History

of the

U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Interviewee: Ed Wilkens

Interviewer: Ronald Oattes
Robert Tucker

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Edward Wilkens

April 20, 2004

TAPE 1, SIDE A

This is another in the series of FDA oral history recordings. Today we're interviewing Ed Wilkens, Director of Product Surveillance and Approval Unit in Newark. The interview is taking place in the Parklawn Building. The date is April 20, 2004. Interviewing Ed Wilkens is Robert Tucker and Ronald Ottes. The transcript of this interview, together with the tapes, will be placed in the National Bureau of Medicine and become a part of the FDA oral history reportage.

RO: Ed, to start this interview, we'd like you to give a brief biographical sketch of where you were born, educated, and any relevant work experience prior to coming to FDA, and then we'll kind of cover your career in FDA, some of the highlights of the regulatory things that you were involved in and so forth.

EW: Okay, Ron. I was born in New York City, in the Bronx, in August of 1927. I spent most of my youth and teenage years in the Bronx. I volunteered for the Army. I volunteered, tried to volunteer for the Marine Corps and I was colorblind, so they wouldn't take me, so I ended up

going around the corner and volunteering in the Army in April of ’44. The war was still going on in Europe, but it wasn’t -- I mean the war was still going on in the Pacific. I couldn’t be called until I was 18, so when I was 18 was August 2nd of ’45, and so I reported to Fort Dix on VJ Day. As this war in the Pacific ended, I went to -- that was the day I had to report, August 15th. Everybody was drunk out there, all hung-over from celebrating the end of the war, and I’m reporting at Fort Dix.

So I was in the Army a little over two years. I went to the Aleutian Islands for a year of that to, on a special study they were having for, they thought we might be fighting the Russians, so they had three task forces going in Alaska for cold weather and the Aleutians for wet weather in the United States, and I was there for a while.

Got discharged in August of ’47, went to Cornell University on the G.I. Bill of Rights, in the College of Agriculture; graduated from there in ’52 with a degree in wildlife conservation and game management. And one sort of interesting thing. While I was at Cornell, everyone in the College of Agriculture had to work during the summer and earn credits during the summer toward graduation. Work credits, they called them. The first two summers, we had to work on a farm, and I worked on a farm up there; and the next two summers, you had to work on something that you were

going to be doing in your major, so I ended up working for Ringling Brothers Circus, Barnum and Bailey Circus. And people said, "Well, how did you ever get, how did you count that?" Well, I worked in the menagerie tent with all the animals, and at the time I was thinking I was going to go into the animal importing business, and all my friends that I was in class with, they went to pheasant farms and various places. And when I came back from the circus after each summer and showed them all my circus pictures with all the good-looking women and all that, they just couldn't believe I got credit for this for graduation. But I did, and I had some fantastic experiences in the circus. We had two murders while I was there, and a lot of exciting things happened.

In fact, I almost didn't come back for my senior year at Cornell because they offered to train me to be a catcher on the trapeze, not a flyer but a catcher. On the 4th of July each year, they had a competition among the employees in athletic events, races and everything, and they had rope climbing, and I had rope-climbed in school. So they had it divided it between the performers and the workers. So I climbed the rope and I tied with the performer who climbed the rope. I was a good rope climber then. And I got a half, I got a, I think we got twenty bucks or something prize from John Ringling, [unclear] son, so that was a big

deal.

And on the basis of that, this fellow said he could train me to be a catcher. When I told my parents that -- we were out in California at the time and with the circus -- they didn't think much of it, so I had to fly back just in time to start my senior year in college, and told my friends what I was doing that past summer. They could never get over the fact that I got credit for that.

So, after graduating from Cornell, I took the Federal Service Entrance Exam, the FSEE back then, and got on it for a wildlife biologist, got on a list, you know, the list that you get on, and was waiting to be called. Now, this was like from '52, '53. And I was working. I did odd jobs then, mainly working for my uncle. I had an uncle who was in construction, and he did a lot of sidewalk work and stuff like that, so I worked sort of as a laborer, mainly on Park Avenue and 5th Avenue, which is the properties that he was doing work for.

And then, finally, I got an offer. I got a call from the Fish and Wildlife Service for a job at the Office of River Basin Studies in Atlanta, a temporary, six-month appointment. So I grabbed that and went to Atlanta, Peachtree Street, and was down there in the southeast region of Fish and Wildlife for the next approximately six months, and part of that time I was in Vicksburg, Mississippi, doing

this work, and also went with them on a couple field trips to Florida.

They were doing at that time a study of the wetland areas in the United States, the whole country, and the wettest part of the country was down in the southeast, where, in the Florida area, and that was the last state they had to do, so all their biologists were out doing the various areas.

What they'd do, they'd go out to these wetland areas -- marshes, swamps, rivers, streams, whatever -- and they'd evaluate them and the value for different kinds of wildlife -- ducks and bear and cougar and opossums -- and they had a big chart, big aerial photographs, and they would mark the areas with different-colored pens, and they would put codes down for the values of the different things, and all these maps would come back to the Atlanta office, piles of these maps, and they hired me to summarize that information, and you had what they call a planimeter. You run it around the edge. It has a little wheel on it and it measures how big that area is. So you'd measure the area here and you'd put down what part of an acre it was or how many acres it was, and then you'd put down a different value for the various types of wildlife. You'd have maybe hundreds of those on one map, and I'd be sitting there all day doing this stuff. So finally they figured, let's get him out in the field and

let him see what it's like out in the field, and that's when I got some chance to go out in the field.

But at the end of that time -- I didn't much enjoy the maps. The fieldwork I enjoyed. And these guys were real, real wildlife people. They went in station wagons and they'd have their fishing rods laid out in the back of the station wagon, and they'd drive along and they'd see a good spot. They'd pull up and stop and get out, fish for about half an hour. At night they would stay in fishing camps in the lakes down there and fish. They [unclear] had a job and they loved it.

But after six months, they got a budget cut, so I had to go, and the fellow that came before me had to go. And they'd get money from the Corps of Engineers. They'd sort of switch money with each other, and they said, "We'll get you back, we'll get you back."

But right after that, I got a chance, an offer from Beltsville, Maryland, Agricultural Research Service right here at Beltsville, to work, come as a parasitologist. I'd had one parasitology course at Cornell. It was a good course. But I had one course, so technically I qualified for that.

So I took that job at Beltsville and was there about, I guess, two months, when Fish and Wildlife called me back and said, "We got more money. Come on back." And I said, "No.

I like it here now," and so forth. So I stayed at Beltsville.

I got hired in Beltsville, I guess, oh, I guess it was in '55, and that's where I met my wife, in the log lodge there. They have a big log lodge with a big restaurant. It's really a -- well, I don't know if it's still there now. But that's where everyone went to eat. She was in another part of the Agricultural Research Service, so all the people would go down and eat there, and you'd get to meet these people. So I met my wife there.

And I worked as a parasitologist. We would feed the different species, mainly dogs, cats, sheep, goats, pigs -- no cattle. They had a large-animal group that did that. And you would infect them with internal parasites. You'd get the eggs and you'd infect then with it, and then you'd wait until they developed. Then you'd treat them with different drugs, and then phenothiazine they invented out there, and they did phenothiazine over and over and over again to try to get, instead of 96 percent efficiency, they wanted to get 96.3, you know, and so forth. So they did a lot of that work.

And then you'd have to slaughter the animals and autopsy them and see how many parasites were left and figure out the efficacy of the particular drug that you fed them. And that got a little tiresome, particularly with dogs and

cats. I don't like to kill dogs and cats, so I didn't really enjoy that part of it. The pigs and the other things weren't too bad. But it wasn't something I want to do for the rest of my life.

In addition, just about everyone out there had a master's degree, and most of them that were going anywhere had Ph.D.'s. I mean, they had authorities out there on parasites, and they were all going to school, and I figured this really is . . .

I started taking organic chemistry. I took, I got A's in two organic chemistry courses at Maryland while I was out there, figuring I'd . . . But I just wasn't happy with the job as a career.

So I don't know to this day who said, "You know, you might be interested in working for Food and Drug." I didn't know anything at all about Food and Drug. So I said, "What can I lose?" So I came down to the HEW Building then. I guess it was sometime in the summer.

RO: Excuse me a minute. What grade level were you when you were working . . .

EW: I think I'd gotten a 7; yeah, I'd gotten a 7 there. I came on as a 5, and then I got a 7.

So I come down to the HEW Building and just walked in and went upstairs to the Food and Drug office, came in, saw the secretary, the receptionist, whoever was there, and told

her I'd like to find out about a job, and she says, "Oh, you're really lucky, because our Chief Inspector is in the office today." It was Ken Lennington. And he says, "I'll let him talk to you."

So Ken Lennington interviewed me for about two and a half hours, and he really did a good interview, and he told me a lot about this undercover work that they were doing then, because it was right after they had the -- well, I guess it was during. This was now '57. It was after they had those, the group that went out and drove trucks and they trained them to drive. Clevenger was involved in that, and Bill Hill, I think, and Stonecipher and North, I think, and other people that actually went out and got trained by a trucking company.

RO: That was what, in 1955, wasn't it?

EW: I think somewhere in there, so it was right after that, a year or two after that, and they were starting to do a lot of truck-stop work then. And so he mentioned a lot about that, but he also covered all the other work generally, you know, and it sounded great to me after what I'd been doing. So I said I was interested, and he gave me the forms. I filled them out. And he said, "If you get hired, you'd be in Baltimore District since you're here."

So, to make a long story short, I did get the offer -- and I guess it was, I think I came on as a 5; the top of the

5 or whatever was comparable to what a 7, the level I was in the other place, at Agriculture -- and came on as an inspector and reported to Baltimore. And, let's see. Baltimore, yeah, November 4th, '57, was when I reported to Baltimore.

And there, of course, was Dick Williams, who was my first idol. I mean, he was terrific. I thought, this guy is great. And, well, you know, he was in the Coast Guard, and he'd been in that Coconut Grove fire and his wife had gotten killed there and the whole thing. And the thing that impressed me the most was, when he trained, when we got trained, he's the one who went over the Food and Drug Act with you. We would have sessions with him on the Food and Drug Act. I still have my diary, the first diary. I still have my diaries, and there is the sessions with Dick Williams. You know, sometimes twice a day we would sit down with Williams, and he'd go over . . .

He'd come from New York District. He was -- I don't know what his title was up there, but it was like assistant to Charlie Herman, who was the director up there at the time, and he handled a lot of the legal cases in New York, a lot of the prosecutions and things, so he really had a good knowledge of the Act. Joe North knew him up there. Joe North had been in New York, and he, I guess, brought Joe North down when he came down here. So I heard a lot about

that from Joe North when I worked with him.

But Williams was very interested and really was an inspiring director.

RO: George Sooy was . . .

EW: Sooy was the Chief Inspector, Chief Inspector, yeah. And I'm trying to think. I know a lot of the investigators. I know Larry Carter was there with . . . I have old directories from back then, so a lot of these people that were there, some of them stayed in, some of them left.

But, so I started working in Baltimore, and, as I say, they let me do a lot of my work in the Washington resident post.

I brought stuff down for John Swann, but one of the big projects, of course, we did was oysters. Remember ordering oysters? And we had, for three years in a row, we went down to the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia and inspected these oyster packers during the holiday season. Thanksgiving and Christmas was when they made most of their money. Everyone was buying oysters. So that's when they decided they were doing the most -- it wasn't really adulteration; it was an economic violation. They were putting more water in. They would blow them long in the blowers and they would absorb water, and they claimed they could get three pounds out of two pounds of oysters. They

could soak them up to three pounds.

So we went down there and were told to go in and stay there and watch them, and that sooner or later, since it was the peak of their season, they might behave themselves for a while, and then [unclear] start soaking anyway, and they did in some places. And you'd have to get up real early, of course, and get in there, and there were various size plants, and some had like 200 packer, shuckers. They'd shuck these oysters. A few of the fellows had oyster shells thrown at them as they're walking around, you know, looking, and bing, an oyster shell bounced off the wall, you know, because the people were mad that you were in there, the shuckers, because they were, the firm was losing money and they were [unclear] losing money, too.

And a lot of people came down to assist Baltimore at that time of the year. They had people from -- people from New York came down, and some of those people I eventually got to be with when I was in New York. Those are cranberries; here's oysters. And so I, you know, here's -- this was our instructions on what we were supposed to do during the inspection. This was the thing, how you recorded all the temperatures. I still have some of those. And they'd break you up in teams. Don Sherry came down. Of course, Frank Thompson was the resident in Richmond. He was one of the team leaders. And, let's see. Harold Post; you

know, Harold Post from New York came down.

RO: Now, the Fish and Wildlife Service didn't have any interest in this problem at all, did they?

EW: No, no. This was strictly, strictly an economic -- no health hazard, just an economic, apparently a pretty significant economic problem for the industry because they made a lot of extra money.

This is a clipping: "Oyster Watering Fight Tough," and I have Richard Williams and so forth in here.

So the first year was, I guess, '58, because I'd only been there a short time.. And then '59 and '60 we went back again, and they modified the procedure each year a little bit.

Bright. Remember Bright? Bright was one of the guys. Of course, Carter. Forrest Herron was there. Hank Wisson, Ray Epling, Dave Duncan, Bligh. Looks like Ryson; that's Tom Ryson; Turpin.

RO: Was the state interested in this? Did they assist you at all in these?

EW: I don't recall the state being involved at all in this, no. I don't think they could spare people for this type of an economic violation. We had trouble getting -- in fact, it says in this article we had trouble getting enough people to cover the industry. There were hundreds of these packers.

Here it says -- this is from the clipping -- "This is a tough order for the 20 inspectors in the Baltimore District when there are an estimated 250 to 300 packing plants in the Bay area." So, "Plants have been shown, for instance, simply to stop operating while an inspector is present, then reopening in the middle of the night. More commonly, a packer turns off his water when an inspector appears, turns it right back on when he leaves." And, of course, when we felt that we had a batch that was probably above the standard, then we would take the sample of it there. We would, of course, when it was loaded on the truck, we would get all the information on the truck so that if it was going north, they would try to stop it up there. The problem was the analysis. By the time you got it checked and everything, the stuff had been sold in most cases, this water . . . And we had the skimmers. We could skim it. You throw the stuff out on a skimmer, it's like a screen, and the water drops out and you collect the water, and you can do a calculation to figure if it has more than it should. It wasn't the easiest thing to do, especially for trainees. But the group leaders used to do the skimming to get an idea whether it was worth sampling, because we had to pay for the samples, of course. They charged. Since you were bothering them, they'd charge you a ton of money.

So, how effective that whole project was, I don't know.

RO: Well, analytically, how did they determine excess moisture, water?

EW: Other than -- I don't know what they did in the lab, although it shows them doing it, I think, some of the stuff I hade here in the lab. But just what they did in the field, you know, how we did that out in the field to see if it was worth sampling.

RO: Well, you had these great big stainless steel skimmers that you used.

EW: Skimmers, right. And you'd take a gallon of it, because it was packed, and you'd dump it in there, collect the water at the bottom. You'd [unclear] on after a certain period of time, and you can't press it or anything to squeeze water out. You just had to sort of spread it out gently on there and let it drain. And then you'd do this calculation, which I can't remember now what it was, and you'd see if the percentage was over what you thought it should be. But it was time-consuming, it was -- it wasn't the easiest thing in the world to do. And it was not an easy sample to collect because a lot of times more water -- when you'd get them packed and they'd be shipped and they jostled in the truck, more water would come out of them in the truck sometimes. So when you, if you sampled it further on, you'd probably get a lot more water in your sample at the other end than you got here because it got sort of

pressed out during the trip.

RT: Was there any consumer interest in this, or was this more the protective objective of the enforcement agency?

EW: Well, the people in the area, of course, it was a big industry down there in that area, and they were interested in it. And, of course, when we were on this assignment, we would have loads of oysters to eat. All these oyster restaurants down there, we'd have a great time eating. But I really don't have a feel for whether the public, you know, was complaining about it or not, because the public got good oysters, but there was some more water in them, and I don't know if a lot of them knew that they were getting that. They were paying a high price, but I don't know if they knew that they were getting extra water. So I don't think it was something that a lot of the public, other than from the newspapers, knew that they were getting gypped.

RT: Well, I guess after three or four years of that project, the agency decided that economic violations were not a high priority.

EW: That's what happened, yes. They stopped doing it. And as far as I know, they just don't do that anymore.

RT: That was your first experience with FDA.

EW: Right.

RT: And then you got involved in over-the-counter?

EW: Well, I have another experience.

RT: Oh, you've got another?

EW: Oh, I have another one, yes.

RT: Good.

EW: We had the cranberry crisis, aminotriazole.

RT: Yes.

EW: And that was when I was in Baltimore, and that was in '59. That was during Thanksgiving of '59. That was Thanksgiving season of '59. And I'm going to give this stuff to Swann. This is some clippings. This is Ron Thomas from the lab doing cranberry analyses. And this was . . . Incidentally, it involved a pesticide, I guess, that they put on the product, and it got soaked up into the berries, and they found out that it was, it caused cancer in rats if you ate a whole lot of it, the rat ate a whole lot of it. But it had happened out on the West Coast. I think in Oregon somewhere they had found it, not here. But since they used the same thing here, we had to go out and -- Wisconsin, it was. We had to go out and sample cranberry juice, cranberry sauce, you know, all kinds of cranberry products.

I remember the lab in Baltimore. The hallways were lined up with cases and cases and cases of all kinds of cranberry material, and they were analyzing it and analyzing

it and analyzing it. I don't think we ever found anything.

RT: Actually, the analysis and so on probably was postdated, postdated the Thanksgiving holiday, didn't it? I mean, that volume of work took quite a while to accomplish.

EW: Oh, yeah. But they also thought they'd go out of business. They were saying the cranberry industry is ruined, you know, it's going to go out of business. This is an article: "Cranberry Cross."

RT: Now, cranberries were usually raised in a bog.

EW: Yeah.

RT: Was the aminotriazole added in the bogs?

EW: Yes. It was added in the bogs and then soaked up, apparently, into the plant.

RO: Well, didn't the agency certify certain lots for Thanksgiving that were . . .

EW: I think, yeah. After we -- you're probably right. After we analyzed the lots, we probably put out signs that these codes were okay.

This is an article on -- this is Rayfield; Rayfield put this out, Alan Rayfield, December 2, '59, "Cranberry Operations and Change of Emphasis. With Thanksgiving Day behind us, we are no longer asking for the objective sampling of cranberry products on the market. The examination of the totality of such stocks is beyond the capability of the Food and Drug Administration. Reports to

date indicate the cranberry industry is assuming little if any responsibility for the examination. The emphasis now will be directed toward investigation of retail stocks in which the individual consumer packages bear the statement, 'Examined and passed by the Food and Drug Administration of the United States, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, certified safe under plan approved by U.S. Government,'" and so forth. So this was the plan back then.

But we worked on that for weeks and collected and collected and collected. Now, remember, back then they would let you take home products that passed and the remaining lot that was not going to be examined. So you'd see the chemists walking out with shopping bags with stuff, and we'd say, "Hey, give us some of that. We collected it." So we had a lot of cranberry stuff to eat, but they stopped that a few years after that. Of course, up in New York used to be the same way.

So that was my second exposure, was to the cranberry crisis. And one other quick crisis was . . .

Oh, one other quick interesting thing. I worked on the Scientology, the Founding Church of Scientology. That was L. Ron Hubbard. And Joe North, who was the resident in Washington, D.C., as I say, at the time, he made an inspection of their -- he and I made an inspection of their facility in Washington -- it looks like it's on 19th Street,

N.W., the Founding Church of Scientology, the Academy of Scientology, the Hubbard Guidance Center -- and we collected books they had, and they had what they called an E meter that they would test you on. You'd hold these two tin cans, and they were attached to an ohmmeter, and then they'd ask you questions and read the response on the ohmmeter, and they would do this. They called it clearing you, clearing your mind. It was a clearing procedure. And, of course, people were paying a lot of money to do this stuff. And they were selling the E meters.

And then they had a huge batch of what they called anti-radiation tablets. I think it was folic acid or whatever it is that makes your face flush. And they were selling them as anti-radiation tablets, because back then was when the Russians were testing, and we were worried about fallout and we were sampling vegetables and everything. So they'd tell you, you know, you take these tablets and you'll get the same effect as if you were radiated because your face would flush, and that'll protect you from fallout.

So they had a big batch of that, and we sampled that and we ended up getting that seized. But, boy, as soon as we left that place, they wrote to the Commissioner, they wrote to congressmen, and these are two letters. This is a letter to Larrick, George Larrick, who was the Commissioner

then. And this one went to Marian Folsom, who was Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Now, this is April of ’58. I was in like six months. I’d come in in November ’57. I’d only been in six months. And they’re writing this letter to the Commissioner: “I wish to register a complaint against your inspectors, Joseph R. North and Edward H. Wilkens, who conducted an investigation of this company April 8, 1958.” And Dick Williams sent a copy of this letter to him. He said, “Oh, this is great.” I said, “What do you mean? I’m going to get fired! I’ve only been there six months.” He said, “No, it’s the best thing that could happen to you. [unclear] make it happen to you. They’ll all know your name now.” I said, “Yeah, but they’re going to . . .”

And they’re saying, “Your inspectors fell upon us like wolves and interrupted the activities of our entire office.” And then they go on and on. “Our company deals mainly in religious goods. We have scrupulously [unclear].” Anyway, “Your inspectors . . .”

TAPE 1, SIDE B

RT: . . . your situation. You want to continue? You were talking about wolves as I recall.

EW: Oh, are we back on?

RT: Yes.

EW: Oh, okay.

They, in the letter to Larrick, Commissioner Larrick, they criticized us personally and then the government in general. “When government officers attack only churches and women, the time has come to make an example.” Mrs. Hubbard was there when we made the inspection, and she was pregnant, so she claimed that “the violence of these inspectors was such as to make ill a lady.” This is supposedly Mrs. Hubbard, who was pregnant at the time. She was running the place.

So we were -- I was worried what was going to happen to my career after this, because we certainly had . . . “The interruption of a small business for a day and leveling at it brutality and threats cannot be government. It must be terrorism.” See, even back then, terrorism.

So, to make a long story short, we tried, we were [unclear] awfully sure they would seize the E meters because they even put us on the E meters. They put Joe North on an E meter and were asking him -- he’s holding this. And one guy come up and touched him behind the ears. He said, “Did anyone ever kiss you back here?” And North says, “Oh, all the time,” you know. Oh, and they’d watch the E meter jump around. “Look, look, look.” And it was ridiculous. But they were selling those to clear your consciousness. So they did not seize the E meters. They did seize the tablets.

And eventually, a couple of years, two or three years later, Taylor Quinn came to us in the post -- he was a, he started off as a seafood inspector down in New Orleans. A lot of these guys did shrimp and everything. Jim Green was another one who started out with Quinn down there.

When Taylor came up, they put him in undercover into Scientology. In other words, he signed up for a course and he would attend the course. And Quinn was a very sharp guy, you know. I mean, he was smart. You know, I played chess with him and bridge with him, and no contest. But he went in there and went through the whole routine. And he'd come back from these things and tell me what happened. And they'd sit you with one of their clearing people. You had to rub knees with them; your knees had to touch, and you'd stare each other in the face and you'd ask each other questions. And he went through the whole thing looking for something we could take action on. We never could come up with, they weren't claiming to cure anything officially, you know, so we never could, did anything really on them.

Eventually, a couple of years later, they got some other, some stuff on Scientology, but it's so covered with religion that it's, you tend to stay away from it.

But that was a very interesting investigation. Okay.

So I did a lot of that. So I did the usual inspections of filth in bakeries and so forth. I worked with Bill

Robinson in West Virginia. He was in Charleston, West Virginia, resident post, Bill Robinson. And, again, I'd only been there a couple of months. It was that winter. I come in November, and it was that winter, December, January, they had me down there working on a field trip, working with him, and a grain elevator burned down in Huntington, West Virginia. And this District conference was coming up, and he was supposed to be there. We were supposed to be there, but he was supposed to be there as a resident. So he's says, "I'm going to the conference. You take over this investigation." I hardly knew [unclear]. And he left me there in West Virginia. I never forgave him for that.

And I was collecting samples of this grain that they were shipping out. You know, a lot of it was wet and had gotten wet and was moldy, and they were shipping it all over the place, and I'm out there all hours of the day and night sampling this grain, packing it in boxes, shipping it, getting two or three hours' sleep, rushing back out, sampling more. I'd call the office, and Sue was, "Oh, you're doing a great job down there. Keep it up." I'd say, "Geez," but it was a great way to learn. I mean, it was sink or swim.

But Bill Robinson was okay. He trained me in warehouses, too, and, boy, some of those warehouses, food storage warehouses in West Virginia. I went to awfully cold

places.

And I worked with Frank Thompson in Richmond, which was great. You'd go down there on the ferry, the old Bay Line, right across from the office. You'd go over, get on the old Bay Line, overnight. You'd go down on the boat, you'd get off on the dock and he'd be waiting for you there, and then you'd go out. And him I worked peanut warehouses, huge stacks of peanuts.

RT: Where was that, at Norfolk?

EW: Norfolk, I'm sorry, not Richmond. Norfolk. Norfolk, not Richmond. Norfolk, right.

RT: I heard him say that because I used to work with Thompson and knew him pretty well.

EW: Yeah. It was [unclear].

RO: [unclear] we both got back [unclear].

EW: Yeah. He was a good guy.

And we'd go in these places, and [unclear] all these peanut bags, crawl up on top of the bags and [unclear] again.

And then I worked with Larry Carter on the Shenandoah Valley, on apple products.

RO: You said you'd black-light. What did the black light show?

EW: It would show if the urine. If the rodents were in there and had urinated on the bag, the black light would

make it fluoresce, would make the urine stains fluoresce, and you knew that it was contaminated. And you could then sample it, and some of the peanuts underneath, hopefully, and find that the pee had gone through and the peanuts may have become contaminated, and you could seize the entire lot if you were lucky enough.

RT: That was really an ultraviolet light.

EW: Ultraviolet light, yeah, yeah. They still have them now, but up in our office, they don't use them very often anymore. We don't do that much food work.

This is -- do you remember Joyce Hunley, I think?

RT: Yeah.

EW: She was a chemist up there.

This is apple products: "Byrd's Apple Firm Probing FDA Charges." This was '58, December '58. Senator Byrd was involved in the apple business, the senator's son, Richard E. Byrd, and they found . . . Larry Carter was big on apple products.

RT: What were they looking for in the apples?

EW: They were looking for contamination, mainly with insects. Fruit flies and fruit fly eggs a lot of times would -- the fruit flies would get into the vats where they were holding it, and a lot of times they'd end up or fragments would end up in the apple juice.

RT: Had they sprayed those with pesticides, or were

they looking for pesticides in those apples, too?

EW: I guess they were, I guess they were. But we were looking mainly -- we would get the pesticide information, but we were mainly looking for filth.

And I remember they had these huge tanks that they kept them in, big, huge, huge wooden structures outside. And Larry was way up on the top of these things, and he'd look in, and you'd see the top of the juice that was in there, and around the edges of it was where you'd find these flies. They would be along where the juice hit the wood. There'd be a lot of this accumulation of stuff. And I remember holding him by his legs, and he's hanging down in this vat with this camera, and he called it a Philadelphia lens. He had this Philadelphia lens on the camera, which was an extra magnifying lens that went on. And he had to tie it on because he was afraid it would fall off and go into the vat. So we'd be holding him, and he'd be down there taking these pictures, and he used to take the greatest pictures. I mean, he had beautiful pictures. You could see those insects all around there. So he got a lot of seizures of apple products.

RT: Wasn't that the practice not only in apple, the apple industry, but I think pickle curing.

EW: Oh yeah, yeah.

RT: To have open vats.

EW: Open vats, yeah.

RT: And the industry contended that the layer of liquid really protected the product from that contamination.

EW: Yeah. I never did a pickle plant, but I think the storage was the same thing, yeah. But Larry was great on that stuff. And, boy, he had the greatest pictures.

RT: Well, I think Ron mentioned the spray. As I recall, in the earlier days of FDA, I think John Harley, who later was Deputy Commissioner, when he was in [unclear], they used to do a lot of work on, I think, lead sprays on apple orchards [unclear].

EW: Okay.

RT: But that probably had been terminated fresh before the period you're speaking of.

EW: Yeah. This was '58, my first year really in, my training year.

So all of these things I was doing, but I got involved in undercover work. They called it OTC work, over-the-counter, OTC work, meaning drugs sold over-the-counter without a prescription under the Durham-Humphrey Amendment, which was, I guess, '52, Durham-Humphrey Amendment, which said certain drugs couldn't be sold without a doctor's prescription essentially, and that covered, of course, people who could legally sell them, like pharmacists and doctors, if pharmacists had a prescription. And people who

were selling them, like truck-stop operators and dance-hall people and anybody who sold them and there was no prescription involved, would come under the Durham-Humphrey Amendments. And from stuff I've been looking at recently, back in those days, the '50s and '60s, probably 90 percent of our prosecutions were in these sorts of things, either drugstore cases or people who were selling illegally that had no right to sell them at all.

RT: Wasn't a lot of that traffic in amphetamines?

EW: Oh, yeah, amphetamine and barbiturates. Right.

So what, how I got involved, Joe North had done a lot of this work in New York District. And, again, he was the resident in Washington, and he'd done a lot of this in New York District. So . . .

And, incidentally, as an aside, Dick Williams told me that Joe North was the best investigator he ever knew. He says he would, you'd send him anywhere, and he'd come out with a violation, and he said it would be tied up with a bull. You didn't have to do anything. He had all the evidence, he had all the exhibits, he had all the shipments, everything you needed. You just had to hand it over to the Compliance Officer -- there were no, officially, Compliance Officers -- hand it over to the people [unclear], and they could run with it. So he was, he really had a lot of respect for North as an investigator. So, he's the one who

trained me in a lot of this stuff.

He was doing, he had a case, a drugstore case at that time, Wesley Heights Pharmacy. It was right outside of, it was right near American University. And he had, they had good background on it. Of course, you can't really do a drugstore case, or you shouldn't, unless you have good background on the store, have complaints of either somebody abusing some . . . The ideal background would be if someone came in and reported an injury or death, suicide, damage to their family, the husband, their children or something, because of drugs that they were getting illegally at a drugstore, either a prescription being refilled without authorization or getting it without any prescription, and we had that on this Wesley Heights Pharmacy. I have the folder here with me. So they had good background on the case.

Of course, if you didn't have that background, no matter how good a case you built, when you came to court, they'd always plead entrapment, that you begged them, that you told them, "I have to have these sleeping pills. My wife," you know, "forgot her prescription, and she has headaches and she can't sleep. Please, give me some." So the entrapment was always the offense that you would encounter, and to combat that, you'd have to be able to put a witness on the stand, hopefully, that said, "Well, here's why we went in that store, because Mrs. Jones's husband got

addicted to the stuff and they got it all from the sponsor." So you really needed that background.

Some of the investigators back in those days would go into stores without much background, and they call it shop. They'd shop some stores. And I won't name any names, but they'd go to a town, let's say a small town, or a relatively small town, go to the police station, talk to the police and say, "Is there any chance that any of the drugstores in your town here are either refilling prescriptions without authorization, or maybe someone without a prescription?" and nine times out of ten, the cops would say, "Yeah, I wouldn't be surprised." That was the background, and then say, "We got information from the local police that such-and-such was the case." Then they'd shop the stores, get turned down in three or four of them, get a buy in one of the others, build a case. But that background wasn't too solid when it came to court, you know, so you really had to have good background.

They had good background on this case, Wesley Heights Pharmacy. And he had another investigator was buying there at the time for him. You usually always want to have two investigators if at all possible, because if you only had one, again, the defense would be, "I only sold to this person. I wouldn't sell to anyone else, just to this person. I thought he looked like someone I knew, I thought

he looked like a doctor," or something. So you always want to try to back it up with a second person to show that it wasn't only one person that he was selling to.

So we had one fellow that was already buying there, and I can't remember his name because, you know, when I looked at my file, it didn't ring any bells with me because I didn't know him. But he had made some buys. But he wanted me to be the second guy. So I started making buys there, and, depending on the store, drugstore cases were hard to make. They were harder [unclear] than truck-stop cases and that sort of thing were dangerous, and the conditions were worse. You might have to go in at three o'clock in the morning as a truck driver. But drugstores, you had to watch so many things when you did them to be sure you didn't do something, because these guys, the pharmacist could dispense these drugs. So you had to be careful what you said, you had to be careful what you bought because you wanted to buy things that were impressive in court. We had a list of drugs that we would go for, and which were very good buys. And this I learned later. North told me what to buy. I just went in and bought, asked for what he told me to ask for.

But first I went in as a graduate student. I even got credentials from American University. I went in. I cashed a few checks there and showed my credentials, you know, my

phony credentials as a student there. And not an excessive period of time, but three or four times I went in there, so the guy got to know me. And there was another pharmacist in there, too. But the other fellow was buying from this one pharmacist. So you try to get familiar in the store so when you'd come in, they'd know you.

And, in addition, this was a refill case. I had to get -- they'd get me a prescription. It wasn't marked for refill. It wasn't marked "do not refill," but it was blank down at the bottom, which meant they shouldn't refill it without calling the doctor. And, of course, then you had to make arrangements with the doctor and, more important, with the nurse about a phone call in case they got a phone call. So we'd tell them we would call them up before we went into the store to say, "In the next two hours, be particularly alert for a phone call." We wouldn't tell them what store we were working, but be particularly alert for a phone call on that prescription that you wrote for us. If they ask, can it be refilled, tell them no, absolutely not. Tell them to come back and see the doctor." And then after you went in, if you got it refilled and got out, you'd call them back, call the nurse back again. "Did you get any phone calls?" "No phone calls." "Are you sure?" "No phone calls." Make a notation of that, and then she'd write down on a log we'd ask her to keep when you called and hadn't

been . . . So we'd have that log later on, because the pharmacist says, "Oh, I called the doctor." Well, "No, you didn't," you know. But that took a lot of work, first place, to get a doctor who would write you the prescription and would go through all this nonsense with the calls and everything.

So, I worked -- I was dating my wife back then. I'd bring her along. We'd go in together and I'd say, "Now, don't buy anything for the next two weeks, because when we go in the store, I want you to buy cosmetics or whatever you need in here," you know, "because I can't get reimbursement for this. We've got to buy stuff that you're going to need." And we'd buy, I'd buy toothpaste and all that stuff that I needed, you know, and then I'd ask him to refill. And so, I got refills, I got double refills, without any problem.

And then we'd do the closeout inspection, and the closeout inspection is always a moment of truth, because it's your last buy, and then you whip out your credentials, and the guy suddenly realizes, wait a minute, this guy's been buying a lot of stuff from me, you know.

And in other cases -- it didn't happen to me, but in some cases they fainted, you know, or they've gotten mad and you think they're going to shoot you or something. So you never know. And, of course, you have other people there

because then you need at least one other investigator to do the closeout, which is a lengthy inspection.

So the closeout, you go in and you do an audit of their prescriptions for this product to see how much they bought over a period of time that you've been buying there of the product. You see how much they've dispensed. You'd have to go through the prescription files one by one and see how many times, how much they dispensed, to show they bought this much, they only dispensed this much, and this other stuff is missing. That's particularly important when you're getting it without a prescription, because the other stuff went out without a prescription. So those closeout inspections were lengthy and so forth.

When this thing came up for trial, this Wesley Heights Pharmacy, I remember they had us in on a Saturday, on a weekend, to prepare for trial. We went down here to Washington, D.C., and Gottlieb I think was there, Al Gottlieb from the General Counsel's Office, I guess it was, and the Assistant U.S. Attorney, and they were briefing us. And he says, "This guy got an attorney from the firm that Edward Bennett Williams is in," and this was a big attorney down there. Edward Bennett Williams was a huge, famous attorney in the Washington area. It wasn't his firm, but he worked for this firm. And the attorney that was going to handle this guy's case came from that same firm.

So I then, the trial came, I had to testify, and they really -- and it was the best training I could get because they grilled me up and down and accused me of everything, and even said, "Did you meet with the U.S. attorney about this issue?" and we decided among ourselves that they must have staked out the courthouse and seen us as a group going in there, hoping I would say no, you know, and hit my credibility. But they, in advance, they said, "Be sure you tell the truth on everything." So I said, "Yes." Why did you? Well, we went over my demeanor and so forth and so on. "But they told you what to say." "No, they didn't tell me what to say. I'm saying it from my notebook." I had my notebooks up there, you know, and you've have to give them your notebooks. If you're going on the stand, you had to give them your notebook. So they tried that [unclear] could. If you needed them, you could ask for them, and then you'd have to show them to them.

So I was on I forget how long, but it was quite an experience. And you're hoping some of the questions they ask, you're hoping that your attorney will interfere or object to something, you know, because you're trying to think, "What am I going to answer here?" And if he didn't, you feel like you're hanging out there, you know, in the breeze.

So it was a great experience on testifying. And since

that time -- I testified in about 21 cases in my career, and they weren't all drug cases. Most of them were. I testified in a tomato-packing case in Baltimore, where I was, I made an inspection that they were in bad shape, and I testified for the state because the conditions were bad and [unclear] the sample.

So testifying is really a fantastic experience. It's an exhilarating experience because you're really in combat with this defense attorney, you know, and he's doing everything he can to get you to do something bad.

So that was my first undercover work, was on that Wesley Heights Pharmacy case, and I liked it. I mean, I got hooked right there. And North was good at it. He was so glad it went so well and was a great case. So I got involved in some other cases in Washington, some other drugstore cases.

And then, in '59, well, yeah. In '59 is when they had the next big truck-stop crusade to show the extent of the problem of truck stops and amphetamines, amphetamines primarily, bennies, goofballs, whatever they call them, and to show the extent of it on the East Coast, they had about a three-month period of time where we went out and tried to buy as many, hit as many places as we could and get as many cases as we could during that period of time. And each district committed a certain number of people, and in

Baltimore, Jim Green, who was an 11, he was the lead, and I was with him. I was a 7 or a 9 then, went with him. I went with him. And we worked about three months in Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Delaware. And during that time, we worked 339 hours overtime. You didn't get paid any overtime back then. It was a joke, you know. But George Sooy, he felt so good when we'd come back and was going over all the stuff. "You guys work any overtime?" "We worked 339." Well, we used to turn in the T&P cards. Remember? Time and production, whatever it was, cards, and all this time was on there, because we were working all night long. And he said, "Okay, take two days off." So we got two days administrative leave. That was 16 hours. And we thought that was fantastic. I said, "Oh, my God, this is great."

But had all kinds of experiences in the truck-stop thing. We didn't drive tractor trailers. We had a large van that we rented, you know, like a moving van, and we drove that.

RO: Would you mind telling the purpose of amphetamines at truck stops?

EW: Right. Well, amphetamines is a stimulant, and the truck drivers would make money by -- these were mostly, not all but mostly, independent drivers. The big truck lines were pretty tough on them taking drugs, but some of them

did, and then we would talk to the various truck lines and ask them. But the independent guys would mainly, a lot of times be driving produce, say, from Florida to New York, and they'd want to get in in record time because if they got in early with this stuff, they'd get a good price. In addition, they could make more trips. So they had to stay awake. And the problem was, after driving as long as they did, they couldn't stay awake. So they would take these amphetamine tablets, which would stimulate them, wake them, keep them awake so that they could get in and continue driving, is what it was.

And after a while, though, they don't do it. It wears off, and a lot of times they would collapse. They would black out because the amphetamines, wouldn't take them anymore and they would black on. And we had a lot of accidents.

And I brought a lot of that stuff down for John. I wrote an article for *Truck Stop Magazine* back then on it, and the pictures that we used, I [unclear] got them, but it showed that the drivers -- this is the article I wrote. My friend was the editor of this magazine, *Truck Stop Magazine*, and I wrote the article. This was in July 1960, and the article was "Bennies Can Put You Out of Business." And these are the pictures we had back then. And this is one of the drivers. And the big crash back then was, one of these

truckers ran into, he was hauling cattle, and he ran -- he blacked out and he ran into a Greyhound bus and killed a whole bunch of people on the bus. And, of course, a lot of the cattle got thrown out and killed.

So those sorts of things were happening around the country.

Here's a priest at the scene. That's the Greyhound bus thing.

And so it was coming to the attention -- I have a lot of clippings here on that. It was coming to the attention of the public and congressmen.

This is another article. This is the same picture put out on drugs.

So it was becoming a serious problem, the amphetamines. And it wasn't the biggest problem at the truck stops, but students were taking them to stay awake, and the [unclear] had a problem there. Bars would have them for people.

RT: Didn't that kind of lead to some congressional legislation?

EW: Right. That's one of the reasons they wanted this project. They wanted to show Congress that you needed something to be done. Essentially, it ended up in '65 with the Drug Abuse Control Amendments, which I think were passed in July of 1965, and a lot of this stuff was used to document the problem. So this was now the period, we're

talking now, the moment is in 1959 when we did all this truck-stop work and developed a lot of cases.

Here's an article: "U.S. Tries in Vain to Stamp Out Benny." This was an article that talked about the problem. There were loads of articles.

RT: Now, that amendment, did that lead to any increase in resources, personnel, and budget-wise for FDA in this area?

EW: Yeah. Well, when they passed that legislation, the Drug Abuse Control Amendment say that also formed the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, BDAC, as they called it from the initials, Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, which was a separate bureau in FDA. It was an FDA bureau, just like the Bureau of Drugs or the Bureau of Foods and so forth that we had, and we now had a Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, and people in this bureau just did this type of work.

RT: That was 1966?

EW: Yeah. That was January -- I think officially it was February 1, '66, when it became active. [unclear] check that out. February 1st, '66 is when Drug Abuse Control Amendments went into effect and when BDAC was officially established.

RT: Now, the bureau wasn't established. There was an outside or persons from other parts of government who came in, including, I think, the director, John Finlater.

Correct?

EW: Right, yeah.

RT: And, of course, a number of FDA personnel, I assume, including yourself, got over into that track then.

EW: Right. And that was a whole different story. That was a whole big story.

Well, first there was the training we did. We got trained out at Berkeley, the University of California at Berkeley, and they had three classes, three two-month classes, and ours was the first class, the one I was in, and I was in charge of this class, me and Billy B. Ashcraft. Billy Ashcraft and I shared the responsibility. I was *the* person in charge; he was handling half the class, I was handling half the class, but I did all the administrative work with the local district and so forth.

RT: Was Ashcroft an FDA person?

EW: Oh, yeah, oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh, yeah. He did a lot of undercover work, too. He did a lot of drugstore cases, and that was out in the Midwest where he worked, and eventually he was in Cincinnati when I was in Louisville.

But anyway, he was a very experienced OTC guy, so he had half the people, like I say, and I had half the people out there. And we got trained in criminal investigation, was the course. We got credit; we got credit hours for this course. And they developed this specially for us. Lou

Lasher worked with them. He was, Lou Lasher was involved. And it's at the headquarters level, ORA or BFA, whatever it was back then. He was the one who was handling nationally in the field all the undercover work, and he worked with them on what we needed.

And, of course, then they recruited people, and this is a lot of people that know a lot of this stuff. But they recruited people from everywhere. I mean, they put out the office. I have the announcement; I have the criminal investigation announcement that they put out. And we got retired policemen. These were guys that had retired on 20-year retirement. They were like 40 years old, some of them. We got border patrolmen. We got a lot of Bureau of Narcotics people from the Treasury Department. We got IRS investigators. We got a conglomeration of law-enforcement people, all of which . . .

TAPE 2, SIDE A

RT: . . . it takes, that the agency took law-enforcement people from many sources into this new unit.

EW: Right. They came from everywhere. That's me out on the range, that first course.

The thing was, a couple of things. In the first place, if they came from another federal agency -- and a lot of them, most of them did, Narcotics or whatever -- we didn't do any background checks on them. We accepted them as

qualified, good guys.

I remember Weems Clevenger, who was in New York District and eventually became the Regional Director in New York District, at that time he was the, he was assistant to Finlater. John Finlater was the Director of the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control. Clevenger was one of his, I forget exactly what Clevenger's title was, but he was the FDAer down there in headquarters. Eventually Al Barnard came in down there also. But Clevenger was down there in headquarters.

And they decided down there not to do, waste the time, take the time to check out people who'd been working, say, for the Bureau of Narcotics for 12 years, 15 years. So none of them were checked out. I guess they did some checks on maybe some of the policemen, New York City policemen or something, but in most cases, the people we hired in that first group were not checked out at all virtually. So all these guys came in. And a lot of them had fantastic experience. Some of them had worked on the French Connection case in New York.

The movie "The French Connection" was an actual case, and a number of the agents that I had in my group out there at Berkeley eventually I had as, I became chief agent of the New York Field Office, working for me. I'd worked on that case and a number of other famous cases. I mean, these guys

were real experienced on all types of surveillance and making buys and weapons, legal arrest procedures. They knew all that stuff. Now they're sending them to a basic training out in Berkeley to teach them. And then, of course, they had guys like us who didn't know anything about weapons, didn't know anything really about arresting people and all that stuff. So it was a tough job to fashion that class to cover it.

And actually here -- I didn't realize I had this -- I found out the critique, evaluation of BDAC Training Course #1. And the general reaction was unfavorable. It didn't get good ratings, that course. A lot of the experienced guys said, "I knew all that stuff," and a lot of us said . . . And they spent a lot of time on things that we weren't going to do. It came out that the people who were putting it together out there, a lot of them hadn't the faintest idea of what we were going to be doing. So they were giving a lot of technical stuff, a lot of analytical stuff, that we as agents weren't going to be doing. So they sharpened it up for the next two classes. They worked it over and made it better the next two classes. But the first class was pretty rough. I mean, it wasn't -- a lot of time was spent on things that weren't pertinent.

But we also had exercises, you know. We posed as bad guys and they would have a simulated bust and all that

stuff. And, of course, we shot on the range and . . .

RT: Now, as a result of that Drug Abuse Amendments, was that -- that authorized FDA to carry firearms. Is that correct?

EW: Yes.

RT: And that was the first authorization that the agency personnel had, right?

EW: Right. Although some investigators had been known to carry weapons before that. Harold Leap was one out in Kansas City. He was working with some real Mafia type characters out there. I remember Lasher always said, "I know he's carrying a weapon. I know he's carrying a weapon. I just hope he doesn't kill anybody out there," because we weren't supposed to be carrying a weapon. He was carrying it for some defense.

And also, we had weaponless defense schools. I was at the first one of those, and then I'd give a course at the second one on what we in FDA do, our undercover work. But they had -- this was before BDAC, and they had us in, I think it was in '64 we went out there to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and they had trained us on how to defend ourselves, you know, judo and all that stuff, better than nothing, you know, but that's what we had.

But here, out at Berkeley, it was, you know, this was now 1966. This was February and March. We were February to

April. It was all of February, all of March, graduated in April. And it was right in the middle of the hippie era, you know, and you'd go out for lunch, and here would be on the main mall there, I mean the main thoroughfare, there'd be, you know, "Legalize Abortion," "Legalize Marijuana," and they had this stripper, Carol Doda, one of these strippers, you know. She was out there dancing up on a platform, you know, out in the middle of the college. They were having elections for some, getting people on campus to run for election. They would hire her to come in and have a big sign out on the platform, "Vote for Joe Blow," you know, for head of the whatever, council. And she's up there. I mean, I'd go, "What in the hell is this?" you know. So that was the atmosphere out there.

The young people used to wait outside our training room. It was sort of like in a basement, and we'd come up these stairs during breaks to get outside, and they'd be taking our pictures, saying, "You're not going to catch us. We're taking your picture." They'd be taking our pictures. And in the newspaper, the college newspaper, which I think was the largest college newspaper in the country -- I forget the name of it now -- but they'd have articles in there that, first place -- I have the articles here, some of them -- that the government, that the, they were chewing the college, the university out for bringing these law-

enforcement people here and training them on our campus to go out and catch people who were using mind-altering drugs, and LSD was, Timothy Leary was big then, and everyone, a lot of the kids were taking hallucinogenic drugs. So they'd have these articles in the paper, and they had one one day that police are tapping your room, and they're accusing us of wiretapping their dormitories. It was a riot. It was like Disney World out there. So in amongst all of this, we were getting our training.

But one of the things, at night you'd sit around in the rooms. We had to stay -- they had no dorms for us. We were in a hotel out there. And you'd sit around and talk to these other agents who were with other, had other careers, you know, and other agents, and you'd hear stories about the border patrol, you'd hear Bureau of Narcotics guys telling stories, and it was great. And, you know, because they laughed at us. We'd tell them about a big drugstore case where we went out and bought some pills from a druggist, and they'd laugh. They thought that's the funniest thing.

So, to make a long story short, though, they gave out two awards at the end of the course. Finlater came out and Clevenger came out for graduation. Two awards were given out. The first was the best student, the one who'd gotten the best grades on the tests, and these were tests on -- I'm telling you -- all stuff that a lot of these guys already

had. Frank Flaherty won, who was an FDAer, Frank Flaherty won best student, and then you had the marksmanship award, and this was a riot because they had a number of guys there who were members of the NRA, brought their own weapons with them. There were three or four different weapons. And they'd be out on the range when we had to go. We'd be shooting these little guns that they put in a big pile. We didn't even have enough guns at the beginning. They'd put them in a big pile and everyone would scramble, trying to get the best gun. These guys would have a case, and they'd bring out their fancy guns and they would shoot. So they're all betting which one of these four or five guys was going to win the shooting, marksman trophy. Wilkens won it! One of the happiest days of my life in FDA.

I'd just had a good day, and it was funny because I was in charge there, and the day we were shooting, I was the last one to get a gun. I was seeing everyone had their own weapon, and I'm running around telling people where to go and everything. When I come back, the only gun that was laying there was an old beat-up looking thing. Nobody wanted that one, you know. I didn't care. Frank took it, and you'd shoot slow, then you'd shoot rapidly, and after the time was up, the target would drop. You didn't get all your shots in there. And then you had to put a new clip in. You had to reload. It wasn't a clip. You had to put

bullets in the chamber and then shoot again. So the speed thing. And so it was several times you'd shoot. And I remember Flaherty and some of the other guys, all FDAers, were prowling around. They were out of it already. And they'd come up to me, "You're in, you're in, you're in! You have a good chance to win this." I said, "Oh, go away." So we kept shooting and shooting, and after each thing, they'd come back and say, "You're doing great. So-and-so got knocked out. He's gone. He did terrible." I had the best score. And you wouldn't believe some of these guys, these NRA guys that were fighting. They thought I was a ringer, that I had, was a great shot and made believe I didn't know anything about it and won the thing. And they wouldn't even talk to me for the rest of the time we were out there, which wasn't much because it was at the end when we did the, it was a week or two before the end when we did the shooting. But others were real impressed, and they thought, gee, that's great, because all of them, as I say, were on the range at least monthly on their other jobs. It was just a fluke, but I just got a good run. And I got that trophy sitting in my den now. That's the one I ought to remember. And Finlater [unclear] he let Clevenger give me the trophy, and Clevenger was so happy, too. So, two FDAers won the two trophies there, that scholastic one and the marksmanship one, when these other guys knew all this stuff already. So,

fine.

So then we go back, and they were appointing -- they had, I think, five or seven officers. I've got all that here and stuff, but initially. Wild Bill Logan. You remember Bill Logan?

RT: Oh, yeah.

EW: You should do an interview with him if you can find him. I mean, that would be an interview of all interviews. I don't even know if he's still alive, but, you know, Bill Logan has one eye and chews on a cigar, and, I mean, when he goes undercover, he really goes undercover. I mean, you wouldn't want to go near this guy. He looked like . . . Anyway, he had some fantastic stories to tell you. He and Hayward Mayfield -- Mayfield worked with him as a trainee down in Georgia, and Mayfield always used to tell stories about all of them. He said he used to hold his pants together with a great big safety pin. He said he figured that was his trademark. He'd put a big safety pin on his pants . . . Anyway, he got to be the Director of Atlanta office, and somebody . . .

Again, I have all the stuff in my folder, but I forget.

Another FDAer got the Kansas City office. New York was Ed Kelley, who was an ex-FBI agent. He got the Director's job in New York.

In Baltimore, it was Ed McDonell, and he was an African

American.

RT: He wasn't an FDAer.

EW: No, no, no. He was a Bureau of Narcotics guy. He had worked on the French Connection case, and he was the only African American that got any sort of a job in the upper echelon. He had a great Bureau of Narcotics background and everything. He got that job.

And then there were the chief agents. So I got the Chief Agent in New York, which was a big job, so I was a Chief Agent in New York. And all sorts of things like that.

We originally were in -- 346 Broadway was the original office, right on Broadway. It was only a temporary office, but we were, it was right near the New York City Health Department office downtown.

[unclear] started to run into all kinds of problems. Number one, the director was an alcoholic, Ed Kelley, and the Bureau of Narcotics guys in the group used to take him out after work at night, drink with him, and then take him home. He lived down on the shore, I forget exactly where, but a little ways down on the Jersey shore, and then they'd bring him in the morning. And our Deputy Director initially there was Fred Knoblick. Remember Fred? I have a picture of him here. He was an FDAer, and a nice guy, I mean, a nice FDA guy, you know. He hadn't done much undercover work, a little, but supervised it, I guess. He was a deputy

there to Kelley, and he lived down near the shore, too. So he used to come back in in the morning with Kelley, and he'd say all the way, he said, "I was getting drunk just from smelling him coming into the office in the morning." I mean, he really had a problem. He was an ex-FBI man. He wasn't in the FBI when he came in. He was ex-FBI. So I had to work with him. As the Chief Agent, I had to work with him.

Well, the Bureau of Narcotics guys would hang out with him. Like I'm saying, they'd take him out, they'd get him drunk, they'd hang around with him, you know. So whenever I tried to get these guys to do something and they didn't like it, they'd go into Kelley, and Kelley would say, "No, you don't even have to do that. Don't worry about it." And one of the main things was the recording equipment. When -- and we didn't get into that, but when we did our cases, especially drugstore cases, we would try to record -- or at least I would, and some of the others -- we'd try to record so you could have these recordings later to see what you said to the druggist and everything. But even in truck stops, truck stops, it wasn't as pertinent because you didn't have any traffic defense to worry about. But frequently you'd want to hear, you're talking to him for an hour over coffee or something in a truck stop, and they'd tell you things and you'd want to remember all these men

they mentioned that might be selling and everything. So a lot of times I would record stuff.

We had the Miniphone recorder, which was big. I mean, to conceal, it was big. It was, I don't know, five, six inches long, maybe three inches wide, and probably an inch and a half deep, so it was hard to hide. You had a harness with it that you could put on, have it like under here. And in a drugstore, you could probably get away with that. But in a truck stop, usually with a t-shirt on or something, it was hard to hide. Since I was thin, I used to stick it down under my belt in the front and then have a t-shirt that hung loose over it, and I would hold my breath in. But you had to turn the thing on and off and so forth.

RT: How long would those Miniphones record before you had to change?

EW: We had one tape done at an hour and a half. It was a little tiny wire, very thin wire, and sometimes it would break and you wouldn't know it till you got out of there, and it would be all tied in a knot, you know, because they're very sensitive. But I can tell you a lot about the recorders. But some guys even used it during inspections, and in one place they got caught. It misfunctioned [sic] and started making noises, and they got in trouble over that.

I have a whole folder here on recorders and different

things that came out in BDAC and pre-BDAC about no more recording, no more recording, no more wiretapping, whenever something like that would come up. But, so I used the Miniphone constantly in all sorts of situations and never had a problem.

Then we got the Kel unit, which was a transmitter. That was about the size of a pack of cigarettes, and that transmitted. It didn't record, but it transmitted, and you'd have usually a car that had a two-way radio in the car on the same frequency as the Kel unit, and it would transmit out to the car. So it was great because you could use it, number one, to get your recording easily because you could pretty much hide that easily, but also for protection. In case you got in trouble in there, the people on the surveillance team would know you're in trouble and could come help you, depending on what kind of an outfit you're in.

And the other thing was, if you could talk the guy into getting some more, you'd go in and see how much stuff he had, you know, and he says, "I've got six bottles. Think you can handle that?" "Gee, I wanted to get ten. Can you get me some more?" "Well, I don't know if he has any," and he'd go and make a phone call, and then he'd come back and say, "Yeah, I can get you some more." And he'd either go or maybe he'd send somebody else to go, and the people out in

the surveillance team would know, from listening to you, that these guys were going to go to maybe a drugstore where they were getting the stuff, and they could follow them. So from an investigative standpoint, it was great for that purpose; for safety, it was great; and then, of course, you'd get the recording.

Well, you could not get a narcotic agent to put one of those things on for anything. Immediately, "Oh, they're going to search me. They're going to tap me down. I'll be killed, I'll be dead." I'd say, "Well, gee, I wore this stuff." "They're truck stops. They don't check you out. But these guys, they know." So they wouldn't wear it.

The real reason they wouldn't wear it was a lot of them were essentially, or some of them, some of them, a few of them, were essentially entrapping people. They were -- the narcotics guys really couldn't operate well unless they had an informant. When we started working cases, I'd say, "Here's a big problem we have at this store," this drugstore, or whatever, truck stop, whatever. "All right. Who's the informant?" I said, "We don't have an informant. We just have information on this." "Oh, first you've got to get an informant." They couldn't go in cold. They were used to having an informant. And they'd get their informants by arresting some guy who was either holding, in that case, narcotics and marijuana or a little bit of heroin

or something. They'd grab the guy. Maybe he'd been arrested before, and so they'd have him on a second offense. While it wasn't a big deal, he could get in trouble. So then they'd say, "Okay, who are you getting it from? You take us to your supplier, and we'll forget about this." And the guy, so he'd take them, to save his butt, he'd take them to who he was selling it from. That's how they would work their way up.

The thing was, they had sort of a quota system in the Bureau of Narcotics. You had to get a certain number of cases, you know, get out there and get cases. This is when there was a Bureau of Narcotics, not BDAC, when they were in the Bureau of Narcotics. And to keep their average up, they would go out to their informants. They didn't have anybody, they couldn't find anything. They'd go to people that they knew used to use or used to sell. They may not be doing it anymore. And they'd get the guy and say, "Listen, I need somebody, and I want you to do this, that, and the other thing." "Well, I'm not selling anymore. I don't do business anymore." "Listen," and they'd lean on them and they'd threaten them and everything to get them. And what the informant would do then, he'd go to this guy who maybe wasn't selling badly, but he knew this guy was his friend, so he'd give him some LSD if he was selling, or he'd give him some pot or whatever it was just because he was a

friend. And they'd end up then building a case against that guy. It was really an entrapment type situation where the guy wasn't a big peddler. He just sold to his friend, who was on the hook with the Bureau of Narcotics guy.

So they didn't want that to come out on the recorder. They don't want the people in the car to hear them telling, you know, what they were doing. They would not wear those things. And I had more fights with Kelley. In fact, I had [unclear] there about these guys would go into places in Harlem.

We had one case, a four- or five-story walkup in Harlem. The guy was selling, supposedly selling stuff. And Bob Brown -- I think it was Bob Brown -- an ex-FDAer -- this is not BDAC. This is a young, fairly new guy. He went up to this, no equipment on, and the guy was a judo expert, you know. And they got into a fight with him up there, and to save his neck, he punched his fist through the window up there. I wasn't there; I was back in the office with the team. So they all [unclear] and got involved in the thing.

And I'd explain over and over to Kelley about, you know, you're going to get somebody killed here because this thing, they can't hide it anywhere. I said, "Oh, hide it on me and you. We'll be able to find it," you know. You can stick it down your jockstrap, you could stick it anywhere. "No. They know what they're doing. They're experienced in

this, and if they don't want to do it, they don't have to do it." So it was really frustrating working with these narcotics guys. Mainly the narcotics guys were the only ones. The other guys would wear them.

But the narcotics guys were our big hitters, you know. They had informants, like the guys that we got in New York. They were from New York, they were narcotics. They knew everybody. They knew all the local narcotics agents in the city. So they were the guys that we were depending on to build the big cases, and they would not wear the equipment.

So I could see this was not, in other words, an FDA type organization, as such. And then the headquarters people, the Finlater people, other than Clevenger, were all either narcotics people, customs people, FBI people. They weren't FDA people. So for that two years, from '66 to '68, when they merged them in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs -- I think it was in April of '68 they became the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs; BNDD, we called it -- until that happened and they went into the Justice Department, pretty much the narcotics guys were calling the shots because they were the more experienced agents. Finlater and them used to call up and ask somebody. When I was in California at the class, sometimes Clevenger would call up and say, "Ask Jack Brady what he thinks of this guy. He just applied for the job and he used to be in

New York City." Then I'd have to go get Brady and Brady would evaluate these people for the people at headquarters. You know what I mean? They're thinking of putting him on some job down at headquarters in BDAC, and they'd be asking these guys to evaluate them.

So I could see a lot of problems there. I crossed my fingers when some of them would go out on some of this work, because I know what . . .

Then, I was in the office late a lot of times at night, and I'd get phone calls. Phone calls would come in. A lot of these guys had girlfriends on the side. They would call in, "Hey, is Joey there?" I'd say, "No. Who is this?" "Tell him Emma called." "Okay." I'd find out eventually that most of them were married and they all had these girlfriends on the side, and they would disappear, you know, during the day sometimes. "Where are they?" "Oh, they're out doing surveillance," Kelley would say. "They're out there." Know what I'm saying? "Yeah, they're doing surveillance."

This one guy, Jack Brady, who was really a handsome guy, I mean, he could be a movie star, he worked on the French Connection too, a smart, smooth guy, sharp dresser. He invited us all out to his house one Saturday for a picnic during the summer. [unclear] out on Long Island. Go out there. He's got this huge house, you know, with a swimming

pool, a fancy car. I'm saying to myself, and Flaherty, "What's this? Did he inherit something? What is this?" And another guy, one of the agents, used to walk around. He had all these diamond rings on, you know, like you see in the movies. Where did all these diamond rings, diamond pins, where do these guys get their money, you know? So all this began to worry me, you know.

Eventually, what happened, they did away with the chief agent's job. They removed that nationwide and made it a deputy director job. So you had a director and a deputy director, no chief agent. And that was about the time when I'd had it up to here, and so I was no longer chief agent. I had to go back to being a supervisory agent. But, and Knoblick, who was the, Fred Knoblick, who was the deputy under Kelley, he transferred out to Kansas City District, I guess, BDAC, to be the deputy out there, but the director out there was an FDA guy, too, so there were two FDA guys out there. He got out, and they brought Brady in, the narcotic guy, and made him the deputy. So this guy used to work for me. He's now the deputy.

So about then, when I was getting real, real unhappy with this job, the standards were not what I wanted, not what we had in FDA, and we used to get -- we'd go to the, with our cases, to the U.S. attorney with our cases, and as soon as they'd ask you, "Who made the buys here?" or "Who

developed this case?" you'd tell him. "Is he with FDA?" "No, he's from the Bureau of Narcotics." "Oh." They got worried right away because they said half the time in the Bureau of Narcotics cases, you'd get the guy on the stand and stuff would come out that they never heard before. The defense attorney would hit something on something that the poor guy that they caught would tell them. "Hey," you know, "he told me this" or "he told me that," and they'd bring it up. And your defense attorney, I mean the U.S. Attorney had nothing to combat it because these guys wouldn't tell them things, they would write up memos that weren't accurate. They did not have a good reputation with U.S. attorneys. FBI had a good reputation. We had a good reputation as far as our cases being solid and no surprises and so forth. But they never really liked to handle Bureau of Narcotic agents' cases.

So about then is when Clevenger . . . Well, Charlie Herman retired in New York. He was the director in New York District. He retired. That job opened up. Clevenger was running into the same sort of stuff at the headquarters level, all this weird stuff going on. These Bureau of Narcotics guys, who knew nothing about FDA or nothing about our cases, were in charge. He applies. He gets the director's job in New York, Charlie Herman's job, who's up there, and this was in, I guess this was in '67. Yeah, mid-

’66 or early ’67.

RO: Nineteen sixty-seven.

EW: Sixty-seven, I think it was.

He comes up there and decides to do big things up there, and that’s a whole other story. But he, one thing he did, he was going to expand the office in New Jersey, which was a resident post at that time, and it was a multiple-person resident post, had about seven or eight guys there then under Pete Coluccio, and he wanted to make that into a separate section. He made that a section, he made San Juan, which was a resident post, a section also, and then he had New York section, which George Gerstenberg came in and got the job. He and I applied for the section chief jobs, which were 14’s. In BDAC, I was a 13; as the chief agent in BDAC, I was a 13. Now, when they made it a 14 -- they made it a 14, I think, when they made it a deputy director job, killed the chief agent job, made it deputy director. I think that was a 14 job, because they were just starting off with grades then. They eventually got higher. They’re a lot higher now in DDA. But I wasn’t going to get the deputy director’s job in New York against Brady, and I didn’t really want it either.

Once I applied for the section chief job in New Jersey, and there were a lot of other people who applied, but I got it. So I got out of BDAC with a promotion, which was a

blessing, and came to then to, came to Newark section, reported to Newark, July, I think it was July 17th, '67, right in the middle of the riots. They were rioting in Newark at that time. In fact, they wouldn't let us go over to the resident post. We were all over in Brooklyn, and we'd send one person a day over to get the mail. At that time we were in the post office building, in the basement of the post office building in Newark, was the FDA resident post office. They hadn't built the Federal Building yet. They were building it. And a few months later, they built it and moved into the Federal Building.

RT: Ed, do you remember about how many people, FDA people, came back to FDA?

EW: You mean out of BDAC?

RT: Out of BDAC. Do you have [unclear].

EW: I had told John Swann that I thought about a third of them did, but that's just a wild guess. See, I don't know what happened in the other regions. I know what happened here. Frank Flaherty came out, Jerry Caligis came out, a few others came out. But some others stayed in, but they primarily stayed in the part of BDAC that did the inspections. You had to do inspections in BDAC of firms that made these drugs, you know, to check to see if they could . . .

RT: [unclear]

EW: And also if they had security for their drugs, locked cabinets and all that. So there was a phase of the fieldwork that was pretty much like the inspectional work in FDA, not undercover, and Stanley Chrsohos was one. He stayed in, did that, became the head of that unit in the New York field office, and retired here about five or six years ago.

RO: Who is that?

EW: Chrsohos; he's Greek. C-h-r-s-o-h-o-s, good friend of mine. But he [unclear] good friend of Jerry Caligis. A few of those fellows stayed in . . .

TAPE 2, SIDE B

RT: Charlie Chrisigos or whatever it is.

EW: Stanley, Stanley Chrsohos.

RT: Stanley. That's where you were.

EW: Okay. Are we on?

RO: Yes.

EW: Oh.

RO: That's all right. I was just wondering if you had any idea.

EW: No. I know a lot of them came out reluctantly, because most of them enjoyed the work. I know Flaherty loved it. He hated to leave, but he couldn't take it anymore either. He got out. They moved him to Buffalo. He worked in Buffalo for -- he came out after I did, and then

he came to New Jersey as one of my supervisors there. And others hated it. But, I mean, they liked to do that type of work, but not in the environment that we were working with there.

Just to finish that topic, eventually -- now, again, this is, now we're talking, this is now about a year after what . . . We started, say, in February '66. I came out in July of '67, so it's roughly 18 months, approximately, after things started that I got out. And then, a little bit after that, when they went with BNDD, that was in April of '68. That was like seven or eight months after I got out, is when they went with -- the Bureau of Narcotics joined with BDAC and became the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Justice Department.

Now, at that point, you see, the Bureau of Narcotics was in charge pretty much, because the Bureau of Narcotics came in, so a lot of Bureau of Narcotics . . . I'm sorry, I'm sorry. We went to the Justice Department. It was the FBI that was sort of in charge, the Justice Department people. And what happened, the Bureau of Narcotics guys, these guys that we were worried about, some of them, been wondering about them, they started getting called down to Washington and had little interviews down there, and eventually they resigned. And this, now, this is December of '68, and they're talking about an investigation that

began in August of ’67. Now, I left in July of ’67, so the next month this investigation started, and they’re saying here, “32 U.S. Narcotics Agents Resign in Corruption Investigation Here.” These are a lot of my guys. You know, they’re working for me, including Brady. They’re all called down there, and I guess they pulled out the folder that that Bureau of Narcotics had when they came to BDAC, which they said, you know, “If you don’t get out of here, we’re going to do something with this.” “Okay, okay.” So they volunteered for BDAC. They kept those folders, and when they came back in with the Bureau of Narcotics situation, they whipped those folders out, and those guys were gone.

Some of them -- I know one guy was working as a watchman in a lumberyard somewhere up in far western New Jersey. Brady went down to Florida somewhere and got a law-enforcement job in Florida as a sheriff or a deputy sheriff or something down there, and a few years later, I heard he killed himself. He swallowed his gun, as they say, blew his brains out down there. What he was involved in down there, I don’t know.

But these were the kind of guys, we didn’t know it at the time, but these were the kind of guys that we got into [unclear], we got into BDAC.

RT: Now, [unclear] the Bureau of Narcotics, they had a file on these guys, why they didn’t ship [unclear] FDA.

EW: Unforgivable, unforgivable. I would have raised, you know, if I was down at Finlater's level or the Commissioner's level, I would have raised hell. But by that time, they weren't in FDA anymore. They [unclear]. And, of course, they cleaned them out there before DEA came along.

And a lot of them weren't that bad. I mean, they weren't, I mean, they were -- I mean, well, they may not have been taking bribes, but like I said, they were entrapping people, they were probably taking some money. You know, they'd bust into a place to arrest people, and there'd be a thousand, $100,000 laying around on the bed. The guys would be counting their money, the crooks, you know, and there'd be heroin, half a kilo of heroin stacked up there.

And after a while -- and I ran into this with the local police. I have [unclear]. The local police, the New York City police, we worked with, New York City narcotic office. This is New York City narcotic, and some of these guys I worked with before BDAC. When we were working on hallucinogenic drugs down in the Village and everything, we worked with the New York City narcotic people because they didn't have a war on hallucinogenic drugs. They'd be buying pot and the guys would be offering them LSD. They had no jurisdiction. They'd have to give it to us. So eventually they'd give us the informant and let us buy LSD with the

informant.

So we worked with these guys and got to know them pretty much, and they were a wild bunch, a real wild bunch. A bunch of those got arrested, too, and they cleaned out the head of the New York City narcotic unit. But they used to tell us stories, and they'd tell us stories out of the BDAC class, the federal guys, where they'd break into these places and find these huge amounts of money and huge amounts of drugs there. And when you see, especially with the city guys were getting paid like $20,000 a year or something, and they'd go in and there's tons of money laying around, so they were really exposed to the biggest temptation you can imagine, and it's hard to pass up. Nobody knew how much money was there. You know, they could grab a bundle of it and nobody would know, and they did; a lot of them did.

So that's the sort of, some of the people we got were in that category, and it made it rough and it made the work tough to do when you never could really trust some of your people. You never really knew if this guy was telling you the straight story or not. Hopefully -- and I think rightly -- they got rid of the ones they knew about that they had files on. They got rid of them. When it went into the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, they got rid of those guys.

RT: Now, this would perhaps be out of context, if it

is, let’s don’t move into it now. But sometime before we’re done, the Office of Criminal Investigation in the agency was formed. Would you touch on that [unclear]?

EW: I don’t know about that.

RT: I see.

EW: I really don’t know much about that.

RO: Well, you know, Ed McDonell in Baltimore was one of them.

EW: Well, yeah. That’s [unclear].

RO: He was a nice guy.

EW: I know, I’m telling you. Yeah. And we were absolutely stunned when he -- this is him, and this is the article on him. We couldn’t believe, he bought heroin from peddlers and resold it, and this is a guy who was head of the field office in Baltimore, I tell you, the only black that was in the upper echelon, and everyone talked about him, you know, as a great agent and everything else, and here he’s out selling the damn stuff. So it was unbelievable. Some of these guys were just bad.

Anyway, it was a disappointment, the agency, to me, the 18 months or whatever I was in there, because it wasn’t, in my mind, an FDA type agency. We were overwhelmed, overtaken at the headquarters level and the field level and the agent level with these other people with different standards, different ways of operating. Not that that was bad, but

different credibility, different ethics, and it was more than I could handle. So I'm so lucky that I got out of there with a promotion. I mean, if I got out of there laterally, I would have been happy. But to get out of there with a promotion was great.

RT: Well, what was it, 1967 or '68 . . .

EW: Seven.

RT: Seven, that Clevenger came up to New York.

EW: Yeah. Clevenger came up to New York, and, of course now, I had been in New York since '63. After Baltimore, I went to Louisville, Kentucky, Cincinnati District, with Ted Maraviglia, and I was in -- this was back, now we're talking '61. I went out there in May of '61. I got there on Derby Day in '61 and left in August of '63 and went to New York as a supervisor.

But when I got there in May during Derby Day, I stayed at a YMCA. My wife and I just had my first child, [unclear]. She was only about four or five months old, so they stayed back here in Maryland, and I went out there and stayed at the YMCA, and they broke into my car that night, stole all my clothes. I had everything packed on the backseat, come back, it's all gone. I called Cincinnati office and I said, "Hey, thanks a lot. I come to Louisville. They stole my clothes." He says, "Well, it's Derby, it's Derby weekend, you know."

So I had a great, great -- I loved Louisville. In the first place, I was supposed to . . . You know, back then, it was a big deal when you became a resident. You became an 11, and you were the FDA in that office. Most of them were one-man resident posts. You were Mr. FDA. Well, I was worried because all I had really done, I did some filth work and oysters and OTC, and I figured, God, I'm going to Louisville. They tell me you've got to do creameries, you've got to do butter plants. So I was nervous about getting it, but I wanted the 11 and I figured I could do it.

Anyhow, Lennington, who was the one who called the shots back then, who was going where, he was telling me, "You're going to go to Birmingham. We've got Birmingham, Alabama, for you." I said, "Oh, great." I forget the name of the guy who was in Birmingham, but he'd been there forever He'd been there a long time in Birmingham, Alabama, and he didn't want to move, and they were having trouble getting him to move, at least as quick as they wanted him to move. He wasn't going to move and didn't want to go where they wanted to transfer him or something. They were having trouble getting him out of there. So Lennington says, "Just hang on, just hang on, don't worry. It'll work out, it'll work out. And if not, we have another place you can go."

So then finally, one day they called and said, "Well, we're going to send you to Louisville, Kentucky." I said,

"Oh, great. That's fine," because I used to go to the track a little bit in New York, Belmont and everything, because I like horse races. I thought that would be great. I can see the Kentucky Derby.

So we went to Louisville, and it was really great. The people were great. They were polite. I mean, [unclear] New York and other areas that I've lived in. Even when you caught somebody in a plant, I mean, doing a regular inspection, they wouldn't hide things from you, they wouldn't lie to you. Generally, they were nice Southern type people. It was nice; it was a joy to work out there. And we had an apartment, a garden-type apartment with a swimming pool, an indoor swimming pool, an outdoor swimming pool in this development we were in. My second daughter was born out there. And I did undercover work out there.

I also got trained by, oh, what's his name, oh God. He just retired from Richmond. He was the resident in Richmond.

RO: McEwen?

EW: Yeah, McEwen. Lloyd McEwen trained me. Lloyd McEwen trained me on creamers and cheese plants. He was a tough, tough trainer. Whenever they had a trainee that they really didn't want to keep, they'd send him out with Lloyd for a three-week trip. The guy would come back and resign because he killed you.

You'd go in there at five o'clock in the morning and pull all these samples of milk and all these pads, and you had to mount these pads, you know, and you'd grade them by how much dirt was in them. But you'd bring them back to the motel at night and set them on top of the lamps. You'd set them on top to dry. You'd mount them in these little squares and you'd set them on top of the lamps to dry, and the room smelled of this casein smell, you know. You could hardly breathe. And then you'd go out the next morning.

But we got along great. We were great friends. So I did some of that work. But that was interesting.

Then, though, we started getting all kinds of truck-stop complaints and bennies, and I started doing drugstore cases out there. And I had a drugstore case out there, and I needed a second person, and it was a one-man resident post, so it was hard to get somebody to make buys.

You guys know Frank Barnes?

RT: Yeah.

EW: You know he was *the* man in canneries. I mean, he was the cannery expert, Frank Barnes. I hired Frank Barnes. He was in Louisville. I think he was like 40 when he came in looking for a job, and he came in, I interviewed him, and he had a bunch of kids. He had five or six kids. And I interviewed him. And, again, like with me in Baltimore, they let me work in Washington, they let him work in

Louisville because he lived in Louisville, and he'd work with me. So I got him involved as the second man in the drugstore case. Oh, he enjoyed that so much. He used to tell me later when I'd see him years later, "Oh, I really enjoyed doing the drugstore case with you." And he went in and made buys in the drugstore. It was a prescription case. I got him a prescription and so forth. So I did that.

And then I did quite a bit of truck-stop work there, got a truck line to cooperate with me, and I rode on a tractor trailer with this driver, and we'd go in and I'd make buys and so forth. And that's where I ran into, for the first time, caffeine tablets.

Ted Kopulos, who was a Greek -- I used to kid him -- K-o-p-u-l-o-s, Ted Kopulos came down from Chicago, and I have a folder on him, too. He came down from Chicago, and I think Bates Labs, I think, was in Chicago, and they made amphetamines and they made caffeine, and they made them on the same punches. And they would punch out double-scored white -- and they had all colors; they had green, they had orange, they had yellow -- double-scored tablets. And they had caffeine and they had amphetamine. Well, the caffeine tablets, I eventually learned, were harder. The composition that they put into the tableting machine was a lot -- it compressed harder, so it was more brittle. The amphetamines were a little bit softer. They'd crumble a little bit when

you cracked them. But they looked exactly the same. So I ended up making a lot of buys, you know, and I'd send them to the lab, and they'd start coming back, "What are you buying caffeine for? That's not a violation, it's just misbranded," you know. It's in the bottle with . . . "What do you mean caffeine? What are you talking about?" So we [unclear] with Lasher and everyone, and other people were getting it, too, in that area. And it was primarily this [unclear] Ted Kopulos coming down, selling it as amphetamines to these truck stops. Of course the truck stops were getting complaints from the drivers because it didn't do them any good, you know. But that whole Ted Kopulos thing was, we ended up getting informers who knew him, worked with him.

Bruce Blackburn. He had one arm. I've got a picture of him here. He was a friend of Kopulos, and we wanted to get buys from Kopulos, because we liked to get him because if he was getting them from Bates Lab [unclear], he was probably getting amphetamines from them too, and he's maybe putting the caffeine in places where he's not too sure, and we figured he was peddling both. So we wanted to get a buy off him, so if we could get him, we could get him to let us buy off the Bates. If Bates was selling to him, he was just a bum, you know. He was selling illegally if they were selling amphetamines.

So we had quite an investigation going on Ted Kopulos, and I remember going to Chicago from Louisville for a big Ted Kopulos conference out there and trying to come up with a plan to catch him, and that's when we started working with this Bruce Blackburn, who, like I say, had only one arm.

Here; here's my Kopulos file. Here, here. Here's the one-armed Bruce Blackburn, who, again, had an in with Kopulos, but he never could, he never could set us up with Kopulos, or he didn't want to. And for a couple of years, we worked with this guy, Bruce Blackburn. In fact, I guess you've got it in that package.

He writes me a letter. He writes me a letter from Florida. He was in some -- oh, yeah. Get this. Now, this is this one-armed informant that we had: "Dear Ed." This was April 28, '63. It was just before I left Louisville. He's in Deland in Florida. "Dear Ed, I got in a little trouble down here" -- here, h-e-a-r, you know -- "in Deland, Florida. They have got me in jail. I bring a girl and a boy with me, and I might get into trouble over bringing the girl," and blah-blah-blah-blah-blah. In any case, he wanted me to bail him out. He's saying, "I had to sell my car after they got me, and I would like for all you boys to get together and send me some money, and I will give it back to you as quick as possible. The reason I brought the girl along, she seems to know a lot about the business. Ed, you

can talk to me on the phone.” He gives me his phone number, and “I wish you would answer as soon as possible. Your Old Buddy, Bruce Blackburn.” So we got pretty thick with Bruce, but he never really gave us anything. I don’t think he wanted to. I mean, he worked us and we worked with him, and we never got Ted Kopulos and we don’t know if he was getting amphetamine from Bates -- at least I don’t. Maybe when I left, they may have continued out there.

And that’s a whole other subject sometime, is working with informants. That’s a whole area [unclear].

So my Louisville time was a lot of OTC work out there, too, and then I got the supervisor’s job in [unclear] Clevenger. Well, while I was in Louisville -- I don’t know how much you want on this tape, but I guess we can take it off if we don’t want it in the transcript -- but they were having a problem in New York City with the import inspectors on the docks. They were afraid they were taking bribes, they were afraid they weren’t working full days, and they wanted an investigation done of these guys on the docks in New York. Now, this again was ’62, ’63, probably, ’63. So, since they knew everybody in the district up there, they brought me from Louisville and Tom Kingsley, who I think was in Harrisburg. I think he’s in the Harrisburg resident post.

So Kingsley and I came in and met with Clevenger,

Lennington, I don't know who else, but those were the two main ones. Oh, Jerry Martell was the head. Jerry Martell was head of the Customs; I don't mean head of the Customs, head of the import people. He was a supervisor there, and they trusted him. And they went over with us what they wanted us to do. Essentially, we were going to surveil, maintain surveillance on some of these guys. They told us which ones they were concerned about. And they gave us cameras, photographic lenses. We didn't have radio because, radios at that time on this investigation. We just had cameras.

And for -- we stayed at the St. George Hotel, which was just over the bridge in Brooklyn, over the Brooklyn Bridge, and we followed these guys around and did confirm a lot of them would go to the bar and stay in there three or four hours, and we'd have to go in and hang around, and I don't drink, or not much, very little back then. But you have to go in there. Kingsley would go in and watch these guys, and they'd be talking and visiting, and we'd take turns. I'd come out and he'd go in, you know, because they'd be in there for hours. And then we had offices that overlooked the area. We could take pictures of them going in and coming out and all this. So we -- and then some of them went home for most of the day. They'd go home, and we'd have to stake out the house and see when they'd come out.

So we never established taking any bribes, but we could show that they were abusing their time badly, you know, weren't working eight hours a day.

And eventually they took action against some of them, and years later they've taken action several times against them in New York and had some bribery cases against them that they got from some of the importers, you know, would report it. So they traditionally had some problems with the guys down on the docks there.

RO: Now, these people on the docks, they weren't really qualified in the same degree of qualification as FDA inspectors.

EW: They were, they didn't have to have a college degree. They were called -- when we became called the Consumer Safety Officers, they were called Consumer Safety Inspectors, and they were lower grades. They couldn't go beyond a 9, I think, back then. So they didn't have the same qualifications, but they also didn't have the same responsibility. They were doing mainly checks of stuff coming in and out, you know. They didn't have to do big inspections very often. But they have traditionally had problems.

I think now it's in pretty good shape and everything's tightened up, but back then they had . . .

So that's when I, when I come in then, so I worked with

Clevenger then. See, that was in ’63. He got to know me then on this investigation. So eventually he selected me to come up there as a supervisory investigator in New York. So I came up there in August of ’63, and almost immediately . . . Well, I hadn’t been there more than a couple of months, since September ’63, and this is October ’63. I came up there in August of ’63. And this is Clevenger here. He sent me a copy.

But this is a memo from Rayfield, Alan Rayfield, and this is a memo from Ken Lennington, and it was about the Central Investigative Group, they called it, CIG, Central Investigative Group. And that was Rayfield’s memo and Lennington’s is Inter-District OTC Investigation. And the memo, Rayfield’s memo, saying, “Confidential, Administrator. For some time, some of our operations, particularly in the illegal distribution of dangerous drugs, have involved dealing with criminal elements requiring specially trained men. For the past year, we’ve pursued a program of training selected inspectors in interrogation, shadowing, and other techniques. We plan to continue and expand this training program to include physical training and defensive tactics.” That’s when we went out to [unclear]. “The administration, through the Department’s legislative program, is attempting to obtain authority for selected trained inspectors to carry on.” This was just pre-BDAC. “The Commissioner has

authorized the Bureau of Field Administration to take a more positive role with the establishment of a specialized group to be used as a national resource in the more difficult and complex investigative and undercover operations, especially those involving inter-district operations. The nucleus of the group will be stationed in the Washington headquarters of the Bureau of Field Administration, with at least one, possibly two, having FBI, Bureau of Narcotics, or other similar training and experience. Recruitment from outside of FDA is now being energetically pushed. Other members will consist of selectively trained inspectors stationed throughout the country. District personnel selected for this group will remain assigned to their present districts, but will be subject to call on detail wherever it is concluded that services are needed." And they go on, "undercover work, especially diversion of dangerous drugs by rings and criminal elements will be coordinated through BFA with a group leader," and so forth. And then, "We have listed below those selected from district staffs as the initial members of this group: Sam Wolfe, Atlanta; Harold Leap, Kansas City; Billy B. Ashcraft, Cincinnati; James Reeves, New Orleans; Ed Wilkens, New York District; Richard Bly, Baltimore; Nat Geary, Detroit; and Leroy Gomez, Detroit," no, Denver, "Denver. In selecting this group, we deliberately avoided designating more than one individual in

the same district, though we recognize there are additional capable people available," and so forth.

So they set this thing up, and that was in September. Now this is October, and this is Lennington, same thing, I mean same sort of thing, and he's saying, "The purpose of this memo is to confirm information on the current inter-district investigation," and so forth. "Investigation originally centered around a number of major amphetamines peddlers in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and suspected sources of supply in New York and Philadelphia," and Philadelphia was Lustgarten Labs we were suspicious of. "The investigation has now progressed to the point where it involves inspectors on several assignments from Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, and an informant from New Orleans territory." He goes on and on. Then he says, "Therefore, we have designated supervisory inspectors William B. Logan of Atlanta and Ed Wilkens of New York as group leaders responsible for development of this investigation in Atlanta, Baltimore, and New York/Philadelphia areas, respectively. BFA will be responsible for monitoring the overall aspects of the investigation." And it goes on and on and on. Then it says, "The ultimate goal of this investigation is the development of evidence of illegal drug sales by primary sources of supply. We believe this will include manufacturing sources and/or wholesalers such as

Lustgarten, Physician's Drug and Supply, United Research Laboratories, and possibly others suspected of large-scale diversion into illegal channels. The development of cases against major peddlers will be accomplished as they are encountered or as they are deemed necessary in view of the ultimate goal. And Logan's group has established contacts with state investigators in North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia. They are working with the state units towards development of informants capable of leading us back to the primary sources of supply. These states have been active in investigating," so forth and so on.

And what they were supposed to do is to catch informers down there and then, if any of them were buying at sources up in the New York/Philadelphia area, they would turn them over to me, my group, and we would work with the informers up there. And that's when I worked with Bill Logan, who was a real character. I have all kinds of stories with him.

And they did. They got some informants. I have pictures of some of them. They sent them up. And the one fellow claimed he could get stuff from Lustgarten Laboratories, which was a big plant in Philly. And so we started an investigation of Lustgarten Labs with this informant, and we have recordings of him.

RO: [unclear]

EW: Want me to stop?

RO: No, that's okay, but I have to go. Excuse me, please.

EW: So we then had a meeting in Philly with Blanton. I think Blanton was Chief Inspector then. [unclear] was -- I forget who the director was at that time. I probably have it in some of my stuff.

But we met in Philly, and the thing that was in Philly, they doubted. They didn't think Lustgarten was selling out the back door, hundreds, you know, [unclear]. They didn't think so. The informant said yeah, that he had connections who got stuff there. He didn't get stuff there, but this other guy got stuff there, and he knew the other guy, and so forth.

So we had this meeting, and in the meeting they had an investigator called Jahnke, his name was. I forget his first name -- Lou Jahnke, J-o-h, a big German guy? He was a big drug investigator, one of the big drug investigators, and not undercover but a drug inspection investigator. And apparently he did a lot of inspections of Lustgarten. He knew the Lustgarten, and some of them told me later that they really shouldn't have had him in on this because he knew now that we were going to do this undercover investigation. And not that necessarily -- we always had a halfway suspicion that he may have alerted them to, you know, better watch your step, but we never could prove that.

But some of the guys from Philly -- not me -- but Gerstenberg was there then, Joe Phillips was there then, and some of them told me, you know, Jahnke is friendly with people at Lustgarten. He shouldn't have been in. But we were asking him details about the plant and where the loading dock was and where we would go if we tried to make buys and all that stuff, and they thought he would be the best one, so they brought him in, and they figured that was a mistake to have brought him into the discussion.

In any case, we never did get anything from them. We had discussions, and the peddler that they claimed was getting from him, in the conversations they admitted they knew this guy because of the informer. "You know Ben?" "Oh, yeah, we know Ben." But they would never sell our informant anything without prescription, without, you know, being legitimate.

Right across from Lustgarten, right next to the train tracks -- the train tracks went by them, and we had, there was an old building there, and we were set up in that building taking pictures out of the back and getting our recordings and stuff in that old building, but we never got anything on Lustgarten.

But eventually we got Lieb in New York and I started buying . . .

TAPE 3, SIDE A

EW: . . . from a drug firm in New York, a small drug firm in Jersey, and Cyril Ausbrack was one of the drug inspectors in New York. Cyril Ausbrack was one of the -- they had three top, at that time, drug investigators, drug inspectors in New York. Cyril Ausbrack, Charlie Wayne, and Irving Feldman were the top three guys. Charlie Wayne got involved, and when the original GMPs were written, he was involved in working on those. And Charlie continued inspecting overseas till almost the day he died. He died very shortly after he retired, but he was inspecting forever. But these three guys were the drug people.

And Cyril Ausbrack started telling me about this woman who had a drug firm over in Jersey that had some information on someone that had been in there trying to buy pills from her, and so forth and so on. So I said, “Okay. Well, if she’ll cooperate, you know, I’ll -- let me go over there and she can introduce me to this guy, and I’ll see what’s up,” you know. And we had a woman working with us back then, a woman who was the girlfriend of one of the guys in the office. Tony Roccogrande was one of the investigators and eventually a supervisor in New York, was dating this woman, young woman. And so, to make it look more realistic, we [unclear] after a discussion, she came along as my girlfriend. So she and I went over there when we knew this guy was coming, and this woman in the plant introduced us to

this guy. And we talked about drugs and this and that, and I told them, you know, I can sell drugs, and he hemmed and hawed. "Well, I'm a pharmacist. I can get you anything you want," and stuff like that.

So, of course, we had surveillance on that meeting, and we got his license number and everything on his car. So the initial meeting -- he gave me his phone number and, you know, we'll be in touch and so forth. And when we checked out his phone number, I mean his license number -- I'm sorry -- and got the information on him from the Motor Vehicle Bureau, his name was Maurice Schuman, S-c-h-u-m-a-n, and they claimed . . . And, of course, the information that we got said he was 73 years old. He was 73. Gee, I had pictures of him. He certainly didn't look 73 to me. I said, "This must be his son or something. This guy isn't 73." It turned out he was 73. He was in good shape. He dyed his hair. And he was a pharmacist.

So I eventually started buying stuff to him. I'd tell him what I wanted, he would get it, bring it back. And this was all now in New York City proper, so the surveillance was all in downtown New York traffic and in the Village and, ugh, it was . . . In fact, on this case, eventually we got -- meeting with him and talking with him, I'd have the buyers, and I had the Kel unit on and everything and we've got all these recordings. I had loads of recordings. And

it began to develop that he was getting stuff from some drug manufacturers in Jersey. So when I'd order stuff, he'd go to Jersey after. So we were trying to figure, you know, how are we going to be able to follow him?

So I went out to the, out to Floyd Bennett Field or something, the Army, and got a helicopter. They agreed to work with us and let us use their -- I mean, not let us use; take us up in the helicopter at the critical time when the surveillance came. So, and to see how it would work, I went up with them a couple of . . . I even went up in a straight-wing plane, but a small plane was no good because they'd go up like to Central Park and then have to turn all the way around and come back again. So we tried the helicopter. Clevenger would try anything. "Go ahead and try it." So we flew over in a helicopter. The thing was, there are so many cars down there, you had to try to pinpoint the car. We would have to mark the top of a car.

So all this stuff that we were doing, and when the big time came, when he was going to go after the stuff -- I placed an order for not only amphetamines, but barbiturates now, because I figure he's going to a drug [unclear] and told him I could sell this stuff. And now we had two-way radios in the car, and the surveillance teams would talk to each other, and we had them in the same frequency as the big handy, the big portable radios that you used to get, you

know, at that time. So they could talk to me after he was gone, and I could talk to them and the helicopters up there.

And so he's heading out to Jersey, and they're following him in cars, too, but they have the helicopter up there. And when they'd lose them, the helicopter would tell them, "Look, keep going," you know, "he's up here, he's up there." But the problem was, after they got through the tunnel, they got into the airspace of the Newark Airport, and they wouldn't let the helicopter in, so we lost the helicopter [unclear]. Eventually, the cars followed him to a couple of firms over in Jersey.

And so I worked with this guy undercover for months. They used to kid me that he was my brother. Every time I'd come, "Out with your brother again?" And I'd have to come back and then listen to these recordings and transcribe all this. Well, the girls would transcribe them, but I' be writing down notes and what he said, and, of course, writing down my notes because I made the buy, and I wanted to get my notes from my samples [unclear]. I had a big Webcor recorder that we would play these tapes on, and I'd listen to them. Where something good came, you'd put the mark down, you know, the counter on it, so we made a good remark, I put the number down in my notes that this is where it was on the tape. Spent hours and probably years on that Webcor transcribing all this stuff.

Anyway, to make a long story short, eventually we felt there’s no one really going to be able to buy at these places. Now, this guy, again, was a pharmacist; he was a registered pharmacist. But now, so technically -- and this was before BDAC -- technically, the drug manufacturers could sell him the stuff because he was a pharmacist. He, of course, shouldn’t be selling it to us. And also, some of these places knew that he was bootlegging the stuff, he wasn’t using it, because he was familiar with them from his years and years of business in New York, in the drug business.

So finally, in my last big buy, I [unclear], and we had the surveillance team for the big buy, the final buy, where I was going to identify myself, and George Troublefield was the chemist in New York. George Troublefield is retired now. He -- I’ll never forget this because he was in the surveillance team, and the guy I was following, Schuman, the bad guy, when I met him, he says, “You know,” he says, “Troublefield is African American,” he said. What did he call him? Suspicious -- not suspicious. I forget the phrase he used. “A black guy was following me, I thought, so I went around the block three or four times, and I think I lost him. I don’t now if he was following me or not.” Cheesy character: “This cheesy character was following me.” Every time I see trouble, [unclear] a cheesy character, and

he laughed. And he's listening to this because he's telling me this, and I have the Kel unit on. And Troublefield had the radio on this guy and he's listening.

Anyhow, we identified ourselves. Oh, he didn't know what to say, 73 years old now. So we take him up to the office and we talk to him. "Who have you been buying from?" And, you know, he wasn't going to tell us. "Look, if you cooperate with us, we might help you out." So anyway, he started telling us all these firms that he could buy stuff from. [unclear] remember now, he's a pharmacist. He can buy from these places, you know, legally. "Oh, they know what I'm doing with it, they know what I'm doing with it."

So we eventually had to have, we had -- talk about entrapment -- we eventually had to have him trained, and, of course, we always had equipment on him. He never went anywhere without the Kel unit on him. He was used to putting it on himself, he got so familiar with it, and how to turn it on and off. He would go in and he would discuss with them what he was going to do with this stuff when they were selling it to him, you know. "I got this place on, you know Baltimore Street, East Baltimore Street? You remember East Baltimore Street [unclear]. There's a bunch of nightclubs down there, and they want these yellow jackets, Nembutol," and so forth. "They can take as many as I can get. Just tell me, how many can you sell me?" He'd have to

go into this type of a discussion with them, which we recorded, so that later on the guy couldn’t say, “We were selling them to the pharmacist.” You knew you weren’t selling them legally because this guy’s going to divert them. And that’s the whole basis that we had to work with this guy. And some places, once he told them that, they wouldn’t sell to him.

So we built a number of cases with him, and we paid him -- not huge amounts, but, you know, fairly good fees we would pay him. And he got, damn, he got to be like an FDA investigator. He worked with me for a couple of years over a period of time. And when I went to BDAC, he didn’t know what to do with himself.

But anyway, that was one of the problems. When I went to BDAC, a lot of these cases were half done. Some of them had never gotten to the U.S. attorney yet. So what happened, when BDAC started operating, we started initially with cases that hadn’t been finished, or they started with new cases and the old cases never got finished. So during that interim period between the, from the, like the period from ’65, mainly ’65 into ’66, a lot of those cases that were developed -- and a lot of them were huge cases -- a lot of them got delayed for long periods of time because nobody was working them. The new BDAC people were working on the BDAC cases. They wanted to push cases that they were now

developing. And some of them didn't even get to the U.S. attorneys till late, and they accepted pleas that allowed them suspended sentences. So a lot of them, which were great cases at the time, petered out because of the delay. It was just no real intent on anyone's part. They just got backlogged because BDAC, Ed Kelley and Brady were generating all sorts of stuff, and they were processing those things first because it was BDAC cases and they wanted to show everyone what BDAC was doing. So these old FDA cases just sort of died on the vine, although I had a lot of determinations on some of those cases, and some of them got fairly good . . . But nothing like what they would have gotten if we had processed them promptly and on time. So during that period of time, you know, I did a lot of that type of work.

And then came BDAC, and I went through all that.

Incidentally, just an aside, one of the cases during that pre-BDAC period was a case out on Long Island where I think Schuman bought -- this guy was manufacturing drugs, [unclear] amphetamines, in his garage out in Long Island, and Schuman made some buys from him. [unclear] manufacturing [unclear]. So the time came to close that thing out. And I have pictures. I didn't bring them. They're too big for this briefcase, but a bunch of pictures from that. It shows us under the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway

there with Clevenger. We had a U-Haul trailer because we wanted to bring the equipment back. We had a U-Haul trailer, and Clevenger and I are there putting the Kel unit on Schuman. And we went out there, and as we're going out there, it starts snowing pretty hard, you know. And we get out there to the guy's house, and Lloyd Claiborne was the one. We had a big team. Lloyd Claiborne was there, Cyril Ausbrack was there, Stanley Chrsohos that I mentioned before was there, of course Clevenger, Lloyd Claiborne, and Peggy Craig. Do you remember Peggy Craig, who wrote *Black Market Medicine*, the book *Black Market Medicine*? You haven't seen *Black Market Medicine*? Oh, God.

RO: I don't remember.

EW: Well, it's -- I asked Swann last time. He says he has it, but didn't have it among his books on the shelf.

She wrote this book, *Black Market Medicine*, during that period of time, just pre-BDAC. In fact, she has BDAC at the very end, and it had just been formulated. She wrote it as a novel, and she changed the names in it. She has Clevenger in there as Westerfield or something like that. The names you can identify -- we can identify who the people are she's got in there. And she had all these -- she had stuff in there about General Pharmaco, which was a horrible drug firm up there horrible conditions, I mean filthy. There was not, it was not a place that was selling illegally, but it was

terrible from a GMP standpoint, a horrible operation. It was supposedly counterfeiting stuff and everything. She has all that stuff in the book, and pictures in the book, and she was a great-looking woman. She was really -- if you've got the book, I can show you pictures in there. I have a picture of her standing in the back of this trailer, this U-Haul trailer, because she never should have been there. This was an official case [unclear] was there.

And I used to have to take her around with me. Clevenger would say, "Take her out with you tonight." I'd go down to the [unclear]. She wanted to get in the field, you know, she wanted to get out in the street and get dirty, and I'd have to take her with me. And we'd go over to New York City narcotics guys and we were going to go out at night, and she would interview them and talk to them. Of course, they'd talk to her all night long, you know. That was great; they loved that. And they'd take her out, and we'd drive around the streets, and she'd soak up all this language and all this stuff. So I had to drag her everywhere.

Anyway, she was out there with this thing, and she has a picture of it in her book.

But as he goes in to make the last contact with this fellow -- his name is Henry Keller -- as he's going up the guy's driveway, Claiborne was taking pictures. He takes a

picture of him, and it was now snowing like mad. It was a blizzard now. And you see Schuman with his coat up like this, and he's walking up to the guy's house. He goes in, he makes the buy. We come in, we identify ourselves, and he had his setup in the garage, in his garage in the back. And we go in there, and I have pictures of Cyril inspecting it. Cyril was looking at all the equipment -- these are drugs -- looking at the punches and the dies, and I've got loads of pictures.

I had to collect, I made a document, not a documentary. I made an investigational sample of it, and sample number one was the Stokes tableting machine. There's a sign on it, I've got a sign on there, exhibit number one, I mean sub number one. Then we had all sorts of pots and pans and strainers and raw materials, and they're all subs with my sample.

And then we had to load it into the trailer. By now the snow was a foot deep, you know, it's snowing like it was a blizzard. And I have pictures of us trying to get this Stokes tableting machine up into the back of this trailer. We had boards under it and we're pushing and shoving, and I'm pulling from inside and they're pushing. And then I had to drive it out to my -- I lived on Long Island, in North Massapequa. I drove it home that night, the trailer, and drove it in again in the morning. And for years they had it

in the lobby in Bush Terminal in New York, the New York District Office, as an exhibit sitting in the lobby. [unclear] the swan. He said, "Gee. Where is it now?" I says, "Gee, I don't know. I don't know what they did with it."

So [unclear] over the Easter holidays. She comes to my house. She's Greek. Of course, my wife's Greek, and she brings her mother, and we're talking. "What ever happened?" She doesn't even remember it. It was way back. You know, this was in the '60s. So she was going to check around and see if anyone knew where it was, because if they stuck it somewhere, they'd like to have it down at headquarters. Swann had said they'd love to have it down here. I said, "Yeah, [unclear] background. But I don't know what they ever did with that machine.

But this was, why I really brought that up was, the Central Region now, now, today, you know, has a photography contest. They started a photography contest. I don't know why, but they started a photography . . . I guess we had one years ago in the district. Photo of the Month, we used to call it, and people would turn in stuff they did. Mainly it was filth, mainly rats and mice and chewed bags and stuff. I have no idea why Susan Setterberg decided to do this, but suddenly we get an e-mail saying, "This is the contest," and so forth and so on. Well, I read it

carefully, you know. It doesn't say what the pictures have to be, it doesn't say how old they have to be or how new they have to be. It doesn't say you have had to take the picture. It doesn't say much of anything, except you shouldn't have identified the firm. The firm shouldn't be identified in it, and so on. So I figured, hmm, okay. So you're supposed to send in the pictures. They accept the pictures I think till the 15th of the month, and then [unclear] on the computer, and then they'll number them one through whatever, and you can vote in the Central Region. You vote. They have a little box there with the numbers, and if you like photo number one as the best picture, you push photo number one and vote, and you supposedly win $100, a $100 gift certificate or something. How the hell are they going to work that? We never could do anything like that.

Anyhow, so people were kidding me. "You have a lot of pictures. Why don't you . . ." I said, "I don't want my pictures [unclear]." And it dawned on me. I said, "Hey, what could I lose? I'll send it in as a joke," you know. So I have this picture from 196, it must have been '63, '63, '64, '65. No, it was '65, I guess. Yes, this was before BDAC. It's the picture of us loading this tableting machine into the back of this trailer, with the snow pouring down, you know, snow on all the branches around. And I write up a little thing underneath that this was a bootleg operation,

amphetamines were being manufactured in the man's personal garage, and the bust was made during a blizzard. And I said, "Actions like this helped support passage of the Drug Abuse Control Amendments in July 1965." This was January '65 because this was about six months before.

Well, when I submitted -- and you submitted on the computer, you know -- so at the time I submitted mine, one other picture had been submitted, and it's called the Goof Squad, Goof Squad, I think, and it shows four women, it looks like, in the coveralls, but like toxic, you know, their heads are covered with masks, and the Poop Squad, Poop Team or something, just a little name under it. And they have rubber boots on, and so they look like they're going to be walking on Mars, you know. I don't know what it is. They're obviously geared up to do some sort of a special, either terrorism or BSE or I don't know what. But that's the problem. You don't know what they're doing. You don't know what they are. They're just standing there. The Poop Group; that's what they call it, The Poop Group. And I said, "Gee, what is that?" So that was the only picture that had been submitted.

So then I put my picture in. My picture's number two. Nothing else has been submitted. So my picture's up there. If you get on the computer, you can see it. My picture's number two, and that picture's number one, and so far, when

you want to get on to vote, it says, "Voting is not being allowed at the moment. Keep re-contacting us." So I'm trying to figure, either, if they only got two pictures, maybe they're going to extend it another month and say, "Wait two months till we get more pictures." But one problem I think they must have realized immediately, because I have the date on there, they're not restricting what -- I could turn this picture in if I wanted, you know. It doesn't say you can't use somebody else's picture. They needed to straighten that out, and they probably need to put a time frame on, maybe from the last two years or something like that. And they need to put some more restrictions on the picture. And maybe they're rewriting all that stuff now. Maybe they say, you know, we're going to have to start over again because we got this picture from 1965.

Anyway, they're all kidding me. They say, "I'm trying to vote for your picture in the office, but they [unclear] to vote. I think you scared everyone off with your picture," you know. So that picture's on the Internet, I mean Central Region's website or whatever.

So that was another one of the things that, many things that went on during pre-BDAC.

RO: Let's get back to Lustgarten.

EW: Lustgarten, yeah.

RO: Didn't they ever find out that some of the workers

there were loading that stuff off the back end and . . .

EW: Well, that's what we were told; that's what we were told, but we could never get any of them to load it out to us. This one -- and I have the folder here if I can find it. We have this guy saying that this -- I'm just trying to think of the guy. Jeap Ferguson, that was it. Jeap Ferguson, Jeap Ferguson was the guy who was supposedly buying from Lustgarten, and the guy we were working with that Logan had caught down there, a truck driver, bought stuff from Jeap Ferguson. And he claimed that he had gone up there with Ferguson, he'd gone up there with him to pick stuff up, and that he could probably buy himself. But like I say, he never was able to buy for us, and Ferguson . . . This is another thing. Ferguson got arrested and put in jail, so we never really were able to get anything. And then I was pulled off on something else, and Philly was saying, "No, it's not really happening." They were downplaying it. I don't think they're really selling. I don't think they would really sell," and so forth. So it got a low priority. And then other investigations came in, and it dropped. So I don't believe they ever, ever got any Lustgarten people involved. If they got anything from the workers, I don't remember it if they did. I didn't certainly, no.

RO: Okay.

EW: So, incidentally, this, when I gave speeches back then, pre-BDAC, I did a lot of speeches on the stuff to other agencies. I remember giving one to the Bureau of Narcotics. In fact, some of the guys we eventually hired, "I remember when you came over and spoke to us," you know. I used to play this record, "Six Days on the Road," by Dave Dudley. You probably can't even find a machine to play this on now. My son had transcribed this to a cassette so I could play it in my car on the cassette. But it's about a truck driver six days on the road, and he's coming home. And in it, he's saying, "I'm taking little white pills, and my eyes are open wide." So, you know, "I'm passing everything in sight, I'm taking little white pills and my eyes are open wide." It's a great song. It's a good song [unclear]. And I pointed out to the people, "Now, here's the amphetamine or phenny problem now on records," you know, and back then it was a fairly popular record. And I always used to [unclear] speech, "Just listen to the song, here it comes": "Taking little white pills, and my eyes are open wide." So I still have that thing, and I have the tape.

But Lustgarten, yeah. I don't know anything more about Lustgarten other than we gave it a shot. We gave a couple other places up there a shot, never really got any of those. See, if you don't have this place, you can't walk in to Lustgarten and say, "I want to buy. I'm a peddler and I

want to buy some pills." You almost have to have an informant.

RT: Yeah.

EW: Somebody to put you in there. And if the informant can't do it, unless you have tremendous surveillance on these places and see them, like you say, loading stuff out into somebody's car or something, and you get the license plate on the car, and you figure, unless you can do that, and you know what's in the boxes, it's awful hard and time-consuming to develop anything without an informant on that type of a case with a legitimate firm that can sell the stuff.

RT: Well, when Clevenger came up to New York as the District Director, then you went to New York.

EW: No. I was . . . Well, when Clevenger came to New York as the Director, that was in '67. I had been in New York since '63.

RT: Oh, I see.

EW: I came from Louisville in '63 and did all this stuff I'm telling you about with Schuman and that stuff during that '63 to BDAC '66 time. I was doing all this type of stuff then, and then I went into BDAC, still in New York, still FDA, but it was BDAC, it wasn't like a different world. It wasn't something . . . And then I was in there roughly 16 months, whatever it was, and when I came out of

BDAC, I went into the New Jersey section, Newark Section, as we called it.

RT: I see.

EW: And that’s when Clevenger had come in about three, four, five months before and was starting his Project Action, as he called it, and he was coming up with all this new stuff and new staff, new positions. He was getting grades and this too. He was doing everything, you know, Clevenger. And that’s when I got selected to the job in New Jersey as Section Chief.

RT: So you were never -- is it correct to recall that you were not really, you didn’t really have tenure in New York District *per se* then. Is that right?

EW: Well, I had it from ’63 till I went into BDAC for about three years as a supervisor.

RT: I seem to remember [unclear] of coming up to that District, and you were there, so it must have been during that period.

EW: Yeah, ’63. And then, of course, in BDAC, I was around the corner. I mean, I was not around the corner, but I was close by.

And then starting in ’67 -- see, that’s about the time when I came back to New York District. That’s when Silver came in. Silver came in about that same time. Clevenger hired him as his Executive Officer, the first time anyone

had a position like that. He created this position of executive officer and hired Silver. So I have known Silver since then, since ’67. And Silver and I have been through a lot, including negotiating that regional contract in New York for like eight months. I was on that team, and Silver did a fantastic job, unbelievable job, and almost had a heart attack. He had an angina attack. They thought he had a heart attack because our boss there, Caesar Roy, -- don’t get me started on him -- Caesar Roy actually, oh, he was merciless with poor Silver.

We’d have meetings with him during the negotiations. We’d go up to Caesar’s office. Caesar Augustus Roy. All three names mean king, all three of them, and he would have the whole negotiating team, management’s team, sitting there, and Silver would sit there. “What did you do today?” And we were there for, like I said, eight months. And, “Well, we discussed this thing.” “Did you sign off on it?” “No, we haven’t signed off on it yet.” “You haven’t signed off on it yet?” “No.” “Did you tell him this? I told you yesterday to offer him this and nothing more. Did you tell him that?” “Well, no.” “Yes or no?” “Well, I can’t answer yes or . . .” “Yes or no?” He’s screaming at him, and we’d be sitting there. Oh, he really just mercilessly crucified poor Silver, and that’s why I think he had the angina attack. And that was only about a month into negotiations.

But he was our rebel. Nothing good I can say about Caesar Roy.

RO: Well, you were close up there when Clevenger came back as District Director, and that was the time shortly after that when Goddard became Commissioner.

EW: Oh, yeah, right then, yeah.

RO: And, of course, the Commissioner left the regional . . .

EW: Exactly.

RO: . . . with complete authority.

EW: Right. Which [unclear] he took it and ran. I mean, the people down there -- Paul Hile I guess was here then. Right?

RO: Well, it was Sam Fine first, then Paul Hile.

EW: Sam Fine, right. And Paul Hile did not like that, and I don't blame him, but he and Clevenger were not the best of buddies because Hile was trying to, you know, maintain some headquarters attachment here, and Clevenger was taking off. And he told [unclear], "Just tell me what you want and what the boundaries are, and leave me alone." Goddard said, "Fine." He took off. He was writing memorandums of understanding with the import people. This was way, way, way before anyone did it, Clevenger.

He had us train people, state people in Jersey, to do drug inspections, GMP inspections, back in the '60s. We

certified them, commissioned them, commissioned them to do drug inspections. Of course, these guys were all pharmacists. Don Foley was the head in New Jersey of the Drug Unit, and Joe Price was the head of the food people. And they were all pharmacists. There was about seven or eight of them. Lou Ballenger was one of them . . .

TAPE 3, SIDE B

RT: . . . executive officer, which was unusual.

EW: Right.

RT: And he brought Ralph Bernstein in.

EW: Oh, yeah, as his . . .

RT: Well, Regional Associate Commissioner.

EW: Yeah, the RAC, Regional Associate Commissioner. And Bernstein and him were real buddies and drinking buddies and whatever. And Bernstein, of course, was heavily connected with the New York City Health Department. He was in [unclear] markets, I guess.

RT: Yes, [unclear] markets.

EW: [unclear] markets. Well, you know him from CASA and everything. He knew everybody, I mean, and every politician in the area, he knew.

I remember when we were having the CASA, the convention in New York, I mean New York Region had a New York conference of CASA, Central Atlantic States Association of Food and Drug Officials, the regional [unclear]. We had it

that year, and we were going to have it in the Poconos. Not the Poconos, the Catskills. We decided to have it, yeah. So I was the Secretary-Treasurer of CASA then, and so I and Bernstein -- I'm trying to remember if anyone else came. We went up. He says, "I'll take . . ." We were trying to figure out where we were going to go, which hotel, which place.

So anyway, long story short, we went up and went to four or five different hotels in the Catskills. He knew them all. He knew all the owners. Talk about negotiation. He'd sit down. He says, "If we come here, this is what I want. I get a private room, and you get this, and I get that, and we do this, and we want meals, and we want this." He would go down the whole thing, and they'd either say yes or no. "No? Okay, goodbye. There's others," and we'd go somewhere else. So eventually we decided on Kutcher's. But he knew everything. He really knew everybody. And then the state people and neighboring states from [unclear], you know, not just New York people. He knew other people, too, nationally. So he was very valuable working with the states. You could send him in. Of course, after lunchtime, you didn't want too much [unclear] because he was usually, he'd have a liquid lunch. But . . .

And [unclear] funniest things that used to happen. You know, originally, the state was split. Half the state was

in Philly, I mean Jersey, up till -- I mean up to about Trenton south was Philly's, and north of that was New York's, so it was split. And eventually it was put together, but when it was split, Clevenger had a deal with Irv Berch. Remember Irv Berch?

RO: Yeah.

EW: There's two different kinds of guys, I'm telling you.

So me and Bernstein would go down and take Berch out to lunch and try to get a few drinks into him to convince him whatever it was they were trying to convince him to do. And I was there a couple of times, you know, and Berch, "No, no, no, no." "Oh, come on, just that one," you know. And they would really work on him, trying to loosen him up enough to agree to whatever it was, and it was a riot with Berch.

So Clevenger, how could you say, was, all he wanted was a free leash, and he told -- and he fairly got it from Goddard, and Goddard said, "Go." And a lot of the other directors were sitting around waiting for someone to tell them what to do, and Clevenger says, "Well, that's okay. Let them sit around." One of them was jealous of him, you know. He was getting all this publicity, and he had the magazine and the Project Action and all these other [unclear]. But they were afraid to go out and do it on their own. So he went and . . .

And he used to get involved when he -- he would come on some of the surveillance when I was making buys. He would come and listen out in the car. I mean, he was involved in just about anything. And he loved it, because he used to do it himself.

RO: The undercover work.

EW: But he -- anyone who worked for Clevenger -- and I know [unclear] Lenny Fantasia, who went to industry, and Tony Panzica, both guys from the Micro Lab in New York, but top guys, they got big jobs in industry. In fact, Panzica is now retired from industry on a Golden Parachute. When Pfizer took over . . . Well, he originally went with Warner Lambert, and then Warner Lambert got taken over by . . . Anyway, the last merger was with Pfizer, and they kept the Pfizer guy in the position that Tony was in and gave him, according to him, a huge amount of money. He says, "I can retire. I don't have to work anymore." He has enough money to retire. He plays golf now, and he's doing some consulting work. But, I mean, these were tough guys.

And I [unclear] into that, but they didn't get along or they weren't happy with our District Director in New Jersey, with Matt Lewis, and they both got out of there. And they weren't ready to retire. They got out and went to industry. We had a hemorrhaging of people leaving. Jerry Colaitis was the first. He went to Ciba. And from then on, boy, there

were guys going in all directions. But these were tough guys. Both of those guys would be District Directors or Regional Directors now.

And you ask anyone about Clevenger, oh, oh, they loved him. Anything. You know, tell me to jump out the window. Which window? You know, anything, because he had that personality. You know, he could be one of the guys, I mean really one of the guys, and yet you could see him when he was . . .

We went through the IDIP program, Intensified Drug Inspection Program back then, where we stayed in a firm until it got corrected, these drug firms, you know, back in the early '70s, I guess it was, right after Project Hire. And we stayed, and we had a lot of drug firms there. And these people would come in periodically for [unclear] New York, too, and [unclear] seen him handle some of those meetings. I mean, he was never nasty, you know, he was polite, he was smooth. He would -- and he was a master at talking people into doing things. And, I mean, he had a real ability to be effective, and yet not to offend the people he was dealing with, people who were doing bad there He would maybe move them to something else, but he'd do it in a way . . . As a manager, he was, to me, the ideal manager, except he had some bad habits on the side. But as a manager on the job, he was good, very good.

RT: Didn’t Clifford Shane go up there . . .

EW: Yeah.

RT: . . . after Weems left, I guess.

EW: Yeah. He was the next official Regional Director, was -- there was an interim period with Healton and Henry Roberts, who were in there for a while.

RT: Charlie Armstrong was up there, too.

EW: Was he acting, or as an official?

RT: No. He was up there at the same time that Roberts was.

EW: Okay. But the one that, the next one that was officially put in the position, I think, was Shane. And I think after Shane, I think we got . . .

RT: Was it Roy then?

EW: I think we got Roy and then Bebe. Yeah.

But, yeah, Shane, I don’t know. I haven’t heard much. Anyone know anything about Shane? Is he around?

RT: Still living?

EW: Is he?

RT: [unclear] Kansas City.

EW: He went to Africa or something once, didn’t he, on some special . . .

RT: Arabia, I think.

EW: Arabia? For a special training project or something.

RT: This is kind of typical of Weems, I think. Weems apparently saw some guy sitting in the john and eating his lunch, so he wrote up him an award, "The Finger Fickle" . . .

EW: The Fickle Finger. something.

RT: . . . award or something, and sent it down here. And I don't know who it was, Ron, but whoever reviewed it didn't think it was very funny. Was that Hile?

RO: Bobby Cook.

RT: But he had kind of the humor that Winford had.

EW: But, you know, he was great when he was dealing with the state. They loved him.

RT: Oh, yeah.

EW: They loved him because he was offering them free training, you know, and they'd take him out drinking and he'd hang out with them at night. And [unclear] meeting the governor. We'd go down to the governor in New Jersey, the secretary of agriculture, because Bernstein knew all these people. Bernstein would bring them down, and, I mean, he was really very talented in dealing with top-level people.

RT: Yes, he was.

EW: And then with the dishwasher. He knew all the people in the lab, and he knew them all well.

RO: Well, when Clevenger was still there, Newark was made a district. Is that right?

EW: No. Well, no. It became a district the last day of the year in '71. December 30th or December 31st in 1971 was when they published it in the *Federal Register*. That was when officially . . . So I usually figure it as of January of '72, we were a district.

He left there and went to EPA.

RO: In '72.

EW: Well, it was '72, but he wasn't there anymore. He was . . .

RT: He went to Puerto Rico at one time, didn't he?

EW: Well, he went to Puerto Rico with EPA. He transferred to EPA and spent I don't know how many years in EPA and retired from EPA. But I went to his retirement party up here. And he married, of course. His second marriage was to Harry Lynch's secretary from Puerto Rico. He married her and had a second family, I think two daughters. So I was to his first place when his first wife. He came up for that funeral. I went to that. And then he, when they had his retirement party from FDA, when he was going to EPA, and Bernstein arranged this party, and Goddard was at the party, and at that time he had a beard and everything, Goddard. You would never recognize him.

RT: Maybe that's worked out [unclear] has a beard, because he had one later, too.

EW: But they had all these people, the head of the

Health Department, politicians. I mean, it was quite a party. And also, this was in New York City, in some big restaurant that Bernstein made special arrangements for.

RT: Luchow’s?

EW: Something like that. And then his secretary, Helen Murphy, retired at the same time. That was Weems’s secretary for years, Helen Murphy. She retired at the same time, so it was sort of a dual party. And I’ve got stuff on that here, too. It’s all in the Sound of Action.

See, this Sound of Action paper that he put out was for about five years, something like ’67, I mean, yeah, ’67, ’66, ’67, I guess, to ’72, somewhere like that. This thing came out every week. Maybe once in a blue moon, they didn’t get it out for some reason. And they rotated the people that were on it, the editor, and we had a representative from New Jersey on it and would give them news from New Jersey and so forth. And they’d put it out, and it was great, because it didn’t just have news from New York. It had headquarters news, new commissioners, and new things that happened at headquarters. They’d stick it in there. And, in fact, here’s one of the pages here. [unclear] this page. This was September 7, ’68. See, national news. But it was multi-page.

I just tore this off because this has the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug officials’ names, and they talk

about “Henry Giordano, former head of the Bureau of Narcotics is now being made, and John Finlater. Associate Director John Finlater, former Director of FDA’s BDAC, is to supervise other Bureau functions, including compliance and education.” I think he got kicked out. He was [unclear].

Anyway, I saw this and I just pulled this page off. But that Sound of Action, Ken Silver had all the issues, most of the issues. And when he was moving to Florida, I went out to his house. He said, “I’ve got stuff out here I’m going to throw away if you don’t want any of it,” so I got tons of stuff from him. And he inherited stuff from Ralph Bernstein when Ralph Bernstein died. He had no kids, and his wife was dead, and some distant relatives, and he had loads of stuff. And Silver, his sister or whoever was still living, said, “Do you want this? Take it.” It was a whole bunch of Afro stuff, CASA stuff, all kinds of framed pictures. I’ve got them here. Bernstein with just about every Commissioner, with his arm around the Commissioner: “To Ralph, my good friend,” you know, Goddard or Kennedy, whoever it was. He had all these pictures. I got all that stuff, which I’m going to offer to him if he wants it. I don’t know if he wants any of this stuff. But I [unclear] keep a few of them, but I don’t want them all.

But it was amazing the stuff that I inherited from Silver. A lot of it came through Bernstein. But Silver

gave his Sound of Action to him.

Well, now, we had a Summer Hire last year. We hired a Summer Hire, you know, during the summer, and I had this -- I didn't have enough for her to do sometimes, so I had her copy these Sound of -- I Xeroxed them. He had a double side in them, and they were different colors, you know. They put it on colored paper. Anyway, she made me two extra sets. I want to keep one. I brought one down for John. Last time I was here, I gave him a set. And the other set I'm going to leave in Jersey when I finish the project I'm working on there. I'm going to leave it there. But, really, New York doesn't have any. I talked to people in New York. They don't have any. They are the ones who should have it, too. But back then, a lot of this, New York included Jersey, so if we have another summer hire, I'll make a set for [unclear] up there. But you go through these things, oh, you find out all sorts of stuff. And they had pictures eventually; there were pictures in here. And there's pictures of all the commissionings of the Jersey people and the New York people. Eventually they commissioned them in the food area.

RO: I guess Ken Silver was kind of the editor.

EW: Oh, yes. Well, initially he started it. He, a long time in the beginning, he would proof it. You know, he's a wordsmith, so he would proof it. But then

eventually, the other people pretty much handled it themselves. And it turned out great. I mean, from a historical standpoint, it has all sorts of great stuff for that period of time, not only in New York or Jersey, but also nationally. I'd go through this stuff and, "Oh, yeah, I remember that," you know, a big pay-increase scene and stuff like antibiotic certification fees increased. National is biochemical, a pill for bugs, all sorts of great stuff. I got that from Silver, and a lot of other stuff I got from Silver. Some of it I'll keep and some of it, I'm dumping some of it. I'm offering to him.

RT: I'm sure it was a contrast when Shane came up there after Clevenger.

EW: Yeah. Shane was [unclear], which is fine. He wasn't there very long. I don't know how long he was there.

RT: Oh, they must have been there four or five years.

EW: Oh, yeah, okay, four or five years. Because, let's see, Clevenger went out in . . . See, Roy came in '80. In other words, he came the same year Matt Lewis came to New Jersey.

RT: Well, he replaced Shane.

EW: Yeah. So Shane left either '79 or '80, somewhere in there. I'm not sure of the month when Roy came, but I associate Matt Lewis and Caesar come in the same year, in '80. Roy came first, before Matt came. But, and then

Clevenger left around ’72, so there was then about an eight-year, seven- or eight-year period in there that I guess Shane was there. But . . .

RO: Well, I think, as I recall, just as an example, I think when Weems was there, he made procurements, not the PDR, but all kinds of publications. Every staff person had a whole sort of library of things, which was not the usual arrangement.

EW: Oh, no. Oh, he had so many innovative things there. I mean, God. But I just don’t . . .

I had to deal with Shane occasionally, but, see, now, at this point -- and I’m talking now ’72 to ’80 -- at this point, Simmons is the Director in Jersey, Jim Simmons, and I was sure I was going to get that job. I couldn’t believe I didn’t get that job. But I obviously, in my mind, didn’t get it because I was Clevenger’s bosom buddy, and people [unclear], among other things, other problems, but certainly they didn’t want another Clevenger guy in there. And I can understand that now, but I couldn’t then. I remember poor Lee Strait. Poor Lee Strait, who was Clevenger’s deputy back then. He had to come up to Jersey [unclear]. You know, I had applied and been interviewed and all that stuff, and now they were going to announce that it was Jim Simmons. Poor Lee Strait comes over in my office and he’s telling me.

RO: Well, what was your title then, when . . .

EW: I was the . . .

RO: Chief Inspector.

EW: Chief Inspector, yes, Chief Inspector. So, poor Lee, who was a nice guy. He was telling me . . . Oh, here's something. He was essentially telling me that you're not going to get the job. And I said, "What? What do you mean? Why not? Tell me why not." "Well, they just don't think this is the time, and they want somebody new," and this, that, and the other thing. Anyway, I gave him a look.

And when he left, when he left the office, about five minutes after he left, I get this phone call from Lee. He left the office, got his government car out of the parking lot, which was across the -- we were in the Federal Building then, on North Broad Street -- got his government car, drove out of the lot, and went about a block away, made a right turn and went the wrong way on a one-way street. And this is a black neighborhood. I mean, this is black. And he hits a black guy coming the other way, and the natives surround him, you know. So he's [unclear] goes into a store or something and calls up, "I've [unclear] an accident." And I'm up there saying, "Good!"

Anyway, we sent Sam Jones. You know Sam Jones.

RO: Oh, yeah, sure.

EW: Sam Jones was an African American, and another

guy. We sent them down to help him out, and they rescued him from [unclear] and got him back to New York. And then the fun was, someone had to make an investigation into this accident, you know, what had happened. So they got Mario Monterazzo. Mario Monterazzo was an import inspector and looked like the typical Mafia guy, short Italian guy with no neck, you know, and he acted that way, and he was a good friend of Clevenger's and he was a good friend of Harry Lynch and Jerry Martell and all those guys. You want anything done, give it to Mario, and Mario would take care of it. So we had Mario do the investigation of the accident, and he went over to talk to the witnesses over there. He come back and wrote up a report that got Strait off the hook, although he was going the wrong way on a one-way street. I mean, how can you justify that? But that was a big joke back then when all of that happened. Anyway, poor Lee Strait had a bad day.

So the thing with Simmons was, he had never been a supervisor. He'd been a Food and Drug Officer. He'd never been a supervisor or a Branch Director, you know. He essentially was a Compliance Officer. So they took him from a Compliance Officer and made him a District Director. You know, we never heard of this happening before, you know. My God. Forgetting all the other things that were involved, we'd never heard of this. Usually a Branch Director,

usually an investigations branch or [unclear] something, would get [unclear]. But a Compliance Officer, boom, up to . . . So it was mind-boggling to us in Jersey. Everyone assumed I was going to get the job.

But he was a fantastic Compliance Officer. He could get an action, too. He wasn't a very nice guy to work with. I didn't have much trouble with him because, for one thing, I was in a building eight blocks away. We got too crowded in the Federal Building. We were getting too big. So they took the Investigations Branch and moved us down to Raymond Boulevard, a big private building. So for probably half the time Simmons was there, I was eight blocks away. I only talked to him on the phone and when they had a staff meeting, I'd go over to the staff meeting, but I very rarely had to deal with him.

But poor Frank Bruno. Frank Bruno was the Compliance Branch Director there, and he hadn't had an awful lot. He was a very good friend of Clevenger's. But he had been in Puerto Rico and done some work. But he was the Compliance Branch, and he wasn't that polished a Compliance Branch Director. So Simmons took over his job. He was in the office next to Simmons. Poor Frank. He was uncertain what to do. Simmons would say [unclear]. And poor Bruno was emasculated there. And he had a bad heart to begin with. He had had a couple of heart attacks, Bruno, and he would

get so frustrated with Simmons. And eventually -- it was after Simmons left, I guess -- eventually, Bruno married what used to be Simmons's secretary. She was like 30 years younger than him, and he only lasted a couple, six months after that, and then Frank died of another heart attack. But Frank was a good guy, but poor Simmons would, again, almost like Roy and Silver, and Simmons wouldn't holler. Simmons was very low-spoken. But [unclear] got [unclear]. The [unclear] not hear him sometimes. Even with industry, he was [unclear] almost. He would talk and he'd look down, and he'd just mutter. Sometimes you could hardly hear him. He was very quiet, but very intense. And you'd do it his way or the highway, you know, and a lot of times he'd have us out on weekends checking on a consumer complaint, where from my standpoint, there was absolutely no need to do that. But he wanted it done, and we'd be all over the place checking on some ridiculous thing.

But he really knew his compliance work. He would write up the stuff and he would bother headquarters, you know, push it at headquarters level and argue it and appeal cases and so forth. He was very aggressive from the compliance standpoint. So from that standpoint, he was good.

But from a relationship, from a District Director standpoint, working with, he wasn't that great with the state people either. I mean, he didn't fraternize with

them. He wasn't a fraternizer, you know.

But what happened is he got the union, he created the union in New York because the union several times had put in for status, and they never got enough votes to gain recognition. He was there about a year, boom, we had a union. They got it, and Ollie Goldbaum was, I think, the first president of the union up there. And who else? We had other guys. He created the union there. And after he went to Cincinnati, he was only there about a year when they got a union out there. So he really triggered that type of reaction from employees.

And they even -- we always used to claim that he moved us to East Orange. We were in Broad Street in Newark, and one of our people, one of our women [unclear] . . .

RO: Consumer Affairs Officer?

EW: Yeah, Consumer Affairs Officers, Gloria Martini -- gorgeous, gorgeous woman. She was one of my investigators, and then she switched to being a Consumer Affairs Officer. She got, not attacked certainly, but badgered. She was standing on the corner of the Federal Building on Broad Street waiting for a bus. A bunch of guys got around her and, you know, were saying things to her and so forth -- didn't touch her or anything, but she came back to the office and was all shook up. Simmons says, "That's it. We're moving out of Newark."

The thing is, he moved us to East Orange, right across the street from the train that he traveled to work on. So we always claimed that he moved us out there so he'd be near the train station when he came to work, because otherwise he had to come all the way into Newark on the train, and the train station was way down the other end. You either had to walk up or take a bus up where Broad Street was. So he moved us out there because . . . Then shortly after that, he transferred to Cincinnati, and we were out in East Orange. It wasn't much but better than Newark as far as living conditions go.

But he was great on regulatory actions, no question, and he was a stickler, I mean, you didn't give . . . I mean, if people violated internally, if there was a grievance or that sort of stuff, if someone misused a government car, hey, 30-days suspension, no question. I was the same way, so we had no problems in that area. He was very tough on the people for not staying [unclear].

RT: Was he there when you had the vichyssoise, or was that before?

EW: No, no. That's when we were a Section. That was, that happened July 1st, 1971, which was the first day of the fiscal year, because we had the fiscal year ended the end of June, started the beginning of July. That was the first, we got the first recall number that year because it was the

first day of the fiscal year. And it was during that period, let's see, July '71. Yeah. That was -- Clevenger was still there. Oh, yeah, Clevenger was still there then. That was, we were still a Section. Clevenger was still there.

And that vichyssoise thing, we were over, I was over in Brooklyn. Clevenger was at a meeting. I forget, a district -- it wasn't a district conference, some meeting with the managers, when we got the phone call about the vichyssoise things. The person -- I forget his . . . I have this much in my file cabinet up in New Jersey. But the fellow who died -- a husband and wife ate the vichyssoise. The husband died, the wife was paralyzed, and they couldn't figure out what it was, you know. Finally, when it dawned on them, so it was a couple of days later, after this happened, that the Health Department up there started calling FDA, and they called.

I have the whole chronology of the thing, you know, what happened when. But to do it quickly here, the -- I was over there, and I remember I called the firm and talked to Paretti, who was the owner. Andrew Paretti was the owner of Bon Vivant Soup. And we got the information from him. Yeah, here's your chronology here. July 1st, '71. Samuel Cochran was the guy who died, C-o-c-h-r-a-n. He died, and, of course, the soup was coded V141/USA71. That was the

code. [unclear] I'm sure everyone who worked on that knows how to spell vichyssoise. It's not easy to spell. [unclear] how to spell that, we typed it up so many times. But Andrew Paretti was the owner, and we got the information about 1:45 in the afternoon, and I, over the phone, sent Adrian Birch. Adrian Birch was a Project Hire. He was the only one in the office at the time, virtually the only one in the office. And Adrian Birch sent them out to the firm, and he ran out to the firm to get distribution, collect samples, and they had a consultant out there, and they got fact sheets and so forth. That was on a Thursday.

Now, on the 2nd, I sent Jacobsen. Charlie Jacobsen was an experienced food specialist. I sent him out with Birch, and a microbiologist, Duran, from New York. Birch, Jacobsen, Duran, and a New Jersey Health Department inspector, Marty Rosenberg. The four of them went out on Friday and began to, began an inspection.

And, well, it goes on and on almost by minute, hour by hour.

The point was there, this was a gourmet -- they made gourmet products, so a lot of them were eaten cold. People eat vichyssoise soup cold. That was one of the problems. But they had a lot of, they had a huge list of other soups, all kinds of soups that they were making, so there were a lot of -- there were like 90-some-odd products. I have all

the products listed [unclear]. They had all these products, but as far as we knew, the only problem was with the vichyssoise soup. And for a couple of weeks, we were on getting distribution, they started a recall, and then we began to wonder, why did this happen? You know, what caused it to happen?

So we got into the retorting records. They had retorts there. And eventually we started figuring out that a retort basket, they had changed the time and temperatures on a number of the things, but on one of the retorts, we began to find out they hadn't changed it. They didn't raise it and so forth. We then narrowed it down to maybe one . . .

TAPE 4, SIDE A

EW: We began to figure it was a retorting problem, obviously, but how much of a retorting problem was it? Just one basket didn't get in there, or one retort, a whole retort wasn't right? And we began to -- people wouldn't answer our questions after all. We would talk to the canning supervisor, we were talking to people who were in the shipping area, we were trying to get information off of anyone we could. They had lawyers in there. They immediately lawyered up. They had lawyers in there. And we were asking for copies of records. They wouldn't give us some stuff. They filed a case; they filed an action against us for harassing them. Paretti was a head of a gourmet soup

society, so he was well known in the business, you know. He was worried about his reputation.

So, without looking at my notes here, it was -- well, I think on the end I have it.

We would contact these people at home. We would go and talk to like the canning supervisor at home at night to see if we could get information. Flaherty was involved in that. He would do some of that. We would go out and see if we could get information from them, because we weren't convinced that we had found actually what the cause was.

And here, see at the end. This is now August 12. This is like six weeks after the thing started on the 1st of July. This is August 12th. "Inspectors Jacobsen and Birch visited the plant to interview Mr. and Mrs. Paretti. They refused to allow an interview without approval of their attorney." Then I have, "Inspectors Jacobsen and Birch interviewed Louie Casagrande" -- he was the, I think the canning supervisor or something -- "at his home in the Bronx. Mr. Casagrande stated that he had reconstructed approximately 20 batch sheets, but could not identify which ones." They redid their batch records. And they claimed later on that they actually did this while Birch was there the first day in the plant. In the back room, they were changing the time and temperatures on the batch records for that V141. And this is Casagrande telling us this.

So, once we found that out -- and, of course, we were down here at meetings with Hile. I know one meeting, I came down on the weekend at the beginning of the thing, and Paul Hile and Fine -- I think Fine was here.

RO: Yeah.

EW: And we talked over the strategy and what we were going to do, and so forth and so on. But once we got them admitting or the people admitting that they had falsified records and they didn't know which ones, then we said, the agency took the position, everything you've got is suspect. You can't give us records that we can trust now on anything here, so we don't know what time and temperatures you ran any of the stuff on. So, therefore, you have to recall everything. And they had, like I say, these 90-odd products that went all over the place, all over the world [unclear]. There was stuff -- they shipped stuff overseas. So we were monitoring that recall forever. Stuff was coming back from everywhere. And they were going crazy, they were screaming and hollering. But the agency felt it couldn't take any other position because of the fact that they stated that they falsified records. And, of course, the owners were saying, "Oh, no, no, no, he's wrong, he's lying. The canning supervisor doesn't know what he's talking about." But we couldn't accept that, so everything had to go.

We had -- on the files, I have a whole folder at home,

at the office, just newspaper clippings. All these newspaper clippings were coming out of the Bon Vivant and the follow-up and everything.

So we worked on that, oh boy. I mean, we had teams. We stayed in there. They were working at night. We were working at night inventorying what they had in the plant. And eventually, we had to let them begin operation again once they got new procedures set up that the canning companies -- they then have a . . .

Well, right about this time, shortly after that, was when the mushroom crisis came up. It followed the Bon Vivant crisis, and for like two years, we had one mushroom crisis, one mushroom recall after another, Class 1 recalls for botulism because of the time and temperature problems. Many of them back then had changed their formulas, changed their . . . Even adding a different starch could change the center-can temperature because it would be harder for the heat to penetrate. So a lot of them were making all these changes. And if they had carrots in there and cut them smaller or larger, it would, again, increase or decrease the amount of heat. And all these time and temperature things hinged on the center-can temperature. You'd put a probe into the center of the can and see how long it took for the center of the can to reach a certain temperature, and then to kill the bot, it had to be a certain period of time at

that temperature. So the center-can temperatures that they did ten years ago were no good now because they now had different formulas, and slight changes in the formula would change how long it took that center-can temperature . . . So, one mushroom crisis after another.

And we would go back to these wholesalers, these food wholesalers, after we'd finish one recall. I mean, these were recalls, a lot of them from Buffalo, a lot of them from Philadelphia, and you'd go back in. You'd have spent weeks in there. They had no records, these places. A lot of them had just thrown their invoices in a box or something, you know. They had no computers. There was nothing. You'd have to go in and go through, looking for shipments of this, and it was the most boring work after a while. I mean, the people were going crazy doing this stuff.

We had a big command center in the District up there, a mushroom command center, pictures of mushrooms on the wall, and the guys would be working on, when we'd get a new recall from a wholesaler, who they sold to, different customers of theirs, and we had card systems, and we'd have them by zip-code numbers, because we would assign people to go out, we'd clump them by zip code so they'd all be close. They were going to go out and check. And it was a massive operation for all these recalls.

And it came out of -- and, of course, out of both of

those things came the low-acid canned food regulations, of course, came out of that.

But Bon Vivant was the key, I mean, at the beginning of the whole thing. And, you know, they tried to prosecute them, but I have the final thing there. They never -- it went on for years. They never . . .

RT: Didn't they go out of business?

EW: No. They're still operating, under a different name. It's not called Bon Vivant Soup. It's -- I forget what the name of it is now.

RT: Oh.

EW: But, sure, they're still operating.

But there never was a prosecution even though there was a death involved. We figured, oh, it's . . . But then they fought over the destruction of the stuff, and we had to try to keep track of it. We had it embargoed by the state, and there was loads of it. It was tons and tons of stuff. I mean, it's a long silloquy [sic]. I don't know when actually -- this was just the stuff from the initial couple of weeks. But beyond that, I lost track of whatever happened on that case because I was involved in other things. I'd see papers come out. But I don't think anyone ever really got prosecuted. I think Everline was down here. Chuck Everline was down here, I think, handling that, and we just couldn't get them to bite the bullet and prosecute the

Parettis or the firm, as best I remember. Or else they prosecuted them and let them plead, and they got essentially nothing, you know, a suspended sentence or something like that, but nothing real regulatory came out of it. And, in fact, I don't know if the Parettis, I doubt the Parettis are still there. The firm is still there. So . . .

RO: Where were they located?

EW: I'm sorry?

RO: Where were they located?

EW: In Newark, [unclear].

RO: Just right in Newark.

EW: Right in Newark. I mean, what a lucky break, because they could have been way down in South Jersey somewhere. Right in Newark. So all the business we had to do was right, you know, fifteen minutes from the office, which was a tremendous break for us as far as operating and taking care of it.

But it was a landmark case. I mean, that was, up till then, was the biggest recall FDA had ever had, by far.

RO: Well, of course, it happened right before the 4th of July.

EW: Yeah. [unclear]

RO: All the warehouses were closed.

EW: Yeah.

RO: Fourth of July.

EW: I never take a vacation, I mean a planned vacation. I take long weekends, I take a day here, a day there. This is the first year that we've rented a house down on the shore with another family, good friends of ours. Both of us rented a house down, I forget where it was, somewhere on the shore. My wife was so happy.

Oh, this happened just before, well, it was the 4th of July weekend, and the next week we were supposed to be down there. I got down there, I think, two days. I ran down, took a swim, and ran back. The rest of the time I was here or in Washington. My wife says, "The first year . . ." She still [unclear] me about that. "Remember that vacation we took and you were never here?" It happened right at that time. And it was unusual, because I never took, I mean, we never took a vacation like that. So, I'm telling you, that was a case.

People now, today, people who were there when that happened, all you've got to do is mention Bon Vivant and they start talking, you know.

Oh, John Vogel was there. John Vogel was one of the supervisors I had involved in this. And like I say, we were inventorying everything. We were on a night shift. We had a day shift and a night shift. And we'd be inventorying how many cans and cases and cases and cases. Oh, God. And Vogel was involved in that.

I still hear from John. He's on the Internet, and Christmas, I hear from him. He says he's coming up for my retirement party. I said, "Don't bother, John. Just stay down there and send me a card."

RT: Of course, this was primarily a focal point in Philadelphia. Well, you have the grape also.

EW: Oh, yeah.

RT: Did that impact on Newark as well?

EW: Oh, yeah, but it was really a Philly case, and Dick Williams -- not Dick Williams. Yeah, Dick Williams, I've got Richard Williams. No, wait. Dick Davis, Dick Davis. This was Dick Davis's [unclear], that and Three Mile Island. And that was really Philly's, but we had to send a lot of people down there. And, of course, well, my guy found the grape. Bill Fidersky is the guy who collected the sample that they found, they claimed they found the cyanide in, was Bill Fidersky.

The poor guy had a nervous breakdown over that. I mean, he was just going -- it was the first day, the first day that we started on the dock looking through all these grapes. And I'm sure you guys remember this as well as me. But the boats were lined up out there with grapes, and we had people there, and we were supposed to look at every case, not spot-check them, but look at every case that came in. And I was down there for a while, and they had tables

lined up there and all these cases were on. And you look and see if you can find a pinprick in one of the grapes. I mean, oh my God, it was terrible.

Anyway, the first day, Fidersky, for some reason, samples this [unclear]. So he samples this, puts it in a plastic bag, sends it up there, and the lab finds arsenic. Arsenic?

RO: Cyanide.

EW: Cyanide, cyanide in there. And oh, my God, and this is the first day that we started this thing, you know. So, of course, they interviewed Fidersky: where, what box did it come out of? By then, the boxes were all -- nobody knew. And so it kept going on and on and on, and they never found another sample. And, of course, Chile was going bananas. Chile was going wild down there because this is the time of the year they make their money on grapes, and they had all kinds of experts, you know. They had all kinds of experts come in, authorities and scientists, to prove that if they . . . Then they thought it had been put in in Chile before it left, and they were trying to prove that it wouldn't have been still left, it would have disintegrated by then, the grapes would have spoiled from the cyanide and everything.

Anyway, all of this was going on, and, of course, the lab came up for questioning. They just had to defend the

lab because they're the only ones to find it. And, of course, the Chile people, the people from Chile and the growers and the receivers were sampling stuff and having it run through, and they weren't finding anything.

RO: And the agency did kind of an unusual thing, too, I guess, in that they sent two investigators down there . . .

EW: Oh, yeah.

RO: . . . who [unclear] were killed in a plane crash.

EW: Oh, yes. That was afterwards, so that was after that crisis. They were going down to see the improvements they had made. Yeah, Pozar and Hardy. Yeah, yeah. I knew Pozar. I knew them both well, but I knew Pozar was a Chief Investigator back then in Nashville.

RO: Right.

EW: But I brought some stuff down to John last time. I had a lot of stuff on the Pozar ceremony after they had . . . I had a lot of the stuff that they had right after he died and the award they gave out. And then, of course, they have the award now, Investigator of the Year or something that's based on him.

But we had trouble. The troubles I had with the grapes, outside of poor Fidersky, who was continually called out to be interviewed, they had people from Chile come up and interview him. They had, you know, I think the

ambassador from Chile. They had everybody in there asking him, you know, essentially inferring, did you do something with those? And the poor guy, he eventually retired on disability. Now, how much of it was due to the grapes or not. But he was really, he was, went through a lot finding that, not finding that, but collecting that sample.

So, outside of that connection, the only connection for me was to get people down there, because they were going around the clock down there, and people were coming in from other districts all over the country pretty much, or certainly the East, to help them do all this stuff. And some of my people didn't want to go down because they were doing it on the weekends. They worked on the weekends, too, down there with the stuff. And I had a lot of trouble scheduling these crews to go down, and whether they were going to stay overnight. Some of them wanted to come back. They lived in South Jersey, all this stuff. So that sort of stuff was the main involvement that I had in the grape crisis, and Dick Davis on the phone, "Get these people down here!"

Oh, and then the union, the union started objecting. Bill Beerbaum was the union president. Bill Beerbaum; he's retired now, he's a consultant, a good guy and a very quiet guy. But he would, Davis would get him on the phone, and they'd be going back and forth. And Beerbaum would say,

"Well, the contract says, for overtime," and this, that, or the other thing. And Davis would say, "It's a crisis and we need people down here, and you'd better get them down here," blah-blah-blah. Matt Lewis was sitting there looking [unclear]. Matt [unclear] there listening to them yell at each other. Well, Davis was not hollering, but he was coming on strong, and Beerbaum was quiet, like [unclear]. But that sort of stuff.

And then eventually, of course, it got more and more inspecting the lab, and I think Chile sued the United States for huge sums of money for it. And I have all that stuff in my files up there.

RT: Well, who followed Jim Simmons in this?

EW: Friendly Fred Carlson, friendly Fred, always smiling. And I thought I was certainly going to get the job then, you know. This is the second time around. Since Simmons is gone, now Wilkens gets the job. That's okay. I'll be the second director. Friendly Fred.

But the thing is, I was friendly with Fred, because when I was in Louisville, he was in Indianapolis. He was the resident in Indianapolis. I was in Louisville. John McCullough was in Columbus, Ohio, John McCullough, who used to be in Baltimore. He went from Baltimore, I think, out to Columbus. And Charlie Puiatt was in Nashville, Charlie Puiatt, P-u-i-a-t-t. We were the four residents in

Cincinnati District back then in the early ‘60s. So I knew Fred from that, and when we’d go up. Tom Rice was the supervisor then. He used to, when we’d have District conferences, Tom Rice always used to have a poker party at his house, and we’d all go out to Tom Rice’s house and have a poker party out there. And Hayward Mayfield became a supervisor out there, too, Hayward, a good guy too.

RT: How long was Fred there?

EW: In New York? I mean in New Jersey?

RT: Yeah.

EW: Okay. Fred came in. Simmons left. Let’s see. I have all this written down, but I don’t know the [unclear]. Simmons was there from ’73 to ’76. I don’t know the months. He came in January ’73. Simmons reported. He was selected before then but didn’t report till then. And he left in ’76. I’m not sure what month. So Carlson came in in ’76, and he left in ’80, when Matt came in. He lateralled to Boston, I think.

RT: He was the deputy.

EW: Yeah. I think he came from, I think he was Chief Inspector in Buffalo or Chicago. Carlson, I think, was a Chief Inspector, Buffalo or Chicago.

RT: I think it was Chicago.

EW: I think it may be Chicago. You know, he got promoted to a Director to come down here. But then he

lateralled to Boston when he left here. He had his home, that's where he started, I think, and he's from Boston, so he liked it here, but he had a chance to lateral. So he lateralled. And I said, well, the third time is my lucky time. This time I'm going to get . . . And in comes Matt Lewis, who was the Compliance Officer in Philly.

RT: Let me ask you something? What did Bob Martin [unclear]. [unclear] now. You don't want that on tape.

EW: Well, Bob Martin was in New York. Bob Martin was the District Director in New York when Clevenger was the Regional Director. See, now, what happened, that's something a lot of people don't understand, and that's why I brought this down.

In New York now -- you haven't been to the new office in New York, in Jamaica.

RT: No, no, no.

EW: Oh, well, here's what they've got in New York now. When you come into the -- oh, beautiful place, huge building. I mean, they say it's the biggest rent that FDA is paying now, is on the Jamaica office. They have a lab that's three times as big as they need because it was drafted back when we were expanding years ago, and now they've got empty [unclear]. So when 9/11 came, they'd let -- and the Customs lab got wiped out in the World Trade Center, they were in the World Trade Center, they let them

set up their lab out in Jamaica because, and there's still plenty of room out there. And investigation-wise, too, they're huge areas, a beautiful building, but way too big now. But they couldn't change. [unclear] won't change anything.

So what they've done now in the hallway where, as you walk into the Director's office, the District -- incidentally, here's a picture of Simmons, there's Simmons, friendly gent, and here's Lee Strait, and here's my good friend Bob Martin.

RT: I remember him.

EW: Now, what they've done over there in New York, when you walk down the hallway -- and this is all on the computer -- you've got this sign up, you've got this sign, New York District Directors Emeritus, and then you've got this. [unclear] recognize outstanding leadership and commitment of our directors, blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah-blah. You've got that. And then, well, this is the long-distance picture of it. You've got this. This here, this here is this or something. It's a listing of all the directors going back to when the Act was passed. I mean, it's fantastic, you know. They've been there forever.

RT: Oh, yeah. The GO was there. Ask Ron if Gino Cart was up there.

RO: I couldn't remember.

EW: And then these pictures are spread out along the wall, you know, about every -- it's a long hall. About every two or three feet, there'll be another picture. And these are the individual pictures, and they start with Charlie Herman. That's Herman. Then they have Clevenger. I gave them the picture for Clevenger. That, but you see the years there. They have him for that entire period of time, and for most of that time he was the Regional Director.

RT: I see.

EW: They weren't, you know, they had different titles back then, too. And the District Directors were called Assistant Regional Directors, but they were essentially District Directors. So this period for Clevenger is wrong, and I've talked -- I haven't talked to Williams, but I talked to him on the computer and sent him stuff. He says, "No, no, you're right." He was only there as District Director for a short period of time -- I have the dates. Then he was Regional Director, and then all the people were Assistant Regional Directors, because then they jumped from him, you know, they jumped to Gerstenberg, and then to Filene, and then to Ed Warner, and then to Holman. But the thing was -- and that's on the computer. You can just pop it up. But -- and it looks great. I mean, you walk down this hall and there's these pictures, you know.

But it bothers me that they got this gap. I mean, they have Clevenger down for this gap.

Now, I called over to talk to -- unfortunately, he wasn't in; this was months ago, and I got his secretary, who's been there forever. I find out now she left with this latest buyout, a buyout, because she was there long enough. She must have got a buyout. She left a couple of months ago when they had the buyouts. But I talked to her initially, and she had done the research for them, and she'd done it with John Swann, among other things. She called down here and asked him to tell them who was directors when. And he did, but he gave them inaccurate -- he gave them [unclear] office was real information. He didn't have listed, he didn't have Bob Martin listed and he didn't have Lee Strait listed. They were both District Directors when Clevenger was a Regional Director during that time period from, well, '71 or whenever it was when they have Clevenger down. Well, they have Clevenger there through '71, which is well known. They have him from '67 to '71. He was director like from '67 to '69 or '68, something like that. Then he was Regional Director, and then Lee Strait was in there, and then Bob Martin was in there during that period of time as directors. And it's all in the Sound of Action. See, I went through the Sound of Actions, and it's right in there. And so I called John before I talked to, I was going to

talk to New York, called them to explain this Assistant Regional Food and Drug Director was actually the term they used then for District Director.

And then I find in here some references to Joiner. Remember Joiner in Buffalo?

RT: Curtis Joiner.

EW: Curtis Joiner, yeah. He was a District Director there, and I have Sound of Actions where they mention Buffalo District, and they're calling him District Director, Curtis Joiner. And then I have later ones where he's called Assistant Food and Drug Director or Assistant Regional Director Joiner. So the title changed back then, but it was still District; essentially the job was the District Director. So they'd left out Martin and Strait.

So when I told this to the secretary, she [unclear] on the phone, "Oh, no, no," she said, "I checked with headquarters. That's the way it was. That's what . . ." I said, "Listen, I've got it in the Sound of . . ." "No-no, no-no." "Well, I'll tell Mr. Wishner, and if he wants to do something about this, they'd have to change that one thing, enforcement." I never heard from her. I don't know if she ever told him or not. But I told Diana this past Easter. I said, "You know, that's wrong." She says, "I'll talk to Jerry."

Well, if I get to CASA this year, I know I'll have to

pay my own way, I think, because they [unclear] no money, you know, so he’s going to have to send one person, or it’s the first CASA I’ve missed since I’m here. I’ll pay my own way. Washner is going to be out there, and I’m going to bring the stuff and show him, because I’d think he’d want it to be right. It should be right. And they need to put -- of course, they don’t have pictures of these people, so the ones I’m going to offer them, I have the picture of Bob Martin, which is pretty good. The only one I have, could find of Lee Strait was that profile picture. See, that one of Martin will be okay. They’ll just take the head. And this is about all I have on Lee Strait, but it’s better than nothing. The thing is, they should put them in between there to get it accurate.

Now, I mentioned this to Doug Elsworth, who’s our Director now. After Matt Lewis, Doug Elsworth came as Director from the Center of Drugs. And I said, “Yeah, you should do the same thing here. We haven’t had that many directors, but you could put . . .” And he said, “Yeah, a great idea.” So I went down to the firm that did it for them to get prices and everything, and we’re going to do the same sort of thing in Jersey. But right now we don’t have the money and so forth. And before I retire, I’ll make an effort to get them to . . . They might even put other people’s pictures up, too.

Anyway, it looks great over there.

And, see, the way they have them, this plate with this information on it is included in this whole thing. In other words, however they do it, this isn't a plate that's bolted on there. It's included in it. But when you get, of course, to the current person, like if you were going to put, say, Washner's picture up or if you were going to put Doug Elsworth's picture up here, you can't include it in the picture. But you just, two little tiny screws, you put some screws on. So for that one, either you put them all on that way if you start, or you . . . Anyway, that's what we're hoping, thinking we're going to do over there.

But it's really, it really looks good. I mean, it gives you the history going all the way back to when the Act was passed, for heaven's sakes. I don't know how they found all that stuff out, but they got [unclear]. They just missed those two guys. So that's the setup in New York. Martin and Lee Strait are missing.

RO: Well, what kind of inventory stuff are you working on now?

EW: Me?

RO: Well, I mean, not you necessarily, but the District.

EW: In Jersey?

RO: Yeah.

EW: Well, you know, we've lost a lot of our drug firms. The drug work is sort of less than it was years back.

Oh, one of the interesting things is, we have more than 50 percent of our investigators are women now. Of course, I was there when the first woman was sworn in, Emma Jean Gallanger, eventually Emma Jean Tibbetts. She married Jim Tibbetts, one of our investigators. But it was Emma Jean Gallanger. She was a schoolteacher. And I think she was about 22 when we hired her, and she had been a schoolteacher, very smart. And I remember back then, in the '60s, when they were thinking of -- women wanted to become investigators. People can't believe me now when I say, you know, when I was [unclear] for several years, there were no women investigators. [unclear] But I remember back then when women were flying, and I was one of the ones who said, "No way can a woman do this job." I mean, I'm thinking of all the undercover work and the truck stops. [unclear] can't do this work. But not only that, I'm thinking grain elevators and flour mills and sampling grain in the grain cars. We had to push this big dryer, you know, this seven-foot dryer down into the grain, and then screen it and get samples. The women can't do that. And it turns out they got some of these farm girls out there that they interviewed, and they could push it a hell of a lot easier

than some of our guys could, you know. So from a physical standpoint, they were getting women who could easily do it. So they kept getting people but turning them away and turning them away and turning them away. Finally, she got hired in New York, and Larrick came up and swore her in. It was in Bush Terminal in '65. I remember it well. And so I [unclear].

Clevenger, he was Chief Inspector now. This is before BDAC, '65. He had me as a supervisor, he had, I guess -- Bill Robinson was there as a supervisor, but I don't know if he was still there then or not. He had -- who else was supervisor there? Well, anyway, he had -- Bill Logan was one of his supervisors there, Wild Bill Logan. He assigns her to Wild Bill Logan to groom and train. And I was in a carpool with Logan back then. Flaherty and I and Morty Schneider, who worked with Boyd Loftis. Loftis and Schneider were the Compliance Officers, and Boyd Loftis was the Compliance Officer and Morty Schneider was his assistant. And Ed Steele, who came to headquarters, Ed Steele; Danny Sullivan was a chemist in the lab . . .

TAPE 4, SIDE B

EW: . . . having to split the carpool in two and have two cars in the carpool, and we used to race each other in coming in on the Belt Parkway to see who'd get to the office first.

But in that carpool, we would have these discussions, you know, and we kept asking Logan, you know, he'd be in there, "I want a cigar." I'd say, "How's Emma Jean doing, Bill?" "Oh, she's doing okay, she's all right." Eventually he starts telling us, "You know, Emma Jean got a good case today. She [unclear] and she did," and he starts telling us about what she's doing. She was doing pretty good. He was getting more and more impressed with her.

And I remember one story was, Charlie Herman, who was the Director then, in his office, there were very few windows in Bush Terminal, but he had a window, and he could look down to the parking lot next to the building. And they said he was looking down one day, and Emma Jean drives in, gets out of the car, opens the trunk, and pulls out this little cart that you, like you can go shopping with, it folds down, you know, you can pull it down, it had wheels on it, it pulls down, you put stuff in it. She pulls it out, unfolds it, puts her filth kit and her samples and everything in this cart, takes it [unclear]. He calls Weems in. Charlie Herman says, "Listen, [unclear]. Why haven't we done that all along instead of jack-handing it in on our backs?" you know. So he was so impressed with what she did.

Another story. We had up there in the lab Mary Logan. Mary was a supervisory chemist in the lab, a good friend of Clevenger's. And when Clevenger was out frequently, she'd

act as director. Other people would too, but sometimes she'd act. So one day she was acting as director, and Emma Jean came back from an inspection of a real bad warehouse out on the docks, you know, an old rat-infested place. And when she come in, she comes to Logan and tells him that, tells him the story. Anyway, and Logan says, "We've got to tell this to the director." The director is Mary Dolan. And she says, she's explaining how she's walking around this warehouse, and she's looking here and she's looking there, and she turns from this row of whatever it was and turns into this next aisle, and here was one of the workers urinating in the corner right next to a lot of something, some sort of food. He was urinating right there, right there on the floor. So Mary Dolan says, "Did you get any pictures?" [unclear]

But anyway, she turned out to be a very good, very competent and very good inspector, and eventually she came to New Jersey, and I had her in New Jersey, and that's where she met Tibbetts and eventually married Tibbetts.

Except she was a very early women's libber. I don't know officially when women's lib started taking off, when they were burning their bras and everything. But she was right at the beginning of that era, and you couldn't say anything that wouldn't bring a reaction from her that sounded offensive to women or you didn't think she could do

the job or something.

So, remember when we took over the Fair Labor Standards, FLSA or . . . What was it? No, not that. When we took over toxic substances and . . .

RO: Yeah.

EW: Is that FLSA?

RO: FLSA.

EW: FLSA, yeah. And we were going out to these crazy places that we never had been to before. They were making firecrackers and all sorts of stuff that came under this act that we inherited. Eventually they became product safety, Consumer Product Safety Commission, and we lost that stuff. But for years, whenever it was, we had to go out to see if they were in our inventory, building up our OEI, and we had to go to these firms to see if technically did they come under us.

Well, she went to one of these places, and a relatively small place, I guess, and she's talking to the, not the boss, but next to the boss, I guess the manager. And she's sitting at the edge of the desk. He's at the desk like I am, and she's sitting right here on a chair and asking him these questions about this, and she's writing the stuff down and asking him more questions. And finally he says, "Look, you have no jurisdiction in here. We don't make anything that you regulate." And he reaches over and, you know, she

had a pad on her, and he grabs her by the arm. He says, “Will you please leave.” And she says, “Get your hands off my body!” she [unclear] out. “Get your hands off me!” And so from out this door comes the guy’s boss. He comes running out the door. “He touched my body!” she says. [unclear]. So she comes back to the office.

Meantime, though, we get a phone call from the guy, or from the boss -- I forget which -- saying what happened, you know. He’s telling us what happened. Paul Weiner was her supervisor. Paul gets the call. Someone called in and wanted to talk to someone about Emma Jean. He comes to me. And so we wait. She comes back in the office, sits down at her desk, working, didn’t say anything, called us over. Says, “How was your inspection? We got a phone call from so-and-so out there.” She says, “Yeah. He touched my body.” She says, “I reported it to the police.” And right across from where we were was the police station in downtown Newark. And she, in fact, went over and filed a complaint against this guy for assaulting her. All he did was touch her on the, and ask her to leave.

So I ran down, we went down to the police station, and the guy says, “Do you want us to go out and arrest this guy?” “No, no, no, please don’t.” “Well, she filed a complaint. We’ve got to do something.” So we had to talk her into dropping the complaint, which was extremely hard to

do. And I don't know if she was married to Tibbetts. No, she was married to Tibbetts then, and we asked her husband, "Will you talk to her?" "I can't talk. She won't pay any attention to me." So I had to go through heaven and hell to get her to drop that complaint, or the police were going to arrest this poor guy out at the firm. Oh, boy, she was something. So that's -- I have vivid memories of Emma Jean.

Eventually she tried to come back to FDA, I think up in the Boston area, maybe ten years later or something. I remember someone from up there called me and asked me about her and everything. Well, they hired her part time. I said, "How can you hire her part time?" They had her in there for a short period of time, but she never, as far as I know, officially came back. But she was the groundbreaker. I wish we had a picture of her. I don't know if we do. We should have a picture of Emma Jean. She certainly should be up in the History Office here, name, but the picture should be there. I don't recall if we have any pictures of her.

RT: You mentioned that Newark, anyway, had lost a lot of the drug firms. Where'd they go, Puerto Rico or . . .

EW: Well, a lot of them merged. I mean, several of them have merged, and where there were two or three firms before, they're now one firm. I don't know if any more have gone to Puerto Rico, but some of them have gone overseas. I don't know where overseas, not necessarily Puerto Rico, but

overseas somewhere. We still have a lot of drug firms, but not like we used to. We used to have, oh, the gold standard of drug firms up there. All the big ones were up there, and some of them still are. Roche and Schering and so forth we still have, and now Pfizer or part of Pfizer. But we had a lot of smaller firms, too, or medium-size firms, and a lot of them have been eaten up by the larger firms. A lot of the smaller firms are gone. And I have not, you know, I'm not involved in that on a day-to-day basis like I was since I've been in PSAL, so I don't know the actual nitty-gritty. But we don't have the inventory of drug firms we had before. And a lot of our people went to those drug firms, a lot of our people went to them. Some of them are still there.

But they do, we do food work, we do device work.

RT: Are you going to, when you do decide to retire, which you told me was going to be sometime this year, are you going to go into consulting?

EW: Oh, my God, no.

RT: Are you kidding me?

EW: Well, oh, my God. In the first place, I couldn't stand it because if they didn't do what I told them to do, I would report to the FDA. I couldn't after about 47 years pretty soon in FDA. I'm not going to -- if they were doing anything wrong and didn't correct it, I . . . Some of these

guys I get feedback from. In fact, Jerry Caligis left one very large firm there because he didn't like the way they operated and he couldn't take it. So he became a consultant. And others I'm sure are turning their back on some things -- not, people [unclear], but things that they really think they should be doing differently and they won't, for not good reasons. I couldn't, I couldn't. I've been in the government, FDA, too long to be able to do that. In the first place, I'm way too old, but the other thing is, I wouldn't feel comfortable out there. No. I don't have any intentions of . . .

I had an offer, an interview, way back when Dick Williams left, and I went to New York. Well, I was in Louisville, and then I went to New York. And while I was in New York, at the beginning [unclear], in '63, '64, somewhere in there, I got contacted by a headhunting group that essentially told me that it was a Richardson Merrill inquiry to see if I'd be interested in a job that involved a lot of overseas travel. It was a GMP type, you know, auditing type work for Richardson Merrill at their various locations. And the salary sounded fantastic. This was just an interview, not offering me the job but to be interviewed for the job, and I got this preliminary information.

I remember going out of the building to a phone booth to call them back. I didn't want anyone in the office to

know I was talking to anyone like that.

But Forrest Herron got the job. I told them I wasn't interested, and they asked for other names. Either I gave them other names . . . But I'm sure it was Dick Williams looking at the people that he had worked with in Baltimore, and that's the job that Forrest Herron took. He was with them for quite a while.

RO: Forrest Herron [unclear] gone on to Richardson Merrill.

EW: Yeah, yeah. Herron had worked with me on one of my big OTC cases I haven't told you about, a Western Electric case in Baltimore. [unclear] came in on that case. And then he was in New York, in the Compliance, New York area, with Everline. He and Everline together were in there before Clevenger came.

But, no. I couldn't work.

RO: Well, is there anything else you'd like to add to this? You've covered a lot of things.

EW: Well, I had a million cases, so you probably have enough cases. But this Western Electric case in 1960 was one of my, one of the cases I'm proudest of. This was one of the tougher cases.

This was at the Western Electric plant outside of Baltimore, and we . . .

RO: That was an OTC case?

EW: Oh, yeah, illegal drug case that they were being sold to people in the plant, and, of course, they worked night shifts in there, and the people on the night shifts were supposedly taking these pills, and they were getting them from somebody in the plant.

So Sooy and I went out there to talk to the Western Electric people, what was involved and so forth, and they had this one woman who works there that was telling us this. So I went and talked with her, and she told us who the woman was that was supposedly selling. And, of course, all sorts of lurid things were supposed to be going on there during the night shift between the men and the women and everything in the back rooms. But it was supposedly a real cozy place in the night shift. And they were selling these pills; this one woman was selling these pills.

So, we're trying to figure, how are we going to approach this woman? You can't go in and go up to the woman.

Well, they were building another building next to the, where the people worked on the night shift. It was a big screened-in plant, this Western Electric plant, and they were building a new facility, and it was up and they were doing the inside work. So we got with the construction company. We got credentials from the construction company. We got the hardhats, the uniforms and everything.

And we would go in -- I remember, the alarm would go off at eleven o'clock at night. I'd get up and meet Forrest Herron and Wayne Bohrer, Wayne Bohrer. I took them with me. The three of us were supposed to be part of the night shift working in the construction building right across, right next to where these people were working. And we'd go in there just before they broke at night for their evening dinner, supper, breakfast, whatever they called it. And we'd go in there, and we'd pick up boards and drop them and bang and hit with a hammer, we'd bang on, like we were working. The people would come out, a lot of them, and sit outside the plant on the steps. It was summertime. And they'd hear us banging around in there.

And then we'd come over to go in and get, we'd go into the cafeteria where they were eating, and we would buy some stuff and sit down and eat, I mean, not for a meal, but stuff, cake and stuff, and try to figure out how we're going to approach this woman and ask her for pills, you know, and me being the leader of the group. So we had the woman. We knew exactly who it was, and she'd always be at a table with other women, so we couldn't . . . And the table was full with all the women. So how are we going to do this?

So after, you know, we'd come back in, and Sooy would say, "Get any buys?" We'd say, "No, we can't get near this woman." "What's the matter? Sit down here and do this."

"We can't, George. It just doesn't work out, you know. It's not going to work that way." "Well, you know, we can't be out, send you out there, three guys out there every night."

So one night we hear that, from the woman that was informing or that had told us about her, that this woman had a pet monkey, crazy about the pet monkey. And I'm [unclear]. So, I had worked in the circus, and I had all these circus pictures. I had two books full of circus pictures. And one of them has me holding a baby orangutan, sitting outside with this baby orangutan in my lap. So I bring the picture, take it out of my album [unclear] the night shift. And we wait until she's on line, on the cafeteria-style line. She's on the line. I get up there and get next to her on the line. And while I'm on the line, I say, "Hi." I said, "I hear you've got a pet monkey." She says, "Yeah." I said, "What kind is it?" you know, and we start talking about the pet monkey. "What do you know about monkeys?" I said, "Oh, I know plenty about monkeys." I said, "I used to have a pet orangutan." "Get out of here," you know. So I keep following her over to the table and I sit down at her table with her now. [unclear] and I'm talking with her. So we're talking and talking and there's other women listening and then laughing because we're talking about the monkey. And then I pull out, "You don't

have, you never had an orangutan." So I pull out my picture, you know. She looks, "Oh, my God!" She says, "How old is it?" Then we start talking monkeys.

After we get all through, the bell rings that their break is up, you know, and they're getting up to leave. And I said, "Do you have any bennies? I could use a few bennies." She says, "Shit!" she says. You know, she looks at me. I say, "Come on, [unclear]. I hear you've got some pills." So she reaches in her purse and gives me one tablet. I said, "Well, thanks," you know. She leaves.

Come back the next day to George Sooy. "George, we got a buy." "Great. How many?" "One tablet." "Ahh, what are you talking about?" I had to tell him the story, you know. "So [unclear] tonight, back, ask for more," you know.

Go back that night. She wouldn't come near me. She avoided me like the plague. Well, I didn't chase her, but she didn't come near me for a couple of nights.

Then finally, after I don't know how long, she comes over and she says, "You know, I've been worried, because the girls were telling me that you might be a policeman. We were scared you might be a cop." I said, "What are you talking about? We're breaking our ass over here." "I know. They thought you might be a cop and I was in big trouble, but nothing's happened," she said, "so I can get you all you want." I said, "Okay."

So then I started putting in orders with her, and she'd come back with a bottle or two bottles. And I'm saying to her, "Where do you get this stuff?" She's buying it from this guy. So eventually she introduced me to the fellow. The woman that I got the one off was Anna Henninger, and then she introduced me to Ed Horvath, who was the guy who was really selling them in the plant, Ed Horvath, and I started ordering from him.

And then I'm telling him that I have a brother who's a truck driver, and he can use big amounts of pep pills. "Boy, if you can get pep pills, he can use them. And he goes through Baltimore, too, and he could," because we began to find out that he can get other things besides amphetamines. It turns out he had a, he was getting them from a pharmacist, see. We began to get that idea. So I start saying, "Can you get these sleeping-pill things, because we could, my brother could sell them down," we always used East Baltimore Street as our location. You can sell anything down there. "Oh, yeah. I have a father who's a pharmacist, can get you anything you want." So, sure enough, he starts bringing that stuff back.

Well, that's, to my knowledge, this was the first time that we used radio cars. We used -- see, we were in the Appraiser Store Building, which was the Customs House Building. Customs was in there. We went to Customs there.

They had radios in there, two-way radios in their cars, and they had a command station, a command post set up in the building that covered all of Baltimore, you know. From the base station there, they could contact their cars all over the place. So we arranged with them to let us use their cars for surveillance, and also, they let us use their base station with one of their guys there to talk to our [unclear] because we wanted to follow this guy to see where he was getting them.

And, again, you'd place the order, say, "My guy's coming back. My brother's going to come through here tonight on his truck," this and that. So he takes off to get the pills. And our cars are following him, and these now are Customs cars, undercover cars, with radios in them, and the conversation is being monitored back at the base station in the building.

So they follow him to a drugstore. He gets out and he goes into this drugstore. Well, the guys in the surveillance cars, they leap out of their cars. They park their cars in the shopping center and they rush into the store, and they see him deal with this guy, the pharmacist. And he comes back out and they follow him right back to us. I made the buy. So we now know where he's getting it from.

So we eventually busted all three of them, the woman that gave me the one tablet -- eventually she gave me more -

- but Horvath, who was the big so-called supplier there; and the pharmacist was Manuel Highkin, H-i-g-h-k-i-n. And this is the whole write-up on that case.

But Horvath, as it turned out, the guy, the man in the plant, when we . . .

Oh, and we had periodic meetings with the Western Electric people, you know, and when we got the first buy, we went back and told them, "Well, we bought from Anna Henninger," because they knew that she was the one [unclear]. They said, "Boy, I'm glad this is over with." "[unclear]. We're not through," you know. "Oh, oh, oh." So I kept going on and on.

Then when they heard we were buying from Horvath, Horvath was one of their best employees -- he had gotten awards, you know, all kinds of awards in the plant -- they were crushed that he was involved. But that's the guy who's selling the pills in there. Oh! When they -- they had to fire the guy at the end, and it killed them because he was one of their best employees.

But after it was over, after it was over, they thanked us. This was when we finished the case, "Goofballs Are Seized," and so forth, in the order we had.

At the time, yeah. That was another thing. At the time when the final delivery was going to be made to me for my truck-stop brother, truck-driver brother, he told us to

meet him, Horvath, at this gas station. This was late at night. The gas station was closed, but he said, "We'll meet there." Okay. So we get there. I drive up early in my undercover car and pull in, and I had been there before, though, with him, so the guy in the gas station -- I'd been there with this guy once before, met in the daytime, so the guy in the gas station knew me. And right next to the gas station, they parked the school buses for that district. There were like dozens and dozens of school buses parked there.

So when I pulled in like one in the morning or whatever it was, he wasn't there, so I'm sitting there in the car. All of a sudden, the house right next to the gas station, the door opens up. This guy comes out with a shotgun. He comes walking over toward the car. I guess I had Herron with me [unclear]. One of them was with me. No, I had the marshal with me. That was it. The marshal was with me. He was [unclear].

So I said, "Wait a minute, I know this guy." Pinky is the name. "I know him, I met him before." So I get out of the car and I say, "Hi, Pinky. How's it going?" "Who is it?" "You know, I was here with so-and-so." "Oh," he says, you know, "we've been having vandalism in the school buses. People were breaking into the school buses." So I told him, I said, "No, no. I'm meeting Horvath here in a few

minutes." "Oh, okay, okay." But [unclear] come out with a shotgun, I didn't know what to think, you know.

So he finally came in and opened his trunk, and the marshal, of course, arrested him, and the guy said, "Oh, I was afraid of this. Oh, I was afraid of this." I felt sorry for the guy. He says -- it was just before Christmas -- he said, "I was just hoping to get enough money to buy my son a bicycle." I said, "Oh, gee."

Anyhow, but that was a tough case. It was a tough case in that you didn't have an entré. The Bureau of Narcotics never would have been able to do it because I had their informant. But it worked out.

RT: What was the name of the pharmacist that was . . .

EW: The pharmacist was Manuel Highkin, H-i-g-h-k-i-n. And this was the closeout. It was in December of '60 when we closed this thing out, so it was during the '60s. And here, Herron and I are signing the thing.

And they got fined. Someone, Horvath went to jail, I think, for a year, and the others got fines. Of course, the pharmacist was the one who should have gotten the most, and he always gets the least. They're the ones that know what they're doing, you know.

RO: All right. It seems to me, with the broad experience you've had, if any more, you could write that up and make an interesting article.

EW: [unclear]. Yeah.

RT: Well, thanks a lot, Ed.

EW: Okay, my pleasure.

END OF INTERVIEW