HISTORY OF THE

U. S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

Interview between:

Gordon R. Wood, Retired Director

of Los Angeles District

and

Robert G. Porter

Pasadena, California

February 2, 1978

INTRODUCTION

This is a transcription of a taped interview, one of a series conducted by Robert G. Porter, who retired from the U. S. Food and Drug Administration in 1977.

The interviews were held with retired F.D.A. employees whose recollections may serve to enrich the written record.

It is hoped that these narratives of things past will serve as source material for present and future researchers; that the stories of important accomplishments, interesting events, and distinguished leaders will find a place in training and orientation of new employees, and may be useful to enhance the morale of the organization; and finally, that they will be of value to Dr. James Harvey Young in the writing of the history of the Food and Drug Administration.

The tapes and transcriptions will become a part of the collection of the National Library of Medicine and copies of the transcriptions will be placed in the Library of Emory University.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

TAPE INDEX SHEET CASSETTE NUMBER(S) 1 & 2

GENERAL TOPIC OF INTERVIEW: History of the Food and Drug Administration

DATE: 2/2/78 PLACE: Pasadena, California LENGTH: 120 Min.

INTERVIEWEE	INTERVIEWER
NAME Gordon R. Wood	NAME Robert G. Porter
ADDRESS [redacted]	ADDRESS Room 500 U. S. Food & Drug Admin.
[redacted]	Denver, Colorado
TELEPHONE	TELEPHONE

FDA SERVICE DATES: FROM 1931 TO 1969

RETIRED: Yes YES NO

TITLE: Director, Los Angeles District
(If retired, title of last FDA position)

CASSETT NO.	SIDE NO.	EST. TIME ON TAPE	PAGE NO.	SUBJECT
1	1	0	1	Introductory Remarks
		1	1	Outline of his career
		4	3	Description of old Western District
		6	4	Early training of an inspector
		10	5	Firm history recording system
		11	6	Laws FDA Administered - enforcement practices
		15	8	FDA transferred from USDA to Federal Security Agency
		16	8	Wood transferred to Denver - Life of an inspector
		21	10	Changes with passage of 1938 Act - Class of 1939
		25	13	1948 Reorganization - Duties of District and National Chief Inspector
	2	0		"
		4	17	Fraud investigations
		5	18	False and misleading accompanying labeling and oral therapeutic claims - recording "pitches"
		13	22	Kansas City Flood 1951
		19	25	Cream campaigns of the 30's
		23	28	Illegal sales of Rx drugs - investigations - local cooperation - U.S. vs. Dr. Fakenhy case
2	1	0		"
		13	36	Spray Residue
		22	40	Cranberry episode - Aminotriazole
		23	41	Drug Control Inspections
		26	43	Consumer Complaints
2	2	0	45	Federal-State Cooperation
		3	46	Differences among East, Central & Western Districts
		4	47	Wood's Hall of Fame - Walter G. Campbell.

(continued on next page)

TAPE INDEX SHEET CASSETTE NUMBER(S) _____

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CASSETT NO.	SIDE NO.	EST. TIME ON TAPE	PAGE NO.	SUBJECT
2	2	5	47	Wood's Hall of Fame - Paul Dunbar
		6	48	Charles Crawford
		8	48	George Larrick
		9	49	James Goddard
		13	51	Dr. Ley
		14	51	John L. Harvey
		15	52	Dr. Elmer Nelson, Dr. Arnold Lehmann
		16	52	B. J. Howard
		18	53	Wendell Vincent
		25	56	Dr. Lewis Chernoff
		27	57	FDA after an 8 year absence
		30	58	End of interview.

P. - This is an interview between Robert G. Porter of the Food and Drug Administration and Gordon R. Wood. Gordon Wood retired from the Food and Drug Administration in 1969 as Director of the Los Angeles District Office. The interview is taking place on February 2, 1978, at Gordon's home in [redacted]. I think, Gordon, that it would be helpful to get started so that the listener will know who you are, to give us just a brief sketch of your career, and then I just invite you to move right into the things that you think would be of interest in your own way.

W. - Good enough, Bob. I was appointed to the Food and Drug Administration in February of 1931 as an inspector at the San Francisco Station. I worked in San Francisco until 1934, then I was transferred to the Denver Station. I worked in the Denver Station until 1938, and part of that time I was the resident inspector at Salt Lake City.

P. - Can I interrupt for just a moment. I was a resident inspector in Salt Lake City several years later, and I recall one assignment that was still in the file that you never accomplished while you were there!

W. - Well, I guess I let a few things go. If you looked farther you'd probably find more. I was in San Francisco up until 1943 when I was transferred to Seattle District as the Chief Inspector there. While I was in San Francisco, I had some varied assignments. Most of

the time I was an inspector in the field, but I also had a tour of duty of several months as the assistant to the chief of station -- that was Harry Moore -- and also, I had some experience as the assistant to the Western District Chief, John L. Harvey. I was in Seattle as Chief Inspector there until 1945. Then I was transferred back to San Francisco as Chief Inspector of the old Western District, and I was on that job until 1951 and then I was transferred after the reorganization -- Bob, I'm getting my dates wrong.

P. - That's ok. Just correct them.

W. - I was transferred to Washington in 1948 as Chief Inspector of the bureau or field operations and I worked there until 1952. Then I was transferred back to Los Angeles as Director of the Los Angeles District until my retirement. I was Director at Los Angeles for a little over 17 years, and that was a longer period of time than all of my predecessors there combined. Well, at the time of my appointment in San Francisco the territory of that station included northern California and Nevada with the exception of the Las Vegas area. The Food and Drug set up then was a three district set up. The eastern district under Billy Wharton as Chief, J. O. Clark was the Chief of the central district, and Wendell Vincent was Chief of the Western District.

Grant Morton was the Station Chief at San Francisco, Harry Moore was Chief Inspector. Incidentally, Harry Moore was one of the group of twenty inspectors that started out in the Food Drug Administration under Walter G. Campbell in 1906.

P. - I didn't know that. He was my first district chief.

W. - There were three other inspectors of the district and two wharf examiners. The western district offices were also in the same quarters as the San Francisco station office. Wendell Vincent was Chief, John L. Harvey was an assistant, and Perry Clark was another assistant. The other stations in the western district were Seattle, Denver, and Los Angeles. Los Angeles had been little more than a resident post at that time, but a laboratory was established and Los Angeles became a station along about 1930. The quarters in Los Angeles were miserable. They were housed in an old warehouse down in the railway yards, and in fact, there was railway siding right in front of the door and you usually had to find your way around a couple of box cars on the tracks before you could get into the building. There was very little training at the time I entered Food and Drug. The training programs were for inspectors and others, I assume. Virtually, the only policy indoctrination I received was from District Chief, Wendell Vincent. He told me that it was the basic object of the Food and Drug

Administration to obtain correction and compliance and not to run up a big box score of seizures and prosecutions. He said that no inspector would ever be judged according to the number of seizures and prosecutions he developed. He also pointed out that the personnel, at least in his district, could have their say so on any questions that came up, but once a decision was made they were expected to comply. And, in my years that I knew Wendell Vincent, he lived up very closely to that declaration.

A beginning inspector in San Francisco usually went out with a wharf examiner to learn how to collect samples and how to identify and seal them, how to write collection reports and obtain the essential interstate record. Sometimes you'd set out with an experienced inspector to learn how to make factory inspections. There was little explanation of why certain factories were inspected or certain samples collected. The inspectors just seemed to have to learn by experience or exposure and memory. Finally, you learned who were the good guys and who were the bad guys.

Lots of inspection work at that time was very seasonally related instead of according to formal work plans. March was spinach time and the canneries, in May it was asparagus, August and September was tomatoes and fruits, in the fall was dried fruit and also spray residue

work on pears. The San Francisco District did have a fair pear crop, and there was a very, very small apple crop that seldom reached the interstate destinations.

The inspection staff there was very often supplemented by analysts from the laboratory who would help in factory inspections occasionally. For example, Doris Tillman and Al Blum were very expert on dried fruits and making the organoleptic examination by eye, nose and mouth. Inspectors learned from them so that the better selection of samples during dock sampling could be made. Dock sampling was a major source of samples in San Francisco at that time. An inspector could open two or three boxes of, say a dried fruit, and examine a handful of the product, look for mold, insect excreta, decay and any other defects; and if he found them present, he would collect a sample and make it an official sample and turn it into the laboratory. As time went on, better planning procedures developed. A ledger type of record was used and the data was posted in that about the firms inspected, the dates and the results of the samples collected, the results of analyses, any actions taken such as seizure, citation, prosecutions and so forth. This ledger thing was a very cumbersome deal and it took quite a lot of time to come down the list and pick out the information you might want, but it really was much easier for a small staff to direct corrective action toward the chronic

offenders and toward kinds of violations that were real or potential hazards to consumers.

P. - Gordon, was that the predecessor of the flex site system?

W. - Yes, I think the flex site came along a little later, but it was essentially the same thing except the flex site was a little better set up.

Alert inspectors constantly turned up new firms and new products to be added to the records. In 1931 when I entered the service, FDA had six laws to administer. The Food and Drug Act, the Insecticide and Fungicide Law, the Caustic Poison Law, the Import Milk Law, Naval Stores Law and Tea Act. The Tea Act wharf examiners would collect the samples and the tea examiner would do all of the tasting. There was a tea examiner at San Francisco who served the entire western seaboard.

The Import Milk Act had very little work done anywhere that I know of except along the Canada-New York state border. An effort was made at one time, probably in the late'30's, to import milk from Juarez, Mexico into El Paso. This nearly resulted in an international incident. I don't know all the details, but apparently the Denver Food and Drug Office was having some preliminary discussion regarding inspection arrangement with the Mexican dairy when the Mexican government learned about it. The Mexican officials flatly refused to permit any such deal. They said there was not enough milk in

Mexico for their own people, and none of it was going to be exported to the United States.

Inspection and sample collections under the Insecticide and Fungicide Law and the Caustic Poison Law and the Naval Stores Law were unwelcome assignments to inspectors. A new inspector on the job usually inherited these assignments and I had my share of them.

P. - I bet you did.

W. - Corrective action was largely limited to correspondence from Washington except where something like a serious deviation from a declared composition might occur. This was understandable because many claims for effectiveness could be checked only by field testing which could be time consuming and had to be a seasonal operation. However, obtaining compliance and correction by correspondence was an exercise in futility. Manufacturers would come in to display their "corrected" labels, but frequently they would have made one or two corrections where five or six necessary corrections had been referred to them before the label was acceptable. The operator of the firm would receive the warning letter and would then just repeat this process.

One example, during an administrative hearing -- a respondent claimed that he had never received a warning letter or a letter requiring correction from Food and Drug. I replied to him that we had a reply from his

firm. He said, well this must have been done by his partner because he knew nothing about it. I pulled out the replied letter and showed him his signature at the bottom of it.

Later the Food and Drug Administration was transferred out of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and into the Federal Security Agency under Watson B. Miller. The Insecticide and Fungicide Law, Caustic Poison Act, and Naval Stores enforcement activities remained with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and with a crew of inspectors and analysts from Food and Drug. Some of the transferred inspectors preferred to stay with the Department of Agriculture, but with some exceptions, Food and Drug did a masterful job of unloading.

I was transferred to Denver in 1934. The inspector's life was very different than at San Francisco, or for that matter, at any other major city. The Denver territory extended from El Paso in the western part of Texas to the Canada-Montana border, covering approximately 1/3 of the area of the United States. There were two inspectors in Denver at that time, Kenny Monfore and myself. In the Denver station the population was very sparse and it was necessary to do a lot of travel. On my way to Denver I arrived in Salt Lake in November of 1934 and met up with the Cream Squad under Walter Green -- more about that later. I continued the cream campaign alone

through December after the squad disbanded. Then other field work in Utah and southeastern Idaho. I finally arrived at Denver headquarters for the first time in April, some five months after I was assigned to the Denver office.

P. - It doesn't surprise me, but it will surprise some of the people who have been hired more recently.

W. - I think it will.

After two or three weeks at Denver I was off on an inspection trip in New Mexico and Texas which lasted for two months or more, then back to Denver for a short time and then off again into Utah and southern Idaho -- so it went. Eventually, since I spent probably more time in the Salt Lake area than I did in Denver, I was transferred there as resident inspector post. This was a one man post and the post had operated for a number of years but it had been abandoned a year or two before because of some of the necessary economy measures. A resident inspector assignment was about the best job an inspector could have, especially if it was a one man post. Of course, it was always subject to station plans and assignments and crash programs, but such assignments and duties probably didn't take up 25% of the work time. A one man resident inspector was on his own. He was a free wheeler. He had no regular hours. He might start work at six in the morning at a creamery or work

until midnight in the double shift cannery. He was exposed to almost every kind of food and drug regulated industry. He was responsible for surveillance of all establishments of firms and products in his territory and also for locating new manufacturers and products. He met and dealt with the trade on his own, he cooperated with state and local Food and Drug personnel and health officers some of whom were as much interested in protecting their industries from FDA as they were in protecting the consumer. The resident inspector also met with U.S. attorneys in his district to discuss pending court cases, and he was also available for appearances in court to present statements and facts to judges when requested. He was his own stenographer, secretary, telephone operator, and shipping clerk. He had to be alert and inqusitive. When a problem arose, there was no one to turn to; he had to handle it. The resident inspector had an enviable job. It was good training and good exposure for bigger responsibilities. Best of all, he was not one of the crowd in the big office -- he was an individual and he had identity.

The days of the one man resident inspector are long gone, but those of us who had that experience will always remember it as an outstanding and happy part of our FDA careers.

The Food and Drug Cosmetic Act in 1938 greatly expanded FDA responsibilities, but I regarded it as just

a normal growth development rather than a revolutionary change. For example, inspectors still inspected factories, but they looked a little longer and little deeper because of the insanitary condition provisions applying to factories in the new law. Practically all of us had much to learn about sanitation inspections and how to report them.

There was an increase in personnel of both inspectors and analysts. At the western district their new appointees numbered about 21 to 25, and they came into the San Francisco district for initial training, introduction to FDA, and study of the new law. Discussions were given them by top western district & San Francisco station personnel; also on-the-job training by brief rotating assignments to work with analysts in the laboratory and accompany inspectors on factory inspections and sample collections. At the end of this course which lasted some three or four weeks, each trainee had a private discussion with the top western district officers regarding his preference and qualifications for assignment either as an inspector or an analyst and in which station -- San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle or Denver -- he preferred to be assigned. Their wishes as to assignment were met as fully as possible. The group was then divided into inspectors and chemists and went out to their various duties in their assigned stations. This group is still referred to as the "class of 1939". It was an outstand-

ing group. Some eventually resigned for other occupations, but a big majority stayed with FDA and most have distinguished themselves at highest levels both in field and Washington headquarters.

The injunction section in the new law created a lot of pro and con discussion. Some FDAers regarded it as the most important enforcement section of the law. Others held that it was almost useless. Their point was that an injunction only prohibited what the law already prohibited and to prove an injunction violation it would be necessary to prove a violation of the law so why take the two steps. Probably the truth is somewhere in between. The effectiveness depending on the facts and circumstances in each case. In later years injunctions are being written to forbid such things as specific illegal operations or specific therapeutic or nutritional claims rather than the general charge of adulteration or misbranding. This simplified enforcement and use of the injunction. Another factor, I came to believe that an injunction is a black mark on the firm's credit rating and created problems when financing is soft. A pending prosecution or seizure can be terminated but an active injunction is a continuing threat.

Many Food and Druggers entered the Services in World War II. Most came back; some sought other employment.

The creation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had little effect on Food and Drug field activities.

The 1948 reorganization was quite a shock. The field activities went on more and less as usual. However, there was quite a transition period for those of us in the three district offices who had been reassigned to new divisions created in Washington or to field offices. I believe the reorganization was a very good move. Improved and more rapid communication and travel facilities virtually eliminated the need for the district echelon between the field stations and the Washington administration. As the after-the-fact grapevine had it, the move had been under consideration for a long time; and was finally triggered by the retirement of Mr. Billy Wharton as Chief of the eastern district. This created a problem of filling that position. Apparently there were three or four candidates, each with his supporters and opponents. If there was to be a reorganization, including termination of the three districts, that was the time to take care of it. However, part of the strategy was to abort one potential controversy. It gave birth to another one. Mr. Alan Rayfield was named as Director of the new division of field operations. This division's duty was to supervise the activities of the sixteen field districts and to see that the

administration programs and priorities were carried out. Mr. Rayfield was a dynamic and determined individual -- a good man to get the show on the road. However, again by the ubiquitous grapevine, when Mr. Rayfield was Chief Inspector in Baltimore his territory included West Virginia, which bordered on Ohio in the central district. Dr. Kenneth Milstead was the Chief at Cincinnati. He was also like Rayfield -- a competent, strong-willed person. A hot controversy arose over dairy products being shipped from Ohio into Baltimore territory. Milstead and Rayfield never forgave each other.

Other directors of districts, in what had been the central district, supported Dr. Milstead. It didn't make things any easier for those of us assigned to Mr. Rayfield and the Division of Field Operations. When in line with our new and untried duties, we had to make our first visits to the districts in what had been the former central district. However, speaking for myself, any apprehensions were ungrounded. I received a friendly welcome, good cooperation and was often entertained in private homes -- maybe the latter, because I was a good poker pigeon.

At the time of the reorganization three new divisions were established in Washington. There was a Planning Division under J. O. Clark, former director of the central district, a Legal Division under John L. Harvey, from

the western district. This division reviewed recommendations from the field regarding seizures, prosecution, citations and final decisions. It also directed and assisted the field districts in preparation for contested court actions. The Division of Field Operations was under Alan Rayfield. I was appointed as Chief Inspector of the Division of Field Operations. Prior to this I had been Chief Inspector at the Seattle station and then Chief Inspector of the former western district at San Francisco. This newly created position in the western district -- this was a newly created position in the western district although the eastern district and central district had chief inspectors for a long time. Ole Olsen was Chief Inspector in the eastern district and Walt Simmons was Chief Inspector in the central district. I had heard of these men frequently through the years and had met them at Washington conferences once or twice. However, I did not have very much direct knowledge of their duties. It was my impression that Ole Olsen was largely an administrative officer in overseeing inspectors, their appointments and transfers and assignments among the various stations in the eastern district. It was also my impression that Walt Simmons' duties were more as an inspection specialist who participated in the most difficult investigations and directed and coordinated preparations for trials and contested

cases. My own concept of a district chief inspector was that he should get into the field and work with inspectors on the job. I once had a notion that a chief inspector should know all of the techniques for any inspection job for purposes of training others. I soon realized that that just couldn't be done. There are too many industries and too many changes. No one could possible keep up. So, perhaps the best approach then was to identify the experts of various industries, drug controls, flour mills, antibiotics, spray residue, canneries, dairies and so forth, and arrange for the learners to work with them. Also, a chief inspector should be able to evaluate the performance and abilities of inspectors so that those who have authority to make promotions can be kept advised as to the skills and talents of the various candidates for advancement. These responsibilities are best carried out in the field rather than at a desk.

It was common practice that during my Washington years and, no doubt, after that for the DFO to request the district directors to submit recommendations for promotions for his district staff. Then when funds were available, selection had to be made with fairness to all districts. Some district directors in all sincerity submitted very strong recommendations; others were much more conservative. Since there was never

enough money to include all recommendations, careful evaluation had to be made to compensate for these variations and to weed out the occasional trial balloons. The chief inspector who knew the men in the field could help alot. It would be folly to suggest that anyone could know the merits and demerits of all of the field personnel. I am sure mistakes in judgment were made and that some deserving inspectors had to wait for another go-round but I am equally convinced that those who did receive promotions deserved them on their merit.

Before the passage of the 1938 law, it was necessary in obtaining convictions to prove that unwarranted therapeutic claims were false and fraudulent. This required what became known as a fraud investigation. Proof that the potential defendant knew he was lying and it was an investigation into a state of mind. There were no guidelines, no precedents, no rules, no techniques, no two cases were alike. It could be intriguing, exasperating, unpredictable, and disappointing. There were deadends and pitfalls. It required imagination, persistence, persuasion. It was a search for an intangible. It could be won sometimes by a lucky break or an inspiration, and nothing is the inspector's world is more satisfying. There are still some provisions in the FDC law regarding fraud, but they are seldom used. Just as well perhaps some things are easier. But, the most

interesting of all of inspection activities is disappearing.

The 1938 law expanded the definition of labeling to include written, printed or graphic matter accompanying an article. Vitamin and mineral promotion was getting into high gear, including grossly exagerated nutritional and therapeutic claims which usually were printed on leaflets or folders placed in the shipping case with the product. This was easily established as accompaniment. To get around this problem of accompaniment, various promoters tried almost in turn putting the literature in a separate container or shipping it on a different date or shipping it from a different point of origin or to a different consignnee or even writing the claims in a book all for later assembly and display with the product. But, fortunately, there was no loop hole on that point. The courts decided that if the literature was used to further the sale of the product at destination it met the test of accompaniment. The inspector's role in all of this was more or less routine sample collection except for a much higher degree of dealer hostility. But, the problem of oral therapeutic claims was something else. FDA's legal approach was the double barrel adequate directions for use provision. If the product was offered for the treatment of a disease, the name of the disease must be included in the labeling as part

of the directions for use. Then, if the product was not an adequate treatment for that disease, the article was misbranded by false and misleading claims. The name of the game was to obtain an accurate and indisputable record of what the promoter said in his pitch, and, thereby, hang a lot of tales.

There were basically two types of promoters. The door-to-door peddlers and the lecturers. The door-to-door kind were located through neighbors, phone calls from the peddler himself trying to arrange an appointment, consumer complaints, and so forth. The approach was to arrange for and record his spèil in a home. Sometimes a steno was used to make the recording from an adjacent room or with a microphone. A more effective method was to use a recording device manipulated by an electronic-wise inspector. Microphones could be planted in floor lamps, light fixtures and so forth, or more effectively in a set up like an idle radio positioned near the speaker's chair. Recording equipment in the earlier days was not as good as it is now. However, many cases were developed. The old style notices of judgment list them in all their details.

P. - Wouldn't it have been great if we'd had this type of equipment when we were doing that?

W. - Yes, it would have. However, there were problems. The investigator had to be cautious about leading questions

to avoid entrapment. Also, actions were often against individuals and without any effective restraint on the dealers who hired, trained and supplied them. Making a case on the lecturer was another story. They were easy to locate through their ads, but how to record the pitch? Efforts to do so were made by inspectors in the audience taking notes, but such records were subject to a variety of attacks. Stenographers were also used with good results. However, after a few brushes with the law the word got around. Lecturers would warn their sympathetic audiences that FDA might be listening in. Spotters sometimes controlled the isles of the hall where the meeting was held, and a steno or inspector busy writing was easily recognized and usually invited to leave or stop writing. Some were unceremoniously ushered out. Often there was a back-up reporter in the crowd who continued to record the speech by hand. Results were successful sometimes, but better techniques were needed. This meant microphones and recording devices. The pocket type was not very useful. Audience noises, shuffling feet, conversation, coughs and so forth made the speakers voice almost not intelligible. The next step was to plant microphones and recorders in the auditorium before the lecture. A problem in acoustics and electronics. This work had to be done well ahead of lecture time, and almost always with the knowledge and consent of the auditorium manager. This was a touchy

step since many managers would protect their clients. It is a remarkable tribute to the public relations skills of so many inspectors that they were successful so long. Some recordings were made behind the backdrops. Inspectors rejoiced when they could tune in on an idle loud speaker outlet or sit along side of a loud speaker, but bad news travels fast. Many lecturers were well aware of this occupational hazard. There were a lot of adventures.

One speaker spotted a microphone, delivered a diatribe against FDA and ripped the microphone out, went on with his pitch. He overlooked two other microphones which took it all in. An inspector with rather rotund proportions got himself caught in a very low, narrow, humid passage while making a last-minute equipment check-up. He couldn't get out before the speaker started, and he had to suffer in silence in this uncomfortable hideaway until the show was over.

P. - Was that Frank McKinley?

W. - No I think it was Sidney Weisenberg, Another inspector installed his gear under an elevated platform which was to serve as the speaker's stage -- an ideal location. After the pitch he dismantled his equipment, but before he could get out the dance band entered the stage and a large crowd gathered in the hall. He spent the rest of the evening under the stage. It my memory serves me,

I think that was Sidney Weisenberg, too. He was excellent at this.

P. - Yes, well he is very aggressive.

W. - The Kansas City flood on Black Friday, July 13, 1951, was an unforgetable experience. Damage exceeded Two Billion Dollars, possibly still a record for flood damage in such a limited area. Most of the damage to food products occurred in the central, industrial district known as the CID. The thousands of intransit railroad cars in the yards and in grain elevators along the river. It was FDA's responsibility to see that no flood damaged or contaminated products subject to FDC coverage were diverted for regular markets. I was then chief inspector of the Division of Field Operations and was promptly dispatched to Kansas City to help that district with the problem. It was obvious the Kansas City district needed help, and I was authorized to select some 15 or 20 inspectors from other districts to supplement the local staff. Cooperation of the districts and cooperation from the directors of the other districts was prompt and enthusiastic. Following phone calls to eight or ten districts from Denver to the East, a staff was on the way. Sam Alfend, Kansas City Director, and I quickly arranged the division of duties. He remained in his office most of the time to handle the unending string of visitors and phone calls for information and help and

to manage cooperation with state and local officials. My job was to assign inspectors to their tasks, keep contact with them, and also with Sam Alfend to maintain organization and assign the inspectors where they were most needed. Hundreds of box cars and refrigerator cars had been completely inundated with contents in every stage of decomposition. Some refrigerator cars were so badly contaminated that they could not be cleaned or deodorized. They were crane lifted into a deep trough and buried. Cars of wet wheat had bulged the sides and the doors to the bursting points. Representatives of firms who had shipments caught in the flood came to load their cars and products for possible salvage. Railroad employees were extremely helpful. No car would be open unless an FDA inspector was present. One such visitor was looking for a carload of a packaged breakfast cereal. He told us that his company had a very special waterproof wrapper. We told him there would be no possible salvage, but he wanted to see for himself. When the car was found and opened, the contents were a wet heap of soggy mush intermixed with packages and wrappers, and so it went. The hours of work were long -- from early morning until it was too dark to work any more. After dinner there was a jamm session to review progress and to redistribute the staff if necessary to control the most serious problems. At the end of the session

everyone knew his assignments and was ready to start out the next day.

The work crew was a hand-picked group of inspectors known to be hard workers, to accept responsibility and to have good judgment under circumstances where FDA had a lot of responsibility but no authority. Flooding of elevators caused some unusual problems. Several split open under the pressure of wet, expanding grain. There were tons of wet grain to be disposed of with no vehicles to haul them away and no place to dump them. Word got out to farmers who wanted to haul some of the grain to their farms for stock feed. This was a good solution except it was well known that there had been several incidents where poultry and livestock had died after eating moldy grain. This was before aflatoxin was identified and its hazards known. However, no one wanted to be out on a limb if some farmers did suffer such losses. Still, it was urgent to get rid of the wet grain. The dilemma was settled by preparing a written statement in which the person receiving the grain agreed to use the grain himself on his own premises, acknowledged the hazard, accepted it and released everyone else from responsibility. The release was signed for each truck-load and further identified by the truck license number. It wasn't long until trucks were lined up at the elevators to get their free stock feed -- sometimes long into the

night. The wet grain was disposed of, the farmers were happy and there were no reports of injury to livestock or poultry.

There were many other incidents. Like the lady who called in for someone to please come and get this drowned pig out of her living room. And, the horde of professional salvagers swarmed in to get into the act. They were willing to do the required reconditioning they said, but they could do it better, of course, and cheaper at home --- no sale. They did it under supervision or they did without.

The so-called cream campaigns of the mid '30's were a blitz sort of, obviously intended to improve the quality of direct shipper cream for churning butter. I do not know exactly how or where the program originated, but I got into it on the first go-round when transferred to Denver in 1934. Walt Green from the Washington laboratories was in charge. Prior to the field programs he had written a report about sanitary conditions of the cream and butter industry in many areas of the country including revolting storage practices in many rural communities. A report was mimegraphed and distributed to the field and probably elsewhere. His report should be available some place in the FDA archives. Have you found the report?

P. - I haven't seen it.

W. - It's worth looking for. I had a copy of it and I've had copies of some other interesting things and somebody wants to borrow them so I let them borrow them and that's the last I ever saw of it.

P. - Well, I think there will be a copy in the archives.

W. - It's really an extremely interesting report.

P. - That's what kicked off all the work we nearly did for twenty years on cream and butter. Didn't it?

W. - Yes.

P. - Because we did it all through the '40's.

W. - It contined for a long time.

P. - Not doing much of it now.

W. - Not so much because the dairy industry has changed and the amount of individual farmer shipments is probably gone.

P. - Right. I think it wouldn't hurt for you to tell what direct ship of cream is. I don't think there is hardly such a thing any more.

W. - Oh, you think they wouldn't know what it was!

P. - A lot of people wouldn't know what direct ship of cream was.

W. - The biggest handler of direct ship of cream was right there in Denver. There was a creamery that thrived on it. I forget the name of it, but when we would do a cream campaign, we'd go there and always find cream in terrible condition. He was receiving cream as far away as Oregon and Louisiana. It is unbelievable how far those people would ship it.

P. - And the cream was saved by individual farmers and shipped railway express.

W. - Yes, shipped by express.

Inspectors were trained to recognize various kinds of decomposition and other adulteration by organoleptic examination. Each inspector carried a plastic tasting rod to be dipped into the cream after stirring and then licked off -- a very disagreeable procedure, especially after the taste and odor of the sediment proved that a mouse had drowned in the container. Sometimes the drowned mouse was still in the can.

Special arrangements were made with U. S. Attorney offices to expedite seizure processing of condemened cans, or in lieu of that, the food color was stirred into the container and it was returned to the shipper for his disposition, probably as pig feed. Incidentally, the longest day's work I ever put in for Food and Drug was on a cream campagin in Clovis and Portales, New Mexico. I started my day in a Clovis creamery on a Saturday morning about 7:30. Saturday was the big day for cream. It came in steadily by direct farm deliveries and by truck route pickups. From Clovis I drove a few miles to Portales where two creameries which received deliveries all night. I tasted cream all night too. Alternately, between the two creameries, and I didn't finish until 1:00 p.m. on Sunday.

Programs against the sale of prescription drugs without a prescription were begun after the 1938 law was passed. Buys were made and pretty much to include any prescription drug with emphasis on the more potent ones such as sulfas, antibiotics and sleeping pills. Attention shifted to the amphetamines and barbituates when they became the in-thing for the partying kids crowd. Most inspectors included a few buys from suspect pharmacies along with other work, but as drug abuse increased and supplying the market became big business, specialists in this field developed. Dealers and distributors making keg and multi-keg sales became the targets.

The Los Angeles district had a special problem with amphetamines smuggled across the Mexican border and four or five inspectors had developed into excellent undercover operators. Occasionally, they had contacts with the Los Angles County Sheriff's narco squad. It developed that the Sheriff's office had a very strong case against an M.D. who was selling amphetamines and barbituates to almost all comers including juveniles. However, the question arose that the case against a doctor would not hold up since he could legally dispense prescription drugs. The deputies asked if Food and Drug could handle the case. It was cleared by Washington on the grounds that selling the drugs by the hundreds to buyers without making an examination without a case history, without a diagnosis was outside

the practice of medicine, and, therefore, was illegal under the FDC act. FDA accepted the case, and FDA inspectors made two or three buys to establish that the business was continuing and the case was filed. There was a 21 count information charge. It was a dramatic and hotly contested trial defended by able counsel. Sheriff's deputies testified to 17 or 18 buys selected from some 40 or 50 that they had made during their investigation. Food and Drug inspectors testified as to the remaining buys that they had made. The defendants were convicted on all counts.

P. - Do you remember who those defendants were? Do you remember their names?

W. - Oh yes.

P. - What was their name if anybody wanted to look up the case.

W. - It was Dr. Fakenhy.

P. - I just thought somebody might want to look it up.

W. - Yes. Incidentally, I wrote a summary of that trial and not from the standpoint of the legal problems, but from the standpoint of the human interest behind it. Food and Drug had lined up some witnesses who had bought from Dr. Fakenhy, and they were a cooky crowd -- just their names and the way they talked, the testimony they gave -- it was a side show. But, they testified directly and honestly and I remember one girl -- I think she was only 17 or 18 years old -- I remember her kind of testimoney and a couple

of fellows and all of this was really an extremely interesting case -- about a three page report. It ought to be someplace.

P. - It will be in the case file.

W. - A direct result of this case was the cementing of already close relations between the Los Angeles District undercover squad and the County Sheriff's narco squad in cooperating on investigations. Joint investigations were almost daily, or I should say nightly, operations. Sometimes it was Food and Drug inspectors helping Sheriffs and sometimes it was the reverse. The informal, mutual assistance arrangement was unique in the entire United States. It functioned flawlessly and was a perfect example of how federal and local enforcement officers can work together to the advantage of both parties. Deputy Sheriffs taught Food and Drug inspectors undercover techniques, stakeouts and tailing. They also provided cover to unarmed inspectors on hazardous operations. FDA had more money to spend and on a good case in progress could afford to flush a bundle for a big bust as the saying goes. Also, penalties under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act were much heavier than under the local laws. Cooperation with the Los Angeles police on the illegal drug racket was good. But, it was seldom used. The police policy was to make an arrest as soon as a buy was made. That would take a pusher off the

street corner, but he would be back after a couple of days in jail -- just an occupational hazard. Los Angeles district policy was to work up the distribution chain from the pusher to his dealer who handled the bigger volume then to that dealer's supplier who trafficked in keg quantities or in 50,000 to 100,000 pill lots and then to the latter's source who might deal in dozens of kegs smuggled in from Mexico. This took time and money, but sometimes it ended the career of the big-time operator for a few years anyway.

I have lost track of these activities since undercover work was first transferred to a new FDA unit and then removed entirely from FDA and HEW.

P. - Gordon, I think it would be interesting to know what a typical inspector really did in one of those investigations in just a little more detail as to what he found out and how he found it out and so on. However you want to say it, you know.

W. - Well, it wasn't too difficult for an inspector to get a fairly good lead on someone who that was peddling the drugs. He sometimes would spot a street corner peddler and get into a conversation with him and tell him that "gee, I'd like to get into this business, but I don't want to just buy a few or sell a few pills on the corner. I'd like to get into a bigger where I could get them through some kind of a distributor", and "whose your source, where do

you get the stuff". Well, they had to be pretty convincing inspector, look the part -- some of them I almost didn't like them sitting around the office -- they looked like a main street winos here in Los Angeles. The pusher was usually pretty cagey, but eventually he'd find one or some way to get back to the person that the pusher bought his stuff from. The practice was to, at that level in the field of the operation, for the person supplying the pushers to get what they used to call a bottle which should contain 1,000 tablets but would usually have been scooped so there are only 700 or 800 in it. Then this so-called dealer would wrap those in foil or paper of some kind and about ten or twelve in a little bundle. Then the street corner pushers would take these out on the street. They had their regular customers, and they'd come right up. In fact, Food and Drug along with some of the Sheriff's officers had made motion pictures of their transactions going on. You couldn't see what they were exchanging but you knew what was going on. They weren't very good because of the difficulties but to those who knew what was going on, it illustrated very well. Well, these operators that dealt in these bottle-sized things. They would get their materials as was indicated before from a larger source. So then the Food and Drug inspector would go to this dealer who was serving the street pushers

and talk to him a little bit and tell him somewhat the same story that he's got a place staked out -- maybe off in some neighbor community where it wouldn't hurt this guy's business. He'd say I'd like to get some of this stuff and who's your man, and finally find out where this dealer's source was. He'd then try to work up to this fellow. He'd go to see him and talk to him. They were extremely suspicious, but the undercover men knew their vocabulary and they knew what was going on and they were just experts. So, finally they would be able to maybe buy a few jars from him and then they'd sort of be established as a customer and then they'd have to wait a while, and then they would come back and want to get into a bigger distribution. They would try to maneuver the deal so they would find out where this fellow kept his supply. It was very seldom in the place where he lived -- it would be often an old warehouse or somebody elses apartment or something like that where they would have these kegs. A keg usually contained 100,000 but it could be a smaller number -- it could be 75,000. Once they got an identification on the place, then they would take aim at that. What they would then try to do would to be to approach this fellow to buy a keg, and this is what I meant when I referred to "they could flush a bundle". They might have to pay $200 or $300 or more for a keg. The Sheriffs couldn't do that because they were very short of funds, and if they did pay anything

like that, they'd have to immediately make the arrest and retrieve the money; but Food and Drug could afford to go along a little further than that. The plan that didn't always work, but what was the object, would be the one to buy a keg or two from this fellow. He would not have it, so he would have to "trip to his stash" as the saying goes. Then they would tail him. He would say, "Well, I gotta have the money now. I am not going to bring that stuff and find that you guys are gone or anything like that, you give me the money now. Somebody would have to pay for it... He already has the money--- he won't bring the stuff and then while you guys go a run like that -- just give me the money now. Somebody would have to pay for it, and very often Food and Drug never got that money back. Sometimes when the arrest was made they did. But, then the object was to tail this fellow when he went to get his kegs, and then when he got to where he was keeping his stash which might be several drums, the Sheriff's Deputies would be along and they would make an immediate arrest and confiscate the supply. Now that was the theory and it didn't always work out quite as simply as that. But, there was some ingenious tailing methods that were used. In fact, they traced a few of them by helicopter. They would have a helicopter round, it wasn't unusual there; but they knew what was going on and were very carefully watching the area and they succeeded a time or two in tailing these guys with helicopter and, of course, radio communications.

So it was an extremely interesting operation, but is was very hazardous. We had one case with the Los Angeles Police Department where we called on them. The inspector had come out from Kansas City in what you might call "hot pursuit" of a character who had been operating there and then he was promoting out to the Los Angeles area. So he came out and he kept track of him and he wanted to make a big deal with him. He went to his house and they were talking business and all of this. The guy was a little cagey so they finally made an arrangement where the inspectors would come to a motel room in a downtown motel and they would meet with this fellow there and seal the transaction. So this inspector and one other Los Angeles district inspector went in there. In the meantime, the Los Angeles undercover operators had bugged that room, and had rented the room right along side of it so with the bug they could get a recording and at the same time they could hear what was going on in that room. This guy was a dangerous criminal. So the meeting was held and the inspectors, I guess they had over a $1,000 on them. So this fellow decided that he'd just as soon take the $1,000 and forget about delivering the pills. He pulled a gun and sat there half drunk with that gun in his hand. This went on for about two or three hours. And one time he put that gun right up to the head of this inspector from Kansas City -- I forget his name now; I'd recognize it if I heard it. It was pretty critical business, but the other inspector kind of talked

out of it, "Oh cool off. I'll go buy a bottle of Scotch, and then we'll talk about this some more." So this went on until early morning so as soon as I got down to the office the Chief Inspector, it was Les McMillan, and he was right in on me right a way and said what was going on. We talked about it, and I said we'd better get the cops before that guy is killed. So we went down to the police station to the headquarters and talked to whoever was in charge at this time and he nearly exploded. He said you guys are crazy to let anything go on like that as long as you did. So he got himself a half dozen cops in there in their cars and armed them with shotguns and all of this stuff and they completely surrounded that motel. Then by listening in the room they could tell when there seemed to be a lull and then smashed the door and went in with their guns and they arrested this fellow. So he was eventually tried in local courts, county courts and they were convicted and for all I know they are still in jail. But, this bugged tape was used as evidence and it was just fascinating because you can hear a click sometimes when he pulled the trigger back and you could hear that little click. We were lucky to get out of that without more problems. Well, should I go on now?

P. - That would be great.

W. - Spray residue is another project that has been active in FDA for many years. In my first years at San Francisco

the principal problem was lead arsenate residues on pears. Pears, like apples in the northwest and mountain states, were sprayed against the coddling moth and had to be washed in the dilute hydrochloric acid solution before marketing. Inspectors carried a standardized sodium hydroxide solution and equipment to titrate and would check the acid concentration in the washing machines, which should be about from 9/10 of a percent to 1 percent or thereabouts.

When Bob Born became Chief Inspector at San Francisco he started a surveillance program on many other fruits and vegetables. He prepared lists of produce grown by counties, inspectors were asked to pick up a few investigational samples in season whenever they traveled on other assignments. We didn't turn up very much that way, but it did kindle my interest in spray residues. As resident inspector in Salt Lake City in the late '30's, I did quite a lot of spray residue work in the Provo area and elsewhere. About this time FDA developed a rapid portable colorometric test for lead. After a couple of indignation meetings by the growers, arrangements were made with a chemistry professor at Brigham Young University in Provo, to run residue tests for the growers for a modest fee using the rapid method. He did a good job and the growers who brought in their own samples got an analysis that was probably more honest than the samples. The growers often liked to delude themselves by bringing in the largest apples they could find.

Denver, then under Wendell Vincent, also set up portable laboratories just inside the Utah-Wyoming line at Evanston and at the Colorado-Kansas border. Samples were taken from the apple shipments moving by truck. I worked the Evanston truck assignment with a chemist from San Francisco. Our lab was set up in a tourist cabin. Most of the traffic moved through Evanston in late night and early morning hours, especially along about Thursday or Friday approaching the weekend business. It was a long dismal cold watch on October nights. On one occasion I was on duty from midnight until 11:00 p.m. the next night. Truckers were very cooperative, possibly aided and abetted by a pot of hot coffee on the cottage burner. On the Colorado side, Ken Monfore had had some experiences. Apples could be wiped clean of residue, however, it was impractical commercially. Out on the highway though there was no alternate method. This caused a tremendous run on the local village toilet paper supply with predictable results. One trucker had a terrible time wiping his apples clean. He had only one arm. The advent of synthetic pesticides was paralleled by development of the highly sophisticated analytical equipment and methods.

The Los Angeles district had a large pesticide problem. The warm climate generated a large year around produce industry and also a large crop of insects to go with it.

Inspectors were constantly in the field sampling east bound shipments or reporting them for destination sampling. Sampling was not a random, hit-or-miss operation. It was geared to inspectors' expert knowledge of such things as spraying practices, pesticides used, weather conditions and the lag between application and harvest. The Los Angeles district sometimes accounted for more seizures than the rest of the country combined. Most of this was due to efficient laboratory operations. Samples from the field were picked up on arrival at the carriers' terminal, sometimes before district starting hours and analysis was under way. If preliminary results showed possible high residues, confirming analyses were started. On a hot sample, analysts would voluntarily stay with it until the analysis was completed which commonly met 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m. Reports were on the Chief Chemist's desk for review when he arrived at work in the morning and data and district recommendation was on the way to Washington. Los Angeles also advised the destination districts of a possible seizure action so the product would not be distributed pending confirmation from Washington. Los Angeles district also developed the first three prosecutions under the 1938 law and the pesticide provisions. An unusual pesticide situation developed in carrots grown in an area north of Los Angeles. It arose from complaints of bad taste. Samples showed a high residue of chlorinated hydrocarbon residue. I have

forgotten which one. The growers insisted that the carrots had never been sprayed. It developed that cotton was grown in the area and that carrots were an alternate, off-season crop. Analysis of samples showed that the soil was contaminated with pesticides used on the cotton, and that it had penetrated the outer layers of the carrots possibly by some selective absorption. The investigation was taken over by the University of California at Riverside where research was under way on the effect of soil pesticide residues on various crops and also by the California State Pesticide Agencies. In this situation there was no longer any jurisdiction under the Food and Drug Act. However, extensive soil sampling was carried out and no more carrots were grown in the contaminated areas. Los Angeles district continued to help with soil analysis. The cranberry uproar was something. The National Grange was meeting in Los Angeles shortly after the Secretary issued th Aminotriazole warning. They wanted an administration speaker to tell them about it. No one in Washington was available so I was chosen to be the Daniel in the lion's den. I was provided with a lot of information including a three page list of all the meetings held between administration and industry in their efforts to get an Aminotriazole release for general use. If ever an industry manufacturers' distribution and growers' group was warned and begged by FDA not to use a product except as permitted in

the short cranberry dormant period, it was at this time. But there is always the small crowd that would take a chance and the big crowd that suffers. However, I believe the Secretary's public announcement was justified. Just before Thanksgiving, that's when cranberries moved to market. In any event there was a seizure of cranberries contaminated with 3AT pending in northern California. It was better for the Secretary to speak out before that would hit the fan.

The trade reaction in Los Angeles and elsewhere was terrific. They wanted help. Very shortly districts were authorized to make analyses at the request of merchants with cranberries on hand. Virtually every inspector was collecting samples and every chemist was analyzing them with the laboratory on a 24 hour per day basis. A few samples were found to contain 3AT but almost all were clean and the cranberries were then released for marketing.

The development of drug control inspection can best be told by those who were experts and specialists in that field, but I might make a few generalizations. The Elixir Sulfonanilamide and the Thalidomide disasters were new drug problems not drug control breakdowns. However, there have been several lesser disasters which received far less publicity that were due to drug control failures. There was the ingredient mix up, where a barbiturate was accidentally weighed into a mix instead of another visually similar ingredient. Apparently, the two containers were

side by side in the mixing line and an employee chose the wrong one. Then there was the external-injectable ampule mix up. The active ingredient was the same in the ampule for external use as it was in the ampule for injection. However, the external use product was about 100 times as potent. The composition of each ampule was correct, the labels were accurate; but the labels were similar in appearance except for the potency declaration. In about a dozen known cases, the attendant administering an injection selected the external product by accident with fatal results. These tragedies are preventable by proper factory drug controls covering every step of the process from arrival and identification of raw materials to the labeling and packaging of the finished product.

Food and Drug has pressured the industry when necessary through rigid inspections by tough inspectors. Some of the drug control inspectors have enjoyed the worst reputations in all the regulated industries. On the other hand, Food and Drug has carried out extensive nationwide drug control training for the industry and individual inspectors also do their own brand of education. A manager of a drug factory once told me he would have had to pay a consultant $5,000 for the advice and information he was given by an inspector during the factory inspection.

Consumer complaints can be interesting and useful or worthless. In the present wave of consumerism I suspect the district offices are inundated. Favorite complaints are about foreign objects such as cigarette butts, buttons, gum wads and so forth in beverage bottles. It's a vote for the non-returnable bottle. Practically all of this debris is inserted by the consumer of the beverage. But the bottler doesn't have to leave it there. Once it was a mouse in a bottle of beer. It was easily disposed of, but the half of a rat in the can of tomatoes was different -- where was the other half? Hundreds of cans were opened at the factory and eventually enough fragments were found to equal a whole rat, but it was better resolved by destruction of the whole day's pack.

A doctor from the University of California at Los Angeles School of Medicine, whom I knew through association in the greater Los Angeles nutrition council, one day called me by phone to report a serious problem. He had just returned from a Las Vegas hospital where several new born infants had become blue babies. The identified cause was an antiseptic type product used when diapers were laundered to reduce irritation. This was before disposables. He hoped FDA could do something about it. An inspector immediately went to Las Vegas for the necessary background information as to source and distribution and so forth.

The product was promptly withdrawn. This complaint and follow-up illustrates certain points. It possibly saved lives, the doctor knew where to refer his complaint. As it turned out the product was not subject to the FDC law, but there are times when responsibility must be accepted even there is no authority.

In another case a gentleman phoned and explained that he was using a quinidine preparation on doctor's orders. Recent purchases of the drug tasted like niacin. He was familiar with niacin which he had also used and recognized both the flavor and the other niacin reactions. Follow-up confirmed the presence of niacin and the content quinidine was far below the labeled content. Preliminaries to prosecution were begun. During the investigation it was learned that the California State Bureau of Food and Drug Inspectors was also investigating the manufacturer. At that time shortages of quinine and quinine products had caused a huge increase in prices. The State Bureau suspected that the plant management was substituting niacin or something for quinidine and was disposing of the quinidine on the black market for a healthy profit. The Bureau asked Food and Drug to refrain from prosecution and to leave the case to the State while the State proceeded with its case. It eventually ended that way. This was the result of another very useful consumer complaint.

At Los Angeles district every complaint whether of consumer or trade origin was treated with courtesy. It was good public relations, even if the complaint was frivolous. It was not possible to handle all complaints, but those that were health oriented were followed-up promptly. If a consumer complaint proves to be useful it is also good PR to communicate with the originator by phone or otherwise and to inform her or him of the follow-up and the results.

My experience with state and local cooperation was limited very much to the western states. Most had some type of a food and drug statute, but with very little staff. Sanitation problems were usually handled by a county health department. Some of the state officers were political appointees who changed with the elections. Nevertheless, most of the state men were capable and conscientious. Some assigned their inspection duties and their field work to subordinates who also did a reasonable job considering the handicaps they worked under. The big problem was lack of money. California was the major exception. The Sate Bureau of Food and Drug Inspections was well staffed and equipped. The Chief for many years was Milton Duffy, a dynamic and aggressive official well known and respected by Food and Drug people nationwide. In his own state his word was law. The State Food and Drug Law was essentially the same as the federal law except for differences in

handling of court procedures. California also automatically adopted FDA's tolerances on pesticides. Cooperation was very good and in later years with computer printouts for planning, quarterly joint planning sessions were held to distribute the workload and avoid duplicate inspections by federal and state inspectors at different times. This is similar to cooperative planning practice in other districts. In addition to the State Food and Drug Bureau, California also has a very active pesticide program. While at Los Angeles I enjoyed almost daily phone conversations with the local pesticide branch to exchange information and discuss pending problems. Relations were helped by the fact that I knew and had worked with some of the top men in the State Pesticide Branch when they, like myself, were young inspectors learning their way around in the field. Following my assignment as Chief Inspector of DFO my first plan was to become acquainted with Food and Drug inspectors and their operations in the former central and eastern districts. It took a while to get around but I did not observe any significant differences between those districts and the western district in the way inspection work was done. What was different was the industry ratios. The eastern and central states had huge drug and chemical related firms. Drug manufacture in the west was very limited although it has

grown since then. On the other hand, the West had enormoud food production with attendant industries. The San Joaquin Valley in California alone produces more agricultural wealth than any state in the nation except California and Iowa. Dairy and milling production is greatest in the Midwest although there is substantial production in the West. Inspection expertise and techniques seem to be developed best where there is exposure to the largest volume and variety of the industry.

I have my own personal FDA hall of fame complete with pictures. It automatically includes all commissioners from Walter G. Campbell to Dr. Ley. Also, John Harvey, Dr. Howard, Arnold Lehman, Elmer Nelson and Wendell Vincent. I knew all of these personally, some more than others. Mr. Campbell least of all. Acquaintance with Commissioner Campbell was limited to an introduction at a Washington conference and hearing him speak a couple of times. By reputation, he was a forceful leader, something like a Moses who brought the FDA out of the wilderness and established it as a growing concern. He was a no nonsense man, one to be respected but not loved. Among my acquaintances who knew him well, I never heard one critical or uncomplimentary remark about Walter G. Campbell. Dr. Paul Dunbar succeeded Campbell as Commissioner. He was more of an introvert than his predecessor and sometimes appeared to be a little less sure of himself. He seemed perhaps to be considerate of difficult problems. However, he was

more a scientist and possibly wanted more data before making final conclusions. He was serious minded with little levity but easy to talk with. I felt more at ease one on one with Dr. Dunbar than I would have with Mr. Campbell. He was a successful Commissioner.

Next in line, Charles Crawford, another dominant individual when he lead business. But, otherwise perhaps a warmer personality than either Campbell or Dunbar. I was not in the echelon which discussed FDA problems with him. But, I did sit in a time or two on lesser crises. He would sometimes lean back in his chair, smoke his cigarette, appear to look into space and listen with little participation in the discussion. When he had heard enough, he would make his decision known with minimum explanation, and that was that. I have heard him referred to as a "little Napoleon" and "cold as ice". The story is that Mr. Crawford had a strange blood disorder that did not respond to treatment. Dr. Welsh, an eminent microbiologist and FDA's antibiotic director, prepared treatments for him with cultures from his own blood. After retirement, Mr. Crawford built his own house in the Marin County Hills overlooking San Francisco Bay. He did not live long to enjoy it. At the time of his retirement, the "ice cold little Napoleon" wrote me a warm and personal farewell letter. I hold his memory with affection.

George Larrick followed Mr. Crawford. I had known George since my resident days in Salt Lake City when as

Chief Inspector of FDA he spent two days with me. He was an energetic, outgoing person, easy to meet and easy to talk with. During his regime as Commissioner, FDA grew up in stature with larger staffs, better facilities in the field districts, more responsibilities and bigger appropriations. To accomplish all of this he must have had persuasive powers with the Committe on the Hill. He was also an eminently successful Commissioner. Upon Mr. Larrick's retirement, the chain of succession from within the ranks of FDA was broken.

Dr. James Goddard from the Communicable Disease Center of Atlanta became Commissioner. FDA got a shake-up. If FDA had stagnated from too much within the ranks promotion, it was different now. He shifted programming and planning to almost 100% attention to health hazards with salmonella contamination as the first priority. There was much dissatisfaction in the field among those who thought all of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act should be enforced, not just the few sections however important they were. Elements of the trade and of the medical profession were disturbed by his actions, but Dr. Jim wasn't one to be concerned. He let it be known that top level field personnel should be moved about for better performance, a bit concerning to some of us oldtimers who had sat comfortably for as much as 15 to 20 years. While there was no mass transfer action, four directors eventually

were reassigned to other duties or retired under Dr. Goddard. There probably would have been less concern in the field if Dr. Goddard's staff had been better selected. They were personally accepted, but had so little background or knowledge of the FDA that their ideas just didn't sell.

P. - A few of them weren't all that personally accepted either. You're giving some of them the benefit of the doubt there.

W. - Yes, I know. It was all right to teach planning techniques and the concept of systems analysis, but when you tell inspectors to stop sampling for pesticide residue because it's not a health hazard, or if you walk in rodent pellets on a food factory floor, no sample should be collected because there is no real health hazard, the inspectors won't buy it. These comments were not made in my presence, but were reported by inspectors to whom they were addressed. I told them that we would follow directives already received and would not plan sanitation inspections, but if during another inspection, perhaps health oriented, insanitary conditions not health related were observed, we would proceed as usual; and we would continue our pesticide residue programs. If it ever came to pass, I would much rather explain to a Congressional Committee why I took that action than try to explain why I didn't. Our investigations and samples of these categories were treated the same as usual at the Washington level. One of Dr. Goddard's consumer specialists gals visited Los

Angeles and in conversation she was extremely critical about Food and Drug, almost to the caustic point. We got into an argument. She insisted she did not have to be loyal to the Food and Drug Administration. I told her that anyone with an attitude like that had no business in the Food and Drug Administration and she should get out. It didn't do much good. Dr. Ley succeeded Dr. Goddard.

He was less dramatic and seemed less certain of his actions and decisions.

I retired soon after he became Commissioner and did not have a very long association with him.

The six Commissioners who served during my years were very different in their personalities and abilities. However, I would have complete confidence in the integrity of every one of them.

Next on my Hall of Fame list is John L. Harvey. I knew him from the first day I entered the FDA. He was an assistant to Wendell Vincent. He was a brilliant man and an able speaker, probably the best extemporaneous speaker I ever knew. If he had a fault with his speeches it was sometimes he talked a little too long. He was an able administrator and as Deputy Commissioner virtually ran FDA during period when Commissioner Larrick was very ill. I have always regretted that John L. Harvey never became Commissioner himself.

Dr. Elmer Nelson, Director of the Division of Nutrition, is included in my Hall of Fame because he was a nutritionist with a world wide reputation because of his researches in vitamins, and he was the first eminent scientist in the Food and Drug Administration.

Dr. Arnold Lehman, Division of Pharmacology, is also included because of his status as a pharmacologist. If the top five pharmacologists in the world were selected, he would have to be one of them. Another pleasing trait when speeches were made at directors' conferences in Washington, Dr. Lehman could say more in less time than anyone else on the program. He was also number 1 contributor to my doodle collection returning them from participants at pharmacology conferences in many parts of the world.

Dr. Burton Howard, Director of Division of Microbiology, was a beloved person, well known for the Howard Mold Count, but fame is fleeting. Some analysts even in FDA today use the Howard Mold Count, but do not know the man who developed it. I had the privilege of working with him in the field, in tomato canneries, dried fruit investigations. If I had to name the person who probably did the most to keep the American food supply clean and wholesome, I would have to choose Dr. Howard. He was a pioneer in industry education to help them keep their

products clean. He did extensive research on the source and extent of insect infestation, decomposition and mold in foods so that reasonable tolerances could be established. He wanted food to be as clean as possible, but realized that crops grown in the fields and orchards could not escape some contaminants. His research on mold in tomato products leading to the Howard Mold Count has been fully written up. Burton J. Howard was affectionately known as Dr. Howard. It is a saddening thought that some university did not recognize the ingenuity and value of his work and award him a doctorate while he was alive to appreciate it. He earned it.

Wendell Vincent, Chief of the former western district and later district director at Denver, was in my book the most effective district director FDA ever had. He was not satisfied with piece meal correction. His targets were industry wide. Following a rash of seizures of canned salmon in Alaska, he engineered with the industry an industry wide self-inspection plan including examination of every batch code with complete reports to FDA of every violative lot. The program was monitored by Seattle and has been highly successful with less grief for the industry, less work for FDA, and more wholesome fish for the consumers.

In the mid '30's, about 1934, heavy corn ear worm infestation developed in Utah tomatoes. Many canneries

used poor sorting on their products, and lots of worms were ground up with the tomatoes. Some operators were more or less indifferent, confident that FDA couldn't find the worms in the finished product. Kenny Monfore as an inspector saw what was going on. As an analyst, he devised a crude sort of dilution and overflow technique to separate worm fragments from the tomatoe pulp and then to confirm the worm fragments under a microscope. Seizures were recommended by Denver station and referred to the western district and then to the administration. Washington was very reluctant to take action. There was no background to evaluate and correlate the extent of the adulteration. Wendell Vincent went to bat and managed to push through seizures on the strength of strong factory inspection evidence. As a result, the micro-analytical division under Dr. Howard developed rapid and better flotation methods to separate and identify worm fragments. This was before the 1938 law included insanitary factory conditions in the definitions of adulteration. The new technique was successfully adapted to many other foods such as cereals confections and so forth.

Later, after the 1938 law lead to massive clean-ups in flour mills, Wendell Vincent was convinced that insect fragments and rodent hairs in flour originated from wheat. His persistence in this lead to sanitation programs and

clean-up of elevators and other storage facilities, all redounding to the greater good of the consumer. Eventually the administration started a clean-up of the dairy industry, the center of which was the midwestern dairy land. Wendell Vincent got into the act in Denver territory. He shortly had many dairy plants making sediment tests on every can of milk received and rejecting the dirty ones while the central district was still talking about it. Wendell Vincent, in later '20's, cooperated with the State of California agencies in pioneering a clean-up in the dried fruit industry which was almost a California monopoly. There was special emphasis on figs because of the extensive important orchard improvements that were needed. Prior to the program figs were being sold 25% for human consumption and 75% for stock consumption with a huge price differential. After the clean-up which extended over a few years, the figures were reversed. 75% going for human consumption and 25% for stock. I was told later by an owner of a fig processing plant that it was very rough at the time, but it was the salvation of the fig industry.

Districts in general did not sample products that originated in another district except upon request. However, Mr. Vincent started a frozen fish examination for decomposition of the frozen fish originating on the East Coast. So many seizures resulted that it forced a clean-up in the

fish industry. Wendell eventually retired under pressure but with honor. My associates in Washington, knowing my regard for him, never told me the reason. I had one conversation with Wendell before his death. I told him his name would be remembered as long as I was in the Food and Drug Administration. His weaknesses were human, his virtues as a district director were superhuman.

P. - Gordon, I feel the same way about him.

W. - Good.

The Food and Drug Administration had its share of personalities stretching from genius to the crackpot fringe. A Dr. Lewis Chernoff, Ph.D. from Yale, in my opinion, was the most brilliant person ever in the Food and Drug Administration. He finished his career as Chief Chemist at Denver. He was also a talented violinist in the Denver Symphony. Years ago, the Colorado law did not require a degree from a medical school for licensing as an M.D. All that was necessary was to pass the state examination. Dr. Chernoff got in an argument with a friend that he could pass the examination. A wager was made. He took the examination, and he passed it. He applied for and received his license to practice medicine. He never did, but probably he would have been a better M.D. than many who graduated from a medical school. The Colorado State Medical authorities probably were unhappy because the state law was promptly amended requiring an M.D. applicant to have a degree from a medical school.

What about FDA after an eight year absence? I remember the Two Million Dollar appropriations and the RIF's and am awed by the present Two hundred and Fifty Million Dollar figure and seven thousand personnel, all for the better maybe; but with all the new problems and hazards, but it also savors of bureaucracy and empire building. I don't see many Food and Druggers any more or listen to complaints, but one can sense a different attitude. Morale is lower than it used to be. In the past ambitious employees could at least see the daylight ahead. Today most of the 7,000 are in the Washington set up. How can a field employee elbow his way into that crowd? HEW has long pushed its regional set up to include all of its bureaus and branches. FDA was finally carved up to fit into HEW's pattern of political boundaries instead of trade and economic areas important to FDA. The worst thing that ever happened to FDA was when it got into the clutches of the U. S. Public Health Service. The regional FDA director at San Francisco, and no doubt the others, now has 5 echelons above him. The short terms and quick turnovers of Commissioners since George Larrick reflect uncertainty and lack of leadership. Many outsiders from business and industry have been brought into key assignments. Some of these newcomers have no intention of remaining in FDA and little interest in it. They just want the experience for their own benefit. These practices further

dilute possibilities for career development within FDA. Today's ambitious Food and Druggers may settle for a job but the dice are loaded against a career.

P. -Well, thank you Gordon.

W. - That's it.

P. -Well, I think you gave us a lot of information there, and we'll get this typed up and get it back to you for proofreading and give you a chance to make any changes you might want to make.

W. -I don't know if you are interested any further, but I didn't mention anything about the civil defense program that was put on some years back and I could talk about a couple of characters a little bit like Walt Green.

P. -I never knew Walt Green. I met him once.

W. - I liked that guy. He was something else. And, there was .....

G. -Thank you very much Gordon. This completes the tape of the interview.