIEWER
NAME: Richard E. Williams	NAME: Ronald T. Ottes
ADDRESS: [redacted]	ADDRESS: [redacted]

FDA SERVICE DATES: FROM 1939 TO 1962 RETIRED? Yes

TITLE: District Director, Baltimore, Maryland
(If retired, title of last FDA position)

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DEED OF GIFT

Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of

_____

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Date: September 7, 1989 Signed: Richard E. Williams

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Chief, History of Medicine Division
National Library of Medicine

RO: This is another in a series of FDA oral history recordings. Today, we are interviewing Mr. Richard E. Williams, a former official of the Food and Drug Administration. The interview is being held at his hone at Skidaway Island near Savannah, Georgia. The date is March 20, 1989. I am Ronald Ottes.

Dick, I would like to have you briefly sketch your background: when and where you were born; where you were educated; what brought you to FDA; some of the positions you held; and then, if you'd care, what prompted you to leave FDA when you did.

RW: Born Athol, Massachusetts July 11, 1916; educated in Massachusetts schools, Rockland, Massachusetts and Framingham, Massachusetts; University of Maine, 1938, degree in entomology. At the end of my senior year, I took a civil service exam and, a year later, I was offered a job with the Food and Drug Administration.

RO: What grade was that, Dick, at that time?

RW: It was a P-1 grade, salary $2,000 a year. I entered on duty on August 28, 1939.

RO: Where did you start? In Boston?

RW: Boston. That was at the time that the Food and Drug Administration was gearing up to enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, and a whole bunch of new inspectors were brought in at that time. I believe there were

maybe thirty in what was then the Eastern district of the Food and Drug Administration.

RO: Who was the head of the Eastern district at that time?

RW: W. R. M. Wharton.

RO: He was located in New York.

RW: New York. Should I say "rest his dreary soul"? (laughter) We had four months of initial training in Boston under the supervision of Cyril Sullivan, chief inspector. An interesting event was the two-week school for new inspectors of the Eastern district, held in New York early in January 1940. A very beneficial schooling that was. Immediately thereafter, I was transferred to Philadelphia as a junior inspector.

RO: Could we back up just a minute, Dick? What did the training really consist of? Was most of it on the job? You mentioned that two-week training in New York. That was more formalized.

RW: Going back to the initial training in Boston, it was on-the-job training with the very few older inspectors stationed there. I think we had a group of six or eight new inspectors. Maybe five or six older inspectors were there, plus Cyril Sullivan. As I said, it was on-the-job training. Cyril sent us out with older inspectors on various kinds of jobs: sample collections, factory

inspections, food standards work. Fisheries was a big operation in Boston at that time, of course. Lead in maple syrup was pretty well brought under control, but we did get involved in some of it.

Cyril, I think, was a very good indoctrinator. One thing that has always impressed me: he made sure that we had an understanding of the law. I think that's one thing that the inspectors today do not have. They are not trained in what the law requires or what is legally expected of them, what is legally required of industry. I think that's a significant weakness in the Food and Drug Administration field operations the last two decades.

I wouldn't say that there was anything remarkable about the four-month training period in Boston. As I said, I went to Philadelphia in January of 1940. Ken Kirk was the chief inspector, a very, very capable person.

RO: Did you have station chiefs, or were they all under the Eastern districts?

RW: There was a station chief. George Adams was the station chief in Boston. We never saw much of George; I don't know what he was doing. I think that Cyril Sullivan essentially ran the place. Walter Heath was chief chemist. Between them, I think they ran the place pretty well. In Philadelphia, the station chief was Clement Brinton, a very capable, dignified, gentlemanly, intelligent sort of person, for whom I always had the greatest respect.

RO: Was he more involved in the operation at Philadelphia than Adams was in Boston?

RW: He was definitely very much more involved, much more knowledgeable, to my way of thinking. I think Harold Grigsby was chief chemist at that time. At least, his name was Grigsby; I'm not sure about the "Harold."

RO: Was there a considerable difference in the kind of work you did in Philadelphia as compared to Boston?

RW: At the time I was in Philadelphia, which was a little over a year and a half, the 402(a)(4) work began to be developed, and I was very much involved in that in its early stages. I had a variety of other workm, mostly in the food field. Again, other than the filth-in-bakeries projects, there wasn't anything outstanding, just a wide variet of work.

RO: Were you trying to test some of the new provisions of the '38 act?

RW: Definitely 402(a)(4) needed to be tested, and that was an objective. I think it was in Philadelphia that they initially developed some of the techniques for finding insect and rodent filth in foods. Harry Schuman was a chemist who worked a great deal on that. There was another chemist there, too, Marlow Jackson, who did some work on it, but Harry was the leader, I think. Our inspection force at that time consisted of, as I recall, four or five of us new inspectors and maybe four or five older ones, like Lee Gingell. Has his name come up?

RO: No.

RW: John Brechinridge?

RO: John has.

RW: Bob Stanfill was probably the best inspector that they had there other than Ken Kirk, the chief inspector. Bob eventually became chief inspector and then station chief and then district chief in Philadelphia. He retired there. Bob was a very, very capable man.

Oh, I've skipped something. In August of 1941, I was transferred back to Boston. We had a family problem, my own family in Massachusetts, so I requested a transfer back to Boston, and it was effected. I stayed in Boston from then, August 1941, to June of 1943, when I went into the service. My work there during that period, still under the supervision of Cyril Sullivan, was mostly in the fishery work, but a wide variety of other things, too. We were concentrating on fish problems.

Cyril had a lot of extracurricular activity of which we were aware but of which we had no specific knowledge. I know he had very, very close contacts with many of the fish industry people. Indicative of the kind of person Cyril was, an indication that upset us--me, anyway--greatly was the time when Charlie Dickinson, one of the inspectors, wrote a very good report on the significance of a disease in sardines. This report was based upon his training and expertise as a fishery expert. What's the scientific name? I've forgotten. It was a well-written, knowledgeable, comprehensive report. Cyril took the report, put it into the form of a memorandum to the chief of the Eastern

district as, ostensibly, his own work. Charlie Dickinson never got one iota of credit for that.

Because of things like that, we were somewhat demoralized. We suspected his close ties with the executives in the fishing industry. We knew that he was in places where he should never have been at times when he shouldn't have been there. We noticed the discrepancies in mileage of official cars over the weekends and the like. We knew that one time when he was picked up for speeding, probably intoxicated, in Maine, the news story was that he was chasing a truckload of spoiled fish, which was absolute nonsense. We all knew it. We all wondered why he wasn't disciplined a lot earlier than he was.

RO: Did he resign?

RW: Win Rankin can tell you more about the details of that than anybody else. Stu Schoonover has a lot of knowledge about it. I am aware that Win and Stu, maybe somebody else, were investigating in the New England area, along the coast, for a period of time. I cannot pinpoint the dates, but I know that they were there--I won't say "undercover" basis--on a not generally known basis, and I know they were investigating Cyril's activities.

Let me think. Cyril was station chief when I went back to Boston in February 1946. I was transferred to Springfield as a resident inspector in the spring of 1946. I don't remember when Cyril was made the station chief. It was during the war, when I was away. May we go back a bit?

RO: Sure.

RW: George Adams died, I think, in late 1941, and Stuart Postle was brought in as station chief from Cincinnati. Walter Heath died sometime during that period, and Andy Allison was brought in from Buffalo as chief chemist. When I got back from the service, Winton Rankin was chief inspector there, an outstanding, brilliant individual. Cyril Sullivan by that time had become station chief. During that period, those matters that I mentioned were going on, but we didn't have a great deal of direct contact with Cyril.

(Interruption in tape)

RW: Where were we?

RO: You had been transferred to the Springfield resident post.

RW: Oh, yes. Which I enjoyed very much, because I had a great deal of independence, but it was a rather nonproductive two years that I spent there.

RO: What grade were you then?

RW: They changed from the "P" scale to the "GS" scale. When it was, I don't know. But my grade when I went into the service was a P-2. When I came out of the service, it was still a P-2. When I went to Springfield, it must have been a P-3 or the equivalent GS.

RO: Nine.

RW: After two years there, I was transferred as chief inspector of Philadelphia at the G-11 grade.

RO: Chief inspector then was GS-11?

RW: Yes. It was during that period, from August of 1948 to sometime early in 1951, that I had the great pleasure of working so closely with John Sanders as chief chemist and working under the direction of Bob Stanfill as the district chief. During that period of time, I brought in a number of young inspectors that I was very, very proud of who subsequently did very well, like Bud Loftus. Phil Brodsky was really a prize in his very quiet, unassuming way. Charlie Wayne was working there under my supervision.

RO: You know that Charlie is still working.

RW: I'm not surprised. He's way beyond retirement age, isn't he?

RO: Yes.

RW: I didn't recruit Charlie, but he was there as a trainee inspector when I went to Philadelphia, and he developed into a very, very good inspector. I was always proud of that crew we had in Philadelphia. They were a gung-ho bunch

of hardworking, knowledgeable people. I think we had one of the finest inspection crews that ever existed.

RO: You did more drug work in Philadelphia, didn't you, than you did in Boston?

RW: Yes. Luther Johnke was the very knowledgeable drug inspector on whom we relied. He was largely responsible for training Charlie Wayne, Cyril Osbrack, Morton Schneider.

We were involved there with the incubator reject egg project that truly never did get anywhere until . . . To the best of my knowledge, no civil or criminal cases were ever developed in that project. Yet, it was a terrible abuse. It wasn't until the Food and Drug Administration issued a policy statement. A Federal Register publication, if I remember, declaring that incubator rejects were illegal per se.

RO: Dick, for the record, what really was involved in those incubator rejects? It suggests things to us, but what did they do with that? Why was it a lucrative business?

RW: After eighteen days in the incubators, the eggs were candled, and those which have live chicks in them are returned to the incubator for hatching. The rejects were rotten eggs, not necessarily stinky rotten eggs, but they were decomposed; they were bloodied; they had chick embryos in them. They were broken out, mixed up, strained, and put into thirty-pound cans of frozen eggs

and sold to bakeries at a price, of course, less than the going price of good, sound frozen eggs. The marginal bakeries were the outlet for this racket. As I say, I don't think we ever made a case. We spent a lot of time on the project, but it was very hard to catch up with them, and we never really did.

RO: Do you have any interesting war stories in connection with trying to track some of those eggs going in commerce?

RW: It was frustrating. I can remember John Brechinridge and I, when I was a young inspector, staking out some of those places we suspected. Also as a young inspector, I recall getting a report from a cooperative bakery that such and such an egg dealer on Front Street had a supply of incubator reject eggs. I went down to inspect the place. Indeed, I found a lot of eggs in crates, and they refused to let me inspect them.

I went back to the office, which was just a couple of blocks awat, to see if we could find some way to get a search warrant and get to look at those eggs. We got together immediately with a city inspector who had the authority to inspect them. When we got back there, the eggs were gone. "Never heard of them. What are you talking about?" But that's the kind of thing that went on all the time, just a frustrating project.

But when the Food and Drug Administration came out with this pronouncement that they were, per se, unfit for food within the meaning ot 402(a)(4), all reports we got subsequent to then, all information we got subsequent to that time, seemed to be that the industry, the legitimate egg-hatching industry, was preventing them from getting into commerce.

RO: Was there a legitimate market for those incubator rejects?

RW: Tanning. How they were used in tanning, I don't know.

RO: Of course, they'd command more price going into the food than for that.

RW: Definitely, yes. It was something that we wanted to do something about, but never could. Continue with my career?

RO: Continue with your career.

RW: I was chief inspector in Philadelphia until August 1951. I went from there to the chief inspector position in New York for just a few months, working under the supervision of Charlie Herrmann, who was the district chief. Ralph Horst was assistant chief. Jake Fittelson, the chief chemist, was an outstanding, dedicated chemist, with whom it was always a pleasure to work.

Shortly after arriving in New York, Ralph Horst, the assistant chief, was transferred to the district chief position in Denver. At the same time, we had a reduction in force. I guess it was the only reduction in force we ever had. I took over Ralph's job.

(Interruption in tape)

RW: The hearing officer in New York was Hank Cragin. Hank's sole function was to conduct hearings, Section 303 hearings. He had about two hearings a

week. I don't know what he did with his time (laughter). Joe Cummings was our liaison with the U.S. attorneys. I don't know what Joe did with his time, either, because the cases moved out slowly.

RO: That was comparable to our Food and Drug officers.

RW: Those were Food and Drug officers. They were overloaded with them there. Anyway, I took over Ralph's job, Joe's job, and Hank's job from early 1952 to when I left there in 1955. I always look back upon that as the most productive part of my working career. I've always been very proud of what I accomplished there. I worked closely with Ken Lennington, who succeeded me as chief inspector in New York. Charlie Herrmann pretty well let me run my own shop, which was all of the legal action recommendations; review of proposed actions from the chief chemist and the chief inspector; recommendations to Washington; all the hearing work, the court work.

RO: Did that include import work?

RW: No. Fred Killingsworth handled the import work, the administrative work on imports. But Fred and I had to coordinate very closely to make sure we used the same standards, of course. Probably the most interesting case we had during my period in New York was involved with the oleomargarine racket. Is Abe Ledder still around?

RO: I don't know.

RW: Abe Ledder was an inspector who subsequently went to Washington as a Food and Drug officer. Abe was knowledgeable about the work. All the investigations in the oleomargarine racket were under my supervision, even though I had relinquished to Ken Lennington my chief inspector's responsibilities. But I had been involved in the oleomargarine racket from the start and so I just continued it. It was a rather far-flung racket of mixing butter with oleomargarine, about 50-50 mixture, and selling it as butter, a very lucrative trade.

I remember we had one tremendous seizure of so-called butter, fifty-pound cases that were tied up in a warehouse under seizure for years until I left New York. The case was never settled until after I left there. We had several prosecutions where we caught them red-handed, and those dragged on in the courts.

To digress a little: one of the characters involved was Herbert Wool, a butter and egg merchant. Herb was also caught selling fifteen-ounce packages of butter for sixteen-ounce packages of butter. Herbert was a subject of a criminal prosecution, and the defense called on me to testify in behalf of the defense. The sole purpose of my testimony was to explain why I waited from, say, September to the following February before filing a criminal case. I don't know what he expected to make out of that point. The young U.S. attorney handling the case was Dick Owen, who is now a federal judge in New York.

The defense lawyer had told us ahead of time he was going to call on me; he wanted to be sure I was going to be in court so he wouldn't have to subpoena me. Dick and I wondered why he was going to call me, and we

speculated. We came up with the exact answer: the only reason he could call on me was to explain that delay. So indeed, it turned out in court that I was questioned about why the delay, after identifying my functions and position and so on. My answer was, "Because we were at the same time investigating his sale of oleomargarine as butter." The defense attorney moved for a mistrial. The judge looked at him and said, "Mr. So-and-So, you misconstrue your position here. This witness has answered the question which you asked, as your witness. Mistrial denied" (laughter). I remember Dick sent me a photograph of the transcript with that exchange.

I might digress here to point out that in 1952, when Edmund Lumbard became the U.S. attorney for the southern district of New York, he brought in the finest group of young lawyers, who created a totally new atmosphere in the Southern district of New York. Dick Owen was one of them. There's another judge in New York who was one of them. Leon Silverman was one that I always enjoyed working with. He was terrific.

RO: This was New York, not New Jersey.

RW: Southern district of New York. The improvement in the Eastern district in New York and the district of New Jersey was also substantial. They got rid of a lot of the old hacks and brought in, as a matter of policy, smart young lawyers, ethical young lawyers.

RO: Wasn't there an interesting horseradish case?

RW: Let me get back to the oleomargarine business. I got a call one day from the attorney for Best Foods, Inc. I'd had contacts with him before about this oleomargarine abuse. Best Foods produced Blue Bonnet oleomargarine, I think it was. He told me that one Henry August, who he knew we were investigating because we had inquired of the lawyer about him, was due to pick up a large number of cases of oleomargarine from the Best Foods plant in New Jersey, and he thought we might be interested. It was due to be picked up that night. Well, yes indeed, we had been chasing these guys for ages.

I think we had a total of twenty-four inspectors on stakeout in private cars that night. They followed this van or large car that picked up a number of cases, whatever could be carried in, say, a large car heavily loaded. Picked it up in New Jersey. Our inspectors followed them across the bridge going through all kinds of maneuverings, traced them to a place on Westchester Avenue in the Bronx--Temp-Tee Foods.

Our inspectors kept watch on the place from the time of the delivery of that oleomargarine there to the next morning. By that time, we had a team of inspectors ready to inspect the place. Early in the morning, eight o'clock, nine o'clock or so, we went in. We couldn't find one trace of the oleomargarine. We had seen it delivered there; it could not have moved out.

We had two inspectors stationed outside while the inspection was going on inside to keep track of anything coming or going. One of them, Jerry Martel, who was one of the outside watchers, noticed a discrepancy in the building's space for which he could not account. Eventually, we found a very cleverly hidden room, hidden behind movable shelves. We had overlooked it completely in a several-hour search of the place. In that hidden room, which was probably

a bootlegging hideout years ago, we found all of the evidence we needed. We developed a number of prosecutions from that which were still pending when I left New York.

RO: How did they take oleomargarine and mix it with the butter?

RW: Soften the butter, soften the oleomargarine, put it in those big mixers, and then printed it out as pound packages labeled as butter, and sold as butter. That was probably the most difficult investigational report to write because the only way to report that whole incident was to do it chronologically, everything that happened, then have every inspector sign for what his part of it was (laughter). It was a good report in a very, very quickly but well organized investigation.

I really don't know--because I had left New York--whatever happened to the case in the courts. I do remember the head of Temp-Tee coming in and talking to me in the office, confessing everything, turning government witness, if we would let his son, who worked with him, off the hook (laughter). We just put it up to the U.S. attorney. We had no objection to dismissing the son or not including him as a defendant--I've forgotten just what it was--as long as we had the bigwigs. That truly was a most interesting case.

Another interesting one was the olive oil adulteration. When I was resident inspector in Springfield, I was called to New York for a period of time, along with many other inspectors from various parts--I remember Alf Barnard was brought in--as extra help to work with the New York inspectors. Jonas Bassen, who was resident inspector at Rochester, had arranged with Eastman-Kodak to

spike squalene with anthranilic acid. Squalene was a byproduct of some Eastman-Kodak process. Squalene was purchased by the olive oil racketeers to frustrate the only test that had been developed to differentiate between olive oil and the cheaper vegetable oils.

(Interruption in tape)

RW: Jake Fittleson can tell you a lot more about the analytical work because he was the expert in that. Cloyd Russell and I were assigned the job of inspecting Antonio Correo--Correo Foods, I believe it was--simultaneously with other teams of inspectors inspecting other olive oil adulterers. Cloyd and I found that, indeed, they had mixed cottonseed or other oils with olive oil and sold it at an olive oil price, which was very high at that time, right after the war, and had disguised the adulteration by the addition of squalene. The presence of the anthranilic acid in the mixture was proof of that adulteration.

The Correo case went to trial twice, once on a seizure case tried in New Haven, Hartford, then a criminal case in the Eastern district of New York, a trial which went on for about a month. Cloyd Russell and I were sequestered in the jury room and spent a month playing chess (laughter). I think it was not a trial by jury but before the judge. A conviction was brought. Correo appealed the case.

RO: Some of the early sleuthing that went on, I guess.

RW: Jonas Bassen can probably tell you a lot about that too. Is Cloyd Russell still around?

RO: No.

RW: I feel as though I'm leaving out a lot that should be talked about.

RO: Dick, we can always go back.

RW: In April 1955, I think it was, I was transferred to Baltimore as district director, district chief at that time.

Let's go back a moment. As I said, I think that my tour of duty in New York in the early fifties was the most productive time of my life. It was, no doubt, the pace of the whole city and the tremendous workload that was put on me that just was conducive to high production. The more you have to do, the more you can do. I was always proud of the way we moved the cases through the courts because of the cooperation of the young U.S. attorneys in all three districts for which I was responsible, New Jersey as well as the Southern and Eastern districts of New York.

I don't know if it's pertinent, but the man who handled our cases in New Jersey, the assistant U.S. attorney, was one Jerry Sweitzer. Jerry was just the sweetest guy in the world, a very fine person, but not the greatest lawyer. I enjoyed it because he took advice (laughter). He did everything the way we wanted him to do it. We had some very interesting cases in the district of New Jersey at Newark. Judge Hartsorne, I remember, was, in my opinion, an

outstanding judge, and he heard a number of our cases, particularly one involving over-the-counter sales of prescription drugs, where, much to the shock of the defendant's lawyer, the defendant ended up in jail, which is one of the rare jail sentences that were handed out for that kind of violation in those days.

RO: Before we leave New York, I mentioned earlier that horseradish case.

RW: Oh, yes. I don't recall the beginnings of that case but I do recall that Harold Post, who was an inspector in New York at the time, went to the producer of this horseradish way out in the furthest reaches of the Bronx, made an inspection, was able to identify purchases of turnips by that horseradish firm from a wholesaler in New York. Obviously, a deliberate adulteration. The case was prosecuted, went to court in the Southern district of New York. The assistant U.S. attorney was Larry Costigliani, another of the outstanding crew. I think the case was reversed on appeal. I've forgotten the grounds for reversal now. I believe it's a published case.

Another interesting case. To digress a bit first, I was very fortunate when I was in New York to be allowed to enroll in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law course at the New York University graduate school, where Billy Goodrich and Vince Kleinfeld were the lecturers. This brings me to another interesting case, where we extended the reach of the law a bit, in my opinion. One of our inspectors found that a preserve manufacturer had manufactured a product called Lekvar, which they had made from insect-infested prunes. Of course,

the prunes were from California. The prunes had all been consumed in the Lekvar.

I recommended seizure of the Lekvar in the possession of the manufacturer of the Lekvar on the basis that the raw material had moved in interstate commerce. Ken Kirk was then the reviewing officer in Washington. He said, "No way. The Lekvar hasn't moved in interstate commerce." I protested, talked to Ken on the phone. I said, "Hey, Ken, do me a favor. Talk to Billy Goodrich, will you? See if we don't have jurisdiction." Indeed, Billy agreed we had jurisdiction, and we seized it. Now, I believe that that must have been the first time that we extended 301(k) to that particular set of circumstances, and that led to a lot of other actions and a continuing expansion of that section of the law.

Another very interesting case in New York: the Bureau of Narcotics came to us one day. They had been investigating a Sidney Cohen--this was when I was chief inspector--for the sale of narcotics. They'd been on his tail for a long time and never were able to catch up with him, couldn't build a case. I believe that this was an instance where they turned over all of their evidence to us. I don't think we actually had to do any investigating.

But in any event, after I became assistant district chief, I recommended prosecution of Sidney Cohen based upon these circumstances: he had gone as an individual to a wholesale drug house in New York. He had bought a couple of containers of quinine hydrochloride, I think it was. A quinine compound, anyway. He had taken the two containers from the wholesale drug house, got into a taxi, and went to his home in the Bronx. On the way, he took out his pen knife and scratched the product name off of the label. Our case against

Sidney Cohen was based upon the 301(k) prohibition against defacing the label, removing a required piece of information.

I recommended prosecution. Jack Harvey said, "Don't be ridiculous." So I argued that, "Hell, this man is a criminal. He's using this to dilute the narcotics. It's similar to putting Al Capone in jail for income tax evasion." Well, Jack went along with it. We did prosecute and, under the Food and Drug law, not the narcotics law. The judge got the whole picture, and Cohen went to jail for a year, two years, I've forgotten. That was a little bit of innovative application of the law. Not stretching the law but using a very technical violation of the law to get a malefactor.

RO: Was Jack in Washington at that time?

RW: Jack was the deputy commissioner. I think he was deputy commissioner then. I've sort of forgotten the chronology but I remember it was Jack Harvey with whom I argued.

Speaking of the commissioner's office. . . . I'm digressing from my career here to give a few viewpoints. I was very fortunate in being acquainted with Walter Campbell, Paul Dunbar, Charlie Crawford. I admired them and their abilities very, very highly. Came George Larrick; he was the same caliber of person. But then, I became dissatisfied with the Food and Drug Administration because George seemed to be excessively occupied, or even obsessed, with the concept of growth of the organization. I don't mean to imply that he condoned less than quality work, but growth seemed to be the major objective, and with that I was in fundamental disagreement.

RO: By what time was this?

RW: It's when I was district chief in Baltimore in the late fifties, early sixties. I recall saying about that same thing in a district chiefs' meeting, at which George and Jack Harvey and everybody else were present. But I felt that it was not the best use of tax dollars to try to grow too quickly.

RO: We're talking about the administration of the agency. About that time or maybe a little bit before, I believe they had changed the hierarchy as far as the station chiefs reporting directly to the commissioner's office. Wasn't there an intermediate layer--Bureau Field Administration or something—that district directors then reported to rather than to the commissioner?

RW: Following the retirement of Wharton in about 1947, maybe--I was in Springfield, I know--the three-district organization was wiped out. The sixteen stations became districts. The station chiefs became district chiefs. Simultaneously, there were established in Washington three bureaus: Bureau of Regulatory Management, under the direction of Jack Harvey; Bureau of Field Operations, with Allan Rayfield as the initial director. James Clarke, formerly the chief of the Central district, became director of Program Planning.

RO: That was J.O. Clarke.

RW: J.O. Clarke. I think that those three organizations continued until my resignation in 1962. Jack Harvey, of course, became deputy commissioner

during that period of time. Ken Milstead took over from Jack Harvey as director of Regulatory Management. Gil Goldhammer was his deputy. Shelby Grey took over as director of program planning. Shelby, incidentally, was my predecessor as chief inspector at Philadelphia. I think that they were still in place, all three of them, including Allan Rayfield, when I left Food and Drug. It was always a pleasure to work with the workaholic Ken Milstead in the Regulatory Management field.

RO: He's still working.

RW: Is he still with Tillie?

RO: Yes.

RW: If you don't mind my rambling like this, I might go back to 1946 in Boston when I reported back out of the service. Tillie Checchi was a very young inspector at the time. One of the few jobs we worked on together was Farmer Brown's master cell. Have you ever heard of that?

RO: No.

RW: Farmer Brown was a farmer in southeastern Plymouth County. He produced this "magical" cell made out of concrete with nail holes in it. He put this in water and fed it to his animals—fed the water to the animals—and he claimed they grew like mad. He watered his garden with it, and he claimed his

crops grew like mad. Farmers flocked to him from miles around to buy these so-called master cells, which were nothing but concrete. Oh yes, he would show you under the microscope this magical organism that these cells produced: it was nothing more or less than the common paramecium. It was an example of people being very, very gullible.

I can remember Farmer Brown pointing out: "See those chickens over there? You would think those were six-week chickens, wouldn't you?" I said, "Yes." "They're only forty-two days old" (laughter). Tillie no doubt remembers that. Tillie, as you know, went to Denver, I believe it was, as chief inspector. Then he went into Field Operations under Allan, then became an assistant to Jack Harvey, deputy commissioner; left to go to his own consulting business. Some time after I left FDA, I persuaded my company to hire him as a consultant. He's one of my favorite people from the Food and Drug Administration.

If you think back again to the Boston days, Harris Kenyon was another, probably the most capable of that group of new inspectors that we had at that time. He went on to be chief inspector in Boston following Shelby Grey, then went out to Minneapolis as district chief, went into a position in Washington; I've forgotten what it was now.

RO: They called it the field liaison officer. When Dr. Goddard came in, they kind of scrubbed the old scheme there and decided that all the district chiefs would report directly to the commissioner, and Harris was the liaison.

RW: You asked about the district chiefs' reporting relationship to Washington when I was district chief in Baltimore. It was diverse, truly. For administrative purposes, I felt that I reported to the commissioner. I didn't personally but the commissioner's office--Rankin, Harvey, Larrick. I got certain instructions from Milstead, from Rayfield. Of course, Program Planning devised the regulatory programs that we followed to the best of our ability. I was very fortunate in Baltimore that Allan left me alone; he didn't interfere with me (laughter).

RO: There was some rumor that Allan didn't really appreciate that so much, that he left you alone but you kind of ignored him. At least, that was the story we heard.

RW: I think that's probably true. I think I ignored him for good reason because I was following policy, I believe, and I think, as a matter of fact, my judgment was better than Allan's in most cases (laughter). But he did leave me alone. When he felt strongly about something, I'd listen to him and follow his advice and instruction. But I was fortunate that he did indeed leave me alone, and we could run district business in accord with the policies that were laid down. I didn't go my own way out of wilfullness.

RO: You would like to have, though, in certain things.

RW: I ran my district my way but always in accord with what I understood to be policy. I remember you asked about the over-the- counter business in West Virginia. Mervin Shumate was the resident inspector out there, and he

developed some very, very interesting information, the details of which I do not recall at this time. I do recall that reports that we sent in--they went by way of Field Operations at that time--were sat on, with what adverse results I've forgotten at the moment. At the same time, we were being urged by the commissioner's office to attend the monthly meetings of the Department of HEW's Regional Directors and to report the things of interest that were going on.

In due course, I reported to Ed Baxter, the department's regional director, our over-the-counter project in West Virginia. Ed Baxter was quite taken with it and he reported it in the so-called morning report to the secretary. The secretary thereupon quizzed George Larrick about it. George Larrick had never heard of it. I was told that Allan said to some of his associates, "Hey, we got Williams now" (laughter). All of which I ignored. Incidentally, I hired Allan after he retired to work for our Merrel plant on a temporary basis in the GMP (Good Manufacturing Practices) area, and he did a good job there.

(Interruption in tape)

RW: Where were we?

RO: We were talking about that OTC in West Virginia.

RW: Yes. I do not recall enough details about that to discuss it. I know that Merv Shumate spent a lot of time on it. He developed some very interesting

information. I don't know if anything ever came of it. So be it for that. I just couldn't comment.

Watered oysters. You brought up that problem. Again, the problem there was that there just wasn't any standard that was enforceable from the laboratory standpoint. You had to watch them violate the law in order to enforce it. That GICORP organization was established, Joint Industry Government Research Project, to see if they could develop standards and methods of enforcement thereof at a place on the shore of the Chesapeake Bay. I left Baltimore before that ever accomplished anything; I don't know what became of it.

RO: They decided they never could come up with anything. We lost a case of watered oysters, or the agency did. What was the name of that?

RW: I think I was district director of Baltimore at that time, and the case was tried in Norfolk, I believe. It wasn't Morgan, it was somebody else. The inspector involved was Harry Lynch. I don't know why the jury found the defendant innocent, because I thought the evidence was good. However, we did lose it. There's no doubt in my mind but that they're soaking oysters to this day.

RO: Probably so. Baltimore district had a heavy tomato cannery industry. Do you want to talk a little bit about some of the tomato cannery projects?

RW: The problem was packing of rotten tomatoes, packing of insect-infested, fly-infested tomatoes, fruit fly infestation. Packing conditions were primitive but acceptable, for the most part, from the sanitary standpoint, except there were swarms of flies. Tomatoes rot quickly, and there was a legal standard for mold in tomatoes which recognized that it was economically not feasible to eliminate every bit of decomposed material. The standards of tolerances for insect eggs, fly eggs in tomatoes, which again recognized that, gee, those little flies are going to get in there somehow. The sole objective was to keep the flies and the rotten part of the tomatoes to the feasible limit. Whether that was a reasonable limit, I can't tell. I think most of the packers made a sincere effort to control those factors as best they could.

I do recall there was one of the larger plants that had a stop-go system lighting on their lines, which said, "Okay, the mold count is running very low. You can shove the rot through a lot faster and still stay below the 40 percent mold count level." There were also plants there that had a warning system when the inspectors arrrived. The oyster packers had warning systems. They had a good network of warnings on the eastern shore when the inspectors were arriving. It was a major project to try to keep sanitary conditions, unwholesome conditions to a minimum.

RO: Most of those canneries just operated seasonally. They were small operations.

RW: Yes. Campbell Soup, who had a modern plant that operated year round on a variety of products and bought more tomatoes than anybody else was able to

keep its product under control, both from the rot and the fly standpoint, whereas the smaller packers, with their relatively primitive facilities, were not completely able to do it. If the Food and Drug Administration had demanded of Joe down in southern Delaware the same standards that Campbell could achieve, I think that very few of the packers would have remained in business.

Reminds me, an interesting case that came up. Phillips Packing Company, on the eastern shore of Maryland. Cambridge, I think, was a packer of soups similar to the Campbell soups. I believe it was Bill Logan who made an inspection there one day during the tomato canning season. He found that, from the very beginning of the tomato soup canning season, they had been using, as one of the ingredients in the soup, badly insect-infested flour as a thickening agent. He got samples of the ingredient, representative samples of all of the finished products packed during the season. He found the same bugs in the ingredient that we found in the finished product.

We sent Phillips a letter reporting what we found, as required by Section 704(d), just a factual letter, as you know. The day after Phillips executives received the letter, they came into the office. "Well, what can we do about this?" I said, "As a matter of fact, I have in my desk right now—here it is--a recommendation for injunction which will require the destruction of your entire season's pack." So they stopped packing. They informally embargoed the entire inventory, gave us an accounting of it, and searched around for a way to get rid of it because there was a tremendous amount involved.

I remember they finally found a buyer in Holland, for the entire amount, who would accept it with full knowledge that it was in violation of the Food and Drug law, that it contained insect parts from the flour. Of course, meeting

those conditions meant that, under the export exemption, we had no basis for denying the export of it. So Jack Harvey made the final decision that, indeed, we have no choice. That was an interesting operation, which reminds me of another one.

There was a seafood packer on the eastern shore of Maryland, a very well-known company. In their crab picking plant, where they pick crabmeat from the shells, they had these drums for the waste material; crab offal went into the drums, along with cigar butts, cigarette butts, paper towels--what have you, refuse generally. That supposed crab refuse, which, per se, had nothing wrong with it as long as it was just crab, was boiled to extract the crab flavor from the shells and claws and the like—the unusable parts, the unsalable parts of the crabs--and the stock from that boiling was used to flavor quite a variety of products, including their fish sticks and so forth.

I think we sent a 704 letter to them on that matter. They came running in. "What do we do?" Again, "We see no possibility for disposal of any of that stock which you have on hand." I don't remember what became of all that but I'm sure they mended their ways from then on. I think also that that was being done by lower or middle management without the knowledge of top management that this really and truly offensive material was being used.

RO: What kind of federal-state relation did you have at that time, working relationships with the state and local officials?

RW: You're asking about Baltimore?

RO: Yes.

RW: We had frequent, you might say continuing, relationships with the state and local health officials and others in North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia and Maryland, District of Columbia. For example, I remember fondly the director of the North Carolina Bureau of Investigation. I can't remember his name now but he gave us so much help in investigating over-the-counter sales of drugs, a very, very capable individual. A man by the name of Cary, I think, who was in a similar position in the police department in the District of Columbia worked with us very well in that area. I don't recall that Maryland was active at all in that field. Virginia, with Ralph Ware, who was the secretary of the Board of Pharmacy; but he was mostly concerned about the substitution of generic drugs in prescriptions calling for brand-name drugs. That was before the generic thing became a big issue.

I don't know that, in Maryland, either the city or the state contributed greatly to the advancement of our programs. We had good relations but, as a matter of policy, it was my job to make sure we did have good relations. But it was hard to get the state interested in things that we were interested in. West Virginia was a no man's land because of its lack of money to do very much. Of course, Maryland was interested in the seafood industry, watered oysters. We spent a great deal of time with them on watered oysters and never did accomplish very much.

RO: Who was your chief inspector and your chief chemist in Baltimore?

RW: George Sooy was chief inspector throughout my seven years there. Ed Hoshall was chief chemist throughout my seven years. Chick Palmer was assistant to the chief. He went to Washington, then Jim Greene came in from a resident inspector job at Raleigh, North Carolina, to become the assistant to the chief.

RO: Anything particular about either George or Ed?

RW: George was an old-timer, strictly the bureaucratic type. He did an acceptable job of training and managing the inspectors. Ed Hoshall was a very hard-working chief chemist who did an adequate job from the standpoint of personnel management and better than an adequate job from the standpoint of nonpersonnel laboratory management. He was a very capable person, but he was no John Sanders. George Sooy was not the chief inspector that such as Harris Kenyon was in Boston or many others, but adequate. I would not have recommended either one of them to become district chief.

RO: As you know, when you left, George Sooy did become district director.

(Interruption in tape)

RO: Dick, the real reason why you left the Food and Drug Administration in 1962: you had gotten to be district director, and I think that it had been customary for a lot of the district directors to move up and go into headquarters.

RW: I mentioned earlier my dissatisfaction with what I considered to be an obsession with growth. I just fundamentally disagreed with that policy. Second, there were maybe two or three jobs that I would have even considered in Washington from the standpoint of Food and Drug Administration operations. But I didn't want any of those three jobs because they were becoming very political, in my opinion. I just didn't want to get involved in the way things were going in Washington: the politicization of the agency. Third, Richardson-Merrell came along with what looked to me like a good opportunity for my personal financial well-being, the well-being of my family, and for the opportunity to contribute to bettering the company and the industry. So I took it.

RO: What position was that with Richardson?

RW: Richardson-Merrell got itself into a pack of trouble with two products, MER 29 and thalidomide. The president of the company recognized that "things are not quite right in some areas of the company. I want them right. One thing we're going to do is to get a top-level Food and Drug person in here to guide us and advise us, to monitor what's going on in the various divisions, and to make sure we stay on the right track." I liked the sound of it. They offered me the job; I took it.

They couldn't think of a good title. They made me Food and Drug coordinator, which was a misnomer. I was reporting to the secretary and general counsel because I was mostly involved in the legal matters. As a very

practical matter, I reported to the president of the company whenever I wanted to. I had free access to the president. If I ran into problems with, say, the general managers of the divisions, although very rarely did I run into problems, I could go right to the president and say, "Look, we've got to do this." I worked with him; I worked with the executive vice presidents; I worked with my own boss, of course. I was allowed a tremendous amount of freedom to go and do whatever I felt was necessary in working with the general managers, the presidents of the various divisions. I liked the independence and the results.

RO: The problems with thalidomide are probably well known but what about MER 29.

RW: Let me say first that, before I took the job with Richardson-Merrell, I told them that I had been involved peripherally with the Food and Drug Administration's investigation of MER 29 and that I would have nothing to do with that whole subject, and the company honored that commitment and held to that. So I really do not know what it was that caused the problem. You may speculate there was inadequate research; there was speculation that there was falsified research. I just don't know of my own personal knowledge. But I do know that the primary objective I had was to make sure that every bit of laboratory data did surface, was made known, and was reported.

RO: What was MER 29?

RW: MER 29 was a cholesterol-lowering drug, and it was a very, very big seller. It was the only thing on the market at that time that really did a good job in lowering cholesterol. The trouble was, it caused hair loss, it caused cataracts, it caused numerous other very serious conditions and, when all of these side effects surfaced and were reviewed, it led to the total recall of the drug and the prosecution of the company.

Thalidomide, I was deeply involved in it from the first. In my opinion, the company was not in any way at fault for that. They suffered tremendous financial losses because of it. It never went on the market in this country but it was under investigation. They followed all the rules as they existed at that time in the investigation; the investigational drug rules, they followed. The side effect there, as you know, was phocomelia, deformity of babies. They were shocking deformities but here was something brand new scientifically that nobody had ever run across before. The investigations that had been undertaken, both in Europe and here, were in accord, I do believe, with all of the then acceptable scientific parameters.

RO: So then your job was directly involved with the marketing of the new drugs, the IND work and things of that kind, to make sure that there weren't any of the MER 29 or thalidomide problems encountered?

RW: My job with the company was across the board on any aspect that was governed by any aspect of the Food and Drug laws: manufacturing, research, marketing to the extent that the labeling and advertising was in conformance with the law. Any law compliance aspect was my oversight responsibility.

RO: The Good Manufacturing Practice regulations were really put in place after you had joined Richardson-Merrell. What is your attitude about the GMPs?

RW: I think they are a very, very reasonable body of regulations. They make sense. Now, of course, I may be thinking that they make sense because all the good companies were able to adapt to them. Maybe it's just because I'm so well acquainted with them that I think they are good. I think they have done a lot to improve the reliability of the drug. No question in my mind but they do contribute to assurance of safety of the drug. So I'm all for them. As you may know, I became more and more active later in my career with the company in the GMP area than any others because it was a very burning subject with the industry generally and with the Food and Drug Administration for many years.

I spent ten years with Richardson-Merrell in the legal department. Incidentally, my subsequent title was Director of Standards. The idea was that I was the one that was setting standards for law compliance, and it applied worldwide. The standards we established were based upon U.S. requirements but those that made good sense no matter where you produced were established as standards in all of our overseas manufacturing plants. So my oversight responsibilities were expanded to a worldwide basis.

RO: If there was ever a difference of opinion with the Food and Drug Administration and Richardson-Merrell on certain aspects, you would probably

come in and speak before the Food and Drug Administration for Richardson-Merrell. Is that right?

RW: There were times when I did join others in the company with discussing problems with the Food and Drug Administration. However, my primary job was not to represent the company with respect to Food and Drug problems. Rather, in contacts with the Food and Drug Administration on specific subjects, it was the responsibility of the general manager of the division and I, among others, would provide support when I could contribute in some way. But I was not a liaison person with the Food and Drug Administration.

RO: I know in recent years some of the people that left FDA and went to industry, their role was to be a liaison with the Food and Drug Administration. What about your attitude toward FDA after you were on the other side? Like, the outside looking in rather than the inside looking out.

RW: That's not an easy question to answer because of so many ambiguities that could arise on different subjects and different matters. As an industry person, I was always very much in favor of strict enforcement of the law by the Food and Drug Administration. I made any number of public pronouncements to that effect because not only did I believe that the Food and Drug Administration's aim, its existence, was desirable; it was good for the public. Further, it was good for my company to have the law strictly enforced because we were trying to strictly comply. So we hoped that our competitors would strictly comply.

On any number of individual subjects, I would have substantial disagreement with the Food and Drug Administration. For example, I think their handling of generic drugs was unfortunate. They refused to recognize that schlock-houses were in no way complying with the laws with which we were required to comply. Yet, they continually approve the marketing of these generic drugs. That was one area of substantial disagreement.

One case where I did very much participate in company representation to the Food and Drug Administration. I should say at this point that, after ten years as the director of standards in New York, I was offered the job of vice president quality operations at a Merrell-National Division in Cincinnati. Because I was anxious to get back into operations rather than staff consulting and oversight, I took it, which was a very beneficial move for me.

An interesting incident arose when I was there. We had an antibiotic product. I think we had three different forms of the product. We had a large supply of the active ingredient, and we realized the manufacturer's expiration date had passed on this bulk inventory. We looked at the quality of the stuff. It was perfect, absolutely in compliance with all the standards. We looked at the law. There was nothing in the law that said that it wasn't acceptable. We continued to use it. Because it was aged, we did in-depth testing to make sure that both the raw material and the finished product continued to be absolutely in compliance with high standards.

At one point, we had difficulty with one batch of our product that had been submitted for certification. It was a technical difficulty, and our microbiological head wrote a letter in which he referred to the fact that this raw material was three years old. Then came trouble. Food and Drug

immediately refused to certify a large number of batches. They said that we should have relied on the manufacturer's out date. No way were we going to rely on the supplier. We had our own standards, which had to be higher than the manufacturer's standards since the material was under our control. We pointed out in meeting after meeting with FDA that there was nothing in the law that said that we had to comply with the manufacturer's out date as long as we were controlling the quality, that once it got into our possession, it was our responsibility to control it, and we were controlling it exactly as it should be controlled. It was months before Food and Drug would move to do anything about it. They finally released everything, all batches. By that time, the product's marketing potential was dead. That's a case of bureaucratic error and foot-dragging.

RO: This was an antibiotic that you purchased from another manufacturer?

RW: Penick, I think, or one of the major. . . .

RO: Who?

RW: S. B. Penick, I think. I don't know who the. . . .

RO: That's all right.

RW: It doesn't matter. It was a bulk antibiotic that we purchased and used as a raw material. I've got to disagree with the inefficiency of the Food and Drug

Administration and the lack of an appropriate interpretation of the law and the bureaucratic foot-dragging. They just didn't want to admit that they had made a mistake. That was a case where I kept pushing and pushing and pushing to get something done. In fact, I promised myself to keep a log of all that had happened and write a book on it, which I didn't do.

RO: The Food and Drug Administration has been criticized for years for not moving quickly on the approval of new drugs. Do you think that's justified?

RW: There's no doubt in my mind but it was largely justified. Kelsey's Gold Medal in the thalidomide matter created a great incentive to do nothing. Kelsey was right, of course, in doing nothing but she was right for the wrong reasons. She didn't have any idea that phocomelia would be a result of use of the drug. She was very, very fortunate. But I think, for example, that the foot-dragging in the case of the sweetener, aspartame . . . I followed that rather closely and I thought that the Food and Drug Administration was being ridiculously nit-picking on trying to find some reason not to approve. Why do they want some reason not to approve? Because the sole thought from my standpoint, the way I looked at it, was, something could happen way off in the future and, therefore, they're not going to approve it. I don't think there was a scientific or logical reason for not approving that long before they did. There are any number of instances like that. This does not detract from my endorsement of the theory, if they would administer it with good common sense in a positive way.

RO: What do you think about the Delaney Amendment?

RW: Shall we talk about grapes? (laughter). Since 1962, I have not been involved with the Delaney Amendment. I often think of the summers that I spent on the farm when I would be involved day after day, week after week, with the application of lead arsenate dust to various crops. I mean day after day, week after week, without any protection whatsoever. Lo and behold, I'm still alive (laughter). That, of course, is an extreme on one side.

The Delaney Amendment, of course, is, in its intent, correct. I thoroughly endorse the idea of keeping poisons to an absolute minimum. It's necessary. I'm very much in favor of protecting the environment from excessive use of poisons. I think, however, the cranberry incident, with which I was very much involved, was terrible overreaction and even a misinterpretation of the intent of the Delaney Amendments. Fleming was the secretary at that time, and I think he used very, very poor judgment, maybe without getting all of the facts. But he should have had the facts before he created the havoc that he did.

I have to wonder if this present apple thing isn't in the same category, although here it's the environmentalists who are doing the damage and not the government. I wonder about the judgment of the Food and Drug Administration in the Chilean grapes cyanide case. I would like to know more about those two grapes. It's hard for me to believe that we had a warning that Chilean fruit, if I read the papers right, was going to be contaminated with cyanide, and then an inspector on the dock in Philadelphia somewhere finds two grapes with .003 milligrams per grape.

RO: A small amount, yes.

RW: I don't think that was conclusive enough to warrant the havoc that has been created. I suspect something is very screwy about those two grapes. What are the chances of an inspector finding two grapes? I wonder if a mistake wasn't made in the analysis. I recall, going way back now, the time when I was in New York, tuna fish was being canned in Puerto Rico. A massive amount of it was shipped to New York. We sampled a lot of it. The laboratory reported decomposition in the tuna fish. We seized I don't know how much tuna fish. The laboratory was wrong. I've forgotten what became of that. I think maybe I left before the whole thing was concluded. But that was, I believe, a laboratory mistake, and I know laboratory mistakes can be made; I've seen them.

RO: We had that problem with the lettuce one time with parathion, I believe it was, in which the analysis was wrong, and I think the government ended up having to pay for the lot of lettuce that was put on hold. Dick, is there anything else you want to talk about now?

RW: I don't know whether we touched upon this earlier but in my twenty years with the industry, I had numerous occasions to be acquainted with the activities of Food and Drug inspectors. I was quite unhappy with the quality of their work in many, many instances. I felt that they were not adequately trained in what the law requires, particularly in the GMP field. They couldn't answer some of my questions about GMP regulations, which I thought they

should know by heart and be able to apply in a common-sense way. I don't think that they are getting the necessary legal training. I know they're not supposed to be lawyers but they're supposed to understand the laws which they are enforcing. I would hope the Food and Drug Administration would place more stress on their basic education.

RO: Do you think there were times when there was a misinterpretation of the GMPs by the inspectors?

RW: Yes, and misinterpretation of the facts, failure to get to the facts and reporting erroneously. No doubt in my mind. But you know, you can't expect the inspectors to be perfect. Certainly, in the stress of an inspection, they're not going to think of everything. They're going to think that they've got the full story and, if they haven't, that can be ironed out later. But there should be better communication subsequent to the inspection. From the industry standpoint, I became very much in favor of a 704 type letter.

RO: Post-inspection letter.

RW: Or a post-inspection conference. "Here's what we find." And then have the company's response to these findings incorporated into the final report or a district director's addendum to the report. Let's get all the facts on the table first before we jump to conclusions and put in the record . . . Which reminds me. This business of making a record available to the public, summarizing in very, very brief form a Food and Drug inspector's findings.

Number one, they're wrong a lot of the time. The summary is inadequate. It can be very, very misleading to the casual observer or the person who inquires "Please send me the record," or whatever the law was. The full disclosure law? No. What is the law that requires Food and Drug to provide . . .

RO: Freedom of Information Act.

RW: Yes. To have all that information in such erroneous and misleading form distributed to the public is outrageous, in my opinion. And I've looked at a lot of those things. I've asked for a lot of them myself.

RO: Not on your firm but on others.

RW: On others.

RO: Dick, we've covered a lot of things in your career here, and I'm sure there are some things that, after we read the transcript, you'll probably wish that you had covered, and we'll have that opportunity. There's one other question I'd like to ask you now. Do you have any idea how Richardson-Merrell became interested in you and selected you to be their coordinator or whatever the job was? I think it was a good choice, but I was just wondering if you had any idea.

RW: I really don't know. They had the need for an experienced Food and Drug person to perform a function. I know they went looking for someone that would

fit into the company, who had the qualifications they were seeking. I know they talked to at least some others in the Food and Drug Administration. Somebody they talked to referred them to me. When they talked to me, they offered me the job. More than that, I can't say.

RO: Dick, I want to thank you for spending the time as far as this interview is concerned. If there are things after we read the transcript, we can always have an addendum to this. Thank you much, Dick.

RW: I'll be very much interested in reading the transcript to see what I said in the course of this long and rambling and disorganized conversation. I would expect that, in reading the transcript, I may think of other subjects that might be of interest. If I do, or if you do, I'd be very happy to have another interview.

RO: Thank you, Dick.